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Firm Productivity and Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Firm-Level Data 
 
Abstract: 
  Using an original and unique linked firm-level panel data from Chinese 
manufacturing firms over the period 2002 ~ 2009, this paper investigates the 
nexus between firm productivity and outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). 
More specifically, the study focuses on three important issues as follows: First, 
we examine whether high productivity Chinese firms have high tendencies to 
undertake first OFDI, that is, self-selection effect; Second, we examine whether 
Chinese parent firms enhance their firm productivity via OFDI, that is 
own-firm effect; Third, we test whether Chinese firms with OFDI behaviors 
have effect on other domestic firms in terms of firm productivity, that is 
spillover effect. 
  For the first issue, we explore self-selection effect based on firms’ first OFDI 
decisions to avoid the reverse causality from OFDI to firm productivity. To deal 
with the possible “sample selection bias” from non-random sample, we conduct 
propensity score matching (PSM) technique. Furthermore, we also investigate 
whether self-selection effect varies with firm heterogeneity. In particular, we 
examine whether the government financial support is one important reason 
why some of Chinese firms without productivity advantage still could 
undertake OFDI. 
  Results show strong evidence that there exists the causality from firm 
productivity to first OFDI decisions, even with the consideration of the reverse 
causality from OFDI to productivity. Meanwhile, when we employ PSM 
technique to deal with the possible “sample selection bias” due to non-random 
samples from first OFDI group and non-OFDI group, the results are still in line 
with self-selection effect. Furthermore, the evidence on self-selection effect is 
robust with different firm productivity measures and sample periods as well. 
Our results indicate that the theory on self-selection effect is still applied to 
Chinese manufacturing firms. 
  Moreover, we further investigate whether the self-selection behavior in terms 
of productivity is affected by some specific factors from competitiveness, firm 
strategy, region, and host country. We find the self-selection behavior in 
low-HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman index) and non-SOEs (state-owned 
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enterprises) groups, while no evidence on productivity advantage exists in 
high-HHI and SOEs groups. The reason for OFDI from weak competitive firms 
is explained as the support from government, which is partly confirmed by our 
Chinese firm-level dataset. The self-selection effect is also captured in firms 
located in east region, with the strategies on information and trade & sales, and 
investing in MEDCs (more economically developed countries). In contrast, no 
significant productivity advantage for firms from mid & west region, with the 
strategies on production, as well as investing in developing countries. The 
findings reveal the substantial heterogeneity in self-selection effect on OFDI in 
fact, which could be a complement on the theory on self-selection effect. 
  For the second issue, we investigate own-firm effect based on firms with 
first OFDI behaviors by using the combined approach of PSM technique and 
differences-in-differences (DID) analysis. 
  First, to correct this potential “sample selection bias”, we employ the PSM 
technique to eliminate the systematical differences between first OFDI firms 
and non-OFDI firms by selecting a control group (non-OFDI firms) for the 
treatment group (first OFDI firms), and then we can regard the firm 
productivity between two groups as a random pick. In the next step, we use the 
new sample with two groups to conduct DID analysis, which is an insightful 
approach to identify various productivity effects as a result of different reasons. 
  Our analysis yields four main conclusions. First, overall, Chinese 
manufacturing firms exactly raise their own productivity through OFDI, and 
this evidence is robust with different time period; Second, results also indicate 
the substantial heterogeneity on own-firm effect. In particular, the absorptive 
capacity is critical when parent firms increase productivity via OFDI, and the 
absorptive capacity related with product innovation is more important than that 
of process innovation for own-firm effect; Third, the strategies for technology 
acquiring have significant promoting effects on increasing firm productivity; 
Fourth, the privately ownership is a push factor on own-firm effect, while for 
government support (subsidy), no evidence indicates it contribute to accelerate 
the process of the productivity-enhancing via OFDI. 
  For the third issue, we examine productivity spillover effect from both 
inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) and OFDI to Chinese domestic firms 
through its mechanism but not take it as “a black box” and employ the 
modified spillover variables adjusted by sector-level technology. The 
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specification including both IFDI and OFDI also enables us to compare the 
different productivity effects between IFDI and OFDI. We also employ some 
specifications to control for self-selection effect and own-firm effect from both 
IFDI and OFDI, respectively. 
  Overall, the estimation results produce findings that support positive 
self-selection effect from both IFDI and OFDI, as well as positive own-firm 
effect from OFDI. For foreign invested firms in China, there exists negative 
own-firm effect after the introduction of foreign investment. The results don’t 
indicate there exists much spillover effect for both IFDI and OFDI, as a whole. 
However, after taking consideration of some obstacles in spillover mechanism 
such as differentials of wage, equity holding level, competiveness, technology 
level, linkage to domestic market and government subsidy, we find strong and 
robust evidence that the magnitude of both IFDI and OFDI spillovers become 
stronger as the extent of those obstructive factors decrease. These findings 
suggest that the magnitude of spillovers depends on the extent of obstacles in 
spillover mechanism, which might be a crucial reason for mixed results on FDI 
spillovers in previous studies. In short, both IFDI and OFDI spillovers vary 
across firms as a result of substantial heterogeneity. 
 
Keywords: Foreign direct investment; Multinational enterprise; Productivity; 
Firm heterogeneity; Manufacturing; China 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
1.1.  Study background 
  As one of the most important areas of the study on international economics, 
more and more attention has been paid on the nexus between firm productivity 
and outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in recent years. 
  China as the largest OFDI developing country, has maintained a rapid 
growth on amount of OFDI flows from US$ 2.7 billion to US$ 87.8 billion 
over the period 2002 ~ 20121. It shows that China has already become an 
important force of OFDI in the world. Meanwhile, with the extension of the 
impact of Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) upon global economy, a 
number of Chinese MNEs are growing and expanding sharply. In 2014, 91 
Chinese mainland enterprises are listed in the “Global 500” of “Fortune”2. 
These enterprises are the major players of Chinese OFDI. 
  Therefore, it is no doubt that the study on the relationship between firm 
productivity and OFDI based on Chinese firm-level data is of profound realistic 
meaning and important theoretical value 
  However, due to the exiguity of ready-made Chinese firm-level database on 
OFDI information, studies in this field are rare. We employ an original and 
unique manually collected dataset on firm-level OFDI information, which 
allows us to investigate the nexus between OFDI and productivity at firm-level, 
thoroughly.  
 
1.2.  Study goals 
  In the study, we focus on three important issues on the nexus between OFDI 
and firm productivity for Chinese firms. 
  First, we discuss whether firms with higher productivity have stronger 
tendency to undertake OFDI. 
  Then, we further analyze whether Chinese parent firms enhance their firm 
                                                        
1  Source from “2003 ~ 2013 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment” published by 
Chinese authorities.  
2  Source from (http://www. fortunechina.com) 
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productivity through OFDI as the second issue. 
  At last, we investigate whether Chinese firms with OFDI behaviors have 
effect on other domestic firms in terms of firm productivity. 
   
1.3.  Highlights 
  It is worth noting that there exist three highlights of the study, as a whole. 
  First, in the study content, this is the first study, which thoroughly examines 
the nexus between OFDI and firm productivity for Chinese firms. In particular, 
we examine some Chinese specific characteristics such as the government 
support and the strategic assets seeking motivation empirically in this study. To 
the best knowledge, although masses of studies assert that these specific 
characteristics are crucial for Chinese firms’ OFDI, little studies discuss this 
issue based on formal empirical tests.   
  Second, from the view of dataset, this study employs an original and unique 
manually collected dataset on firm-level OFDI information with more accurate 
and strict link strategy. To the best knowledge, the number of Chinese OFDI 
firms has significantly increased in our merged dataset compared with the 
former studies based on this type of dataset, which could improve the quality of 
empirical analysis on Chinese firms’ OFDI, as much as possible. 
  Third, from the prospective of study approach, we employ some more 
reliable econometric techniques such as propensity score matching (PSM) and 
differences-in-differences (DID) in the study. These econometric techniques 
could reduce the possible econometric bias due to the endogenous issue 
effectively, as a result of imposing stricter controls in analysis process. 
 
  1.4.  Thesis structure 
  Full thesis is divided into seven chapters, which in turn for Chapter 1, 
Introduction; Chapter 2, Literature review; Chapter 3, Data; Chapter 4, First 
OFDI decisions and firm productivity; Chapter 5, Does OFDI really enhance 
firm productivity?; Chapter 6, Spillover effects from both IFDI and OFDI; 
Chapter 7, Concluding remarks. 
  Chapter 1 introduces the study background, goals, highlights, structure, and 
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research framework.  
  Chapter 2, mainly adopting literature research method, firstly, defines the 
main concepts involved in the study, then, analyzes literature on self-selection 
effect, own-firm effect, spillover effect, and specific characteristics on Chinese 
OFDI, to obtain the issues on which we can conduct further studies, as well as 
introduces firm-level productivity measures used in the study. 
  Chapter 3, introduces the unique and original dataset used in the study, 
including description of the dataset, data procession, link strategy, and conducts 
some descriptive analyses based on this merged dataset. 
  Chapter 4, as one of focus issues in this study, mainly studies the impact of 
firm productivity on first OFDI decisions, that is, self-selection effect, 
empirically, including the regression analysis based on qualitative response 
model and count regression, the robustness test by using PSM techniques for 
controlling “sample selection bias”, and the analysis on heterogeneity of 
self-selection effect. 
  Chapter 5, concentrating on the second issue on own-firm effect, investigates 
whether OFDI really increases firm productivity based on PSM-DID approach, 
and then tests the impacts of some factors such as absorptive capacity, OFDI 
strategy, ownership, and government support on own-firm effect. 
  Chapter 6 examines the third issue on spillover effect from both IFDI and 
OFDI in basic analysis, and conduct further analysis on the impacts of some 
factors from the prospective of spillover mechanism, which includes wage gap, 
equity holding level, firm competing, technology gap, linkage to domestic 
market, and government subsidy. 
  Chapter 7 puts forward the final conclusions of the study, and according to 
the conclusions proposes policy implications, in addition, at the end part, 
summarizes the deficiency and future prospects of the study. 
 
  1.5.  Study framework 
  The study framework are organized as follows: 
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Fig. 1-1: Study framework 
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Chapter 2.  Literature review 
 
2.1.  Concept definition 
  Before the formal study, we need to define the relevant concepts in our study 
as follows: 
  Outward foreign direct investment firm (OFDI firms) refers to the Chinese 
parent firms that undertake foreign direct investment in overseas. 
  Inward foreign direct investment firm (IFDI firms) refers to the 
foreign-owned enterprises located in China. 
  Self-selection effect is the effect that more productive firms are more likely 
to undertake OFDI3. 
  Own-firm effect is the effect that parent firms enhance productivity through 
OFDI4. 
  Spillover effect refers to the effect that the presence of OFDI or IFDI firms 
affects the productivity of other Chinese domestic firms. 
  The spillover effect can be further divided into intra-industry spillovers and 
inter-industry spillovers5. 
  We define intra-industry spillovers are productivity spillover effects occur in 
the same industry (among competitors), while inter-industry spillovers are 
productivity spillovers effects occur across industries (through backward and 
forward linkage).  
 
2.2.  Study fields 
In this study, we focus on self-selection effect, own-firm effect and 
intra-industry spillover effect in our study. Fig. 2-1 shows the core issues on the 
                                                        
3 Similarly, from the view of IFDI, self-selection effect could also be defined that the more productive domestic 
firms are more likely to be invested by foreign investors. In this study, we mainly focus on OFDI self-selection 
effect, therefore, the related analyses are included in Chapter 4, 5, and 6. Moreover, Chapter 6 also involves the 
analysis on IFDI self-selection effect. 
4 Similarly, from the view of IFDI, own-firm effect could also be defined as the productivity-enhancing effect of 
domestic firms after being invested by foreign investors. In this study, we mainly concentrate on OFDI own-firm 
effect, therefore, the related analyses are included in both Chapter 5 and 6. Moreover, Chapter 6 also involves the 
analysis on IFDI own-firm effect. 
5 Intra-industry and inter-industry spillover effect are also be called as horizontal and vertical spillover effect, 
respectively (see Vahter and Masso, 2006; Abraham et al., 2010; Du et al., 2011). 
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study. 
 
Fig. 2-1: Study fields 
 
Notes: Fig. 2-1 is created based on the study contents. Spillovers refer to 
intra-industry spillovers. 
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2.3.  Self-selection effect 
2.3.1.  Theoretical background and empirical evidence 
  Since Helpman et al. (2004) (hereinafter HMY) put forward the general 
equilibrium model on heterogeneous firm, export and FDI, the theory of 
productivity heterogeneity has quickly become the workhorse framework for 
firm-level OFDI studies. According to their theory, firms incur sunk costs to 
enter a foreign market. Only relatively more productive firms have the abilities 
to serve foreign markets. Among them, the most productive ones can serve 
foreign markets with their own affiliates, i.e., OFDI. The reason behind is only 
firms with high productivity can afford huge amount of spending, which are the 
sunk costs during the first stage of OFDI process. On the contrary, less 
productive firms tend to avoid these costs by concentrating exclusively on the 
domestic market. This causal links from productivity to OFDI are also known 
as self-selection effect (Vahter and Masso, 2006).  
  In response to the theoretical model, a rapidly expanding strand of empirical 
studies has revealed the extensive heterogeneity across plants in OFDI. 
  Using a cross-section firm-level dataset for Ireland with firms at least 10 
employees in year 2000, Girma et al. (2004) compare the labor productivity 
profitability differences across OFDI firms and other non-OFDI types based on 
a non-parametric test for first-order stochastic dominance by using 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test. 
  Damijan et al. (2007) employ a dataset over 1994 ~ 2002 for Slovenian 
manufacturing to test self-selection effect in terms of labor productivity by 
using Probit model and Count model.   
  With regard to Japan, Head and Ries (2003) firstly adopt a Japanese 
firm-level data for 1977 ~ 1989 with 1070 publicly listed Japanese 
manufacturing firms (large firm) to calculate total factor productivity, and 
compare the productivity of OFDI firm and other types in 1989 by using OLS 
estimations. Similarly, Tomiura (2007) conducts the comparisons according to 
a cross section dataset in 1998 by controlling for other firm characteristics, but 
the firm-level dataset covering all Japanese manufacturing firms without any 
firm-size threshold. Furthermore, Todo (2011) employs a mixed Logit model to 
incorporate unobserved firm heterogeneity to correct for possible biases from 
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correlation to investigate self-selection effect in terms of TFP. The study is 
based on a firm-level panel dataset from 1997 ~ 2005 with Japanese firms at 
least 50 employees and paid-up capital of 30 million yen or more.  
  To explore self-selection effect for German firms, Wagner (2006) uses the 
same non-parametric approach of K-S test as Girma et al. (2004) to compare 
the labor productivity based on an interviewed data with 531 German 
manufacturing establishments in 1995. Subsequently, Arnold and Hussinger 
(2010) further employ a firm-level dataset from Germany over 1996 ~ 2002 to 
examine the productivity advantage of OFDI firms by using K-S test and 
Quantile regressions, but the productivity measures is total factor productivity 
  Recently, based on a large firm-level panel dataset from 9 Central-Eastern 
Europe countries over 2004 ~ 2013, Damijan et al. (2014) employ the 
self-selection effect in terms of labor productivity by using a series of 
econometric approaches including OLS, Fixed-effect, Probit, and 
system-GMM estimations.   
  All these studies provide evidence that high productivity firms have high 
tendencies to undertake OFDI. 
 
2.3.2.  Extensions of the study 
  Nevertheless, causal links from productivity to OFDI in these studies are 
likely to be biased due to the reverse causality, that is, OFDI might make firms 
more productive through several channels. More specifically, firms can directly 
acquire technology, know-how, and other critical intangible assets through 
cross border merge and acquisition (cross border M&A) (e.g. Deng, 2009; 
Pietrobelli et al. 2011), or establish R&D centers in host countries with 
abundant technical sources to engage in innovation (e.g. Child and Rodrigues, 
2005; Zhang, 2010). When all of new knowledge is transferred to parent firms 
through the multinational internal network (Fosfuri and Motta, 1999), there 
may be a productivity-enhancing effect via OFDI. In addition, the 
resource-seeking OFDI focuses on securing raw material supplies (e.g. Child 
and Rodrigues, 2005; Amighini et al. 2013), the marketing-seeking OFDI 
concentrates on expanding overseas market share (e.g. Child and Rodrigues, 
2005; Burghart and Rossi, 2009), and some firms with financial constraints 
might acquire international low-cost funds through OFDI (e.g. Forssbæck and 
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Oxelheim, 2011). All these channels could lead to cost savings or economies of 
scales effect from input and output perspectives, and therefore improve firm 
productivity. This enhancing effect is the so-called own-firm effect by Vahter 
and Masso (2006). 
  In order to isolate the “pure” self-selection effect, we design our research in 
Chapter 4 by two techniques. First, we focus on a subset of samples, namely 
first OFDI firms. These firms don’t have OFDI records in their history, 
therefore when they are making decisions on OFDI, their productivities will 
not be affected by the OFDI. By doing so, we could eliminate the potential 
own-firm effect from self-selection effect. Second, which firms will undertake 
OFDI is not likely to be random selected. Firms with first OFDI behaviors 
might exhibit characteristics that systematically differ from non-OFDI firms. 
This means that traditional econometric regression for self-selection effect 
would yield biased results if non-randomness of firm productivity were not 
taken into account. This problem is the so-called “sample selection bias”. To 
solve this problem, we apply the PSM technique, which has been proved as an 
effective approach to treat “sample selection bias” (see Heyman et al., 2007; 
Lian et al., 2011; Cozza et al., 2014). To our best knowledge, Chapter 4 is the 
first study using PSM in OFDI behavior researches. Therefore, it can be the 
first contribution of Chapter 4. 
  Another issue worth noticing is that although a large plenty of studies focus 
on self-selection effect regarding OFDI, few of them have analyzed which 
specific factors could affect the self-selection behaviors. As Todo (2011) argues, 
sunk costs of OFDI substantially vary across firms depending on firm 
characteristics that should be noticed in future studies. Our dataset provides 
some specific information on firms with first OFDI behavior that makes this 
type of analysis possible. We add to the existing literature by analyzing the 
heterogeneity of self-selection effect. In particular, we conduct concrete 
analysis on the government financial support for OFDI beginners. This is the 
second contribution of the study in Chapter 4. 
  Hence, the main purpose of study in Chapter 4 is to investigate whether firm 
productivity play a key role in firm’s first OFDI decisions, after excluding the 
reverse causality from OFDI to firm productivity and controlling the “sample 
selection bias”. Another purpose is to study which factors could affect 
self-selection behavior in the context of Chinese manufacturing firms. 
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2.4.  Own-firm effect  
2.4.1.  Introduction 
  Does OFDI really enhance firm productivity? This issue is likely to be more 
important to present China. Since the “Going-out” strategy as the nation-level 
policy was published at the beginning of this century, the growth of overseas 
subsidiaries owned by Chinese firms has risen sharply in the past ten years or 
so6.  
  One of the critical reasons on launching this OFDI promotion strategy is that 
Chinese authorities have the belief that Sino-establishments can acquire 
upgrading technologies and advanced management via OFDI so as to improve 
their competiveness (Deng, 2009; Luo et al. 2010), which is similar to the 
benefits firms may obtain through IFDI7. 
  As Dunning (1994) as well as De La Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001) have 
argued, OFDI may be a more effective channel than IFDI to facilitate acquiring 
foreign technologies and management know-how. De La Potterie and 
Lichtenberg (2001) explain the reason that as the geographical proximity of 
plant location via OFDI, investor firms are more likely to involve “total 
immersion” in new circumstances with large quantities of foreign local 
establishments. Fosfuri and Motta (1999) employ another similar expression, 
that is, the “spatially bounded spillovers”, to state enterprises may obtain 
location-specific knowledge through OFDI as a result of the geographical 
proximity. 
  Considerable attention to date has been paid to the host country effect of 
IFDI in China, in both macro- (e.g. Cheung and Lin 2004; Huang et al., 2012; 
Ouyang and Fu, 2012) and firm-level (e.g. Lin et al., 2009; Xu and Sheng, 
2012; Du et al., 2012). Nevertheless, the issue on home effect of Chinese OFDI 
                                                        
6 The number of overseas affiliates operated by Chinese firms can be confirmed through “2003 ~ 2013 Statistical 
Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment” published by Chinese authorities. 
7 With the implementation of the reform and opening up policy in 1978, Chinese government has been devoting to 
attract IFDI in the last three decades or so, which is generally recognized as an important channel of acquiring 
foreign advanced technologies and operating experience. Relative to “Going-out” Strategy, this policy is so called 
“Bring-in” strategy. As a traditional economic open policy, this strategy is conducted all the time. Whereas, the 
cancellation of super-national treatments applied in foreign-owned firms located in China in recent years, could be 
a signal that Chinese government is increasingly inclined towards promoting “Going-out” strategy, but not 
“Bring-in”. 
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received rather less attention, especially for empirical studies based on 
firm-level data. For China, it is undoubtedly important to know whether 
Chinese firms can improve their performance via OFDI, no matter for the 
operation of Chinese firms, or for the implementation of “Going-out” policy. 
To clarify this issue, in Chapter 5, we focus on firm-level productivity and 
investigate whether there exists the productivity-enhancing effect (also named 
own-firm effect (Vahter and Masso, 2006)) of Chinese parent firms after they 
embarking on their first OFDI projects based on our original linked Chinese 
firm-level panel dataset. 
  In addition, although the issue that the special patterns of Chinese OFDI are 
obviously different from traditional OFDI from developed countries, has 
attracted much comment recently (see Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Ramamurti, 
2012), such as the strategic assets seeking motivation (Deng, 2004, 2009), the 
firm disadvantage (e.g. Nolan, 2001; Deng, 2009; Luo et al., 2010), the 
government financial support (e.g. Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Buckley et al., 
2007; Luo et al., 2010), as well as the catch up strategies (e.g. Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005), few of these factors have been considered in empirical 
studies on the effect of firm productivity-enhancing via OFDI. Therefore, we 
also intend to fill this gap through examining the impacts of some Chinese 
special features on own-firm effect. 
 
2.4.2.  Channels of own-firm effect 
  At the beginning of our study on own-firm effect, we should confirm that 
through what channels parent firms can enhance their productivity via OFDI. 
According to previous studies, there mainly exist two types of channels where 
firms can raise their productivity through undertaking OFDI. One is related 
with firm activities on technology and knowledge in overseas, whereas the 
other has no concern with technology.  
  In the former channel, mainly three approaches can be employed, that is, 
firstly, firms can directly acquire proprietary technology, know-how, and other 
critical intangible assets such as international brands as well as reputation 
through cross border M&A, which is the main motivation of strategic 
assets-seeking OFDI (e.g. Deng, 2009; Pietrobelli et al., 2011); secondly, firms 
directly establish plants or R&D centers in host countries with abundant 
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technical sources and high quality of human capital so as to engage in 
innovation and learn from surroundings (e.g. Child and Rodrigues, 2005; 
Zhang, 2010); thirdly, firms may master more accurate knowledge on host 
countries’ market demands that would be used to develop new products as a 
result of the geographical proximity. When all of technologies and knowledge 
transfer to parent firms through the multinational internal network (Fosfuri and 
Motta, 1999), there may be a productivity-enhancing effect via overseas 
knowledge resources. 
  With regard to the later channel, resource-seeking OFDI focus on securing 
raw material supplies (e.g. Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Amighini et al., 2013), 
while the marketing-seeking OFDI concentrates on sales promotion in host 
countries when firms intent to expand overseas market share (e.g. Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005; Burghart and Rossi, 2009) or face trade barriers (e.g. Neven 
and Siotis, 1996), some study (e.g. Forssbæck and Oxelheim, 2011) also 
discuss firms with financial constraints have incentive to invest abroad in order 
to acquire international low-cost funds, all these routes yield cost savings or 
economies of scales from input and output perspective, therefore, parent firms 
could improve their productivity via non-technical routes by engaging in OFDI 
as well. 
  Although the own-firm effect by means of OFDI may be a mixed result. 
Many studies (see Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2009) argue that the 
technology channel is more important for Chinese establishments as firms are 
likely to catch up with their foreign competitors through this channel as quickly 
as possible. 
 
2.4.3.  Theoretical background and empirical evidence 
  In theoretical theory, Fosfuri and Motta (1999) develop a model indicating 
that firms might undertake OFDI to capture local advantages through 
geographical proximity of plant location, therefore, laggard firms might 
employ OFDI to acquire knowledge as a result of spatially bounded spillovers. 
This implies firms without advantage may become stronger through this type of 
technology-sourcing OFDI.    
  In earlier empirical studies of this issue, Kogut and Chang (1991), Yamawaki 
(1994), as well as Neven and Siotis (1996) focus on technology-sourcing OFDI 
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between developed countries, they find evidence on the technology-sourcing 
motivation, but the feedback effect from foreign affiliates to their parent firms 
are not involved in these studies. 
  Consequently, In the second wave of empirical studies, the 
productivity-enhancing effect is taken into account, which including De La 
Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001) for Italy, Braconier et al. (2001) for Sweden, 
Pradhan and Singh (2009) for India, Driffield et al. (2009) for the United 
Kingdom, Driffield and Chiang (2009) for Taiwan, Herzer (2010) for 33 
developing countries, as well as Herzer (2012) for Germany. Overall, Most of 
these studies provide evidence on the productivity-enhancing effect or the 
technology spillover effect via OFDI except Braconier et al. (2001). De La 
Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001) as well as Herzer (2010) also stress large 
differences across countries. As these studies are based on industry-level data, 
which could not distinguish own-firm effect and spillover effect in fact, thereby, 
leading to the further analyses on firm behaviors. 
  Over roughly the same period, the studies based on the micro-level data 
began to appear, which can be divided into two directions, one direction such 
as Globerman et al. (2000) for Sweden, Popovici (2005) for the United State, 
and Branstetter (2006) for Japan, concentrate on knowledge transfer via OFDI 
by using patent citations data, all of these studies capture the knowledge 
transfer effect through technology sourcing OFDI; the other employ firm-level 
data and a variety econometric approaches to analyze the 
productivity-enhancing effect (e.g. Falzoni and Grasseni, 2005; Vahter and 
Masso, 2006) or technology spillover effect (e.g. Chen et al., 2012). Overall, 
Most of them confirm the own-firm effect via OFDI.   
  In recent years, a combined approach based on PSM technique and DID 
analysis is employed in the new stream of research on this issue. This mixed 
technique gives a good solution to the “sample selection bias”, and the specific 
applications are quite flexible. Therefore, many studies examine the firm 
performance change as a result of OFDI by using PSM-DID approach. For 
instance, Navaretti and Castellani (2004), as well as Imbriani et al. (2011) test 
the productivity-enhancing effect of Italian firms via OFDI, Chari et al. (2012) 
focus on the performance of target firms in the United States acquired by 
emerging market purchasers, Yang et al. (2013) and Huang et al. (2013) 
investigate own-firm effect of Taiwan’s firms in terms of technical efficiency 
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and productivity, respectively. Except the study of Chari et al. (2012) not 
involving firm productivity in their analyses, all of papers support the 
productivity-enhancing effect via OFDI. 
 
2.4.4.  Own-firm effect and Chinese firms 
  With regard to the own-firm effect in the context of Chinese firms, three 
empirical studies on the basis of firm-level data have made important 
contributions to literature recently. One paper by Chen and Tang (2014) 
(hereinafter CT) examines the impact of OFDI on firm performance based on 
three micro-level datasets including Chinese manufacturing firms financial data, 
OFDI projects data and international trade deals data from Chinese official 
statistics; while Cozza et al. (2014) (hereinafter CRS) conduct the similar 
analysis by focusing on the Chinese MNEs’ OFDI in 27 advanced European 
countries based on a linked data set from several commercial databases8; 
another study (Edamura et al., 2014) (hereinafter EHITT) concentrates on the 
impact of Chinese cross border M&A on firm performance. The conclusions of 
the three studies are basically the same, that is, the chief indicators of Chinese 
overseas investor firms on performance have been improved after these firms 
embarking on OFDI. 
  It is also worth noting that all of three papers investigate this issue by using 
the popular PSM-DID approach to deal with the possible issue of “sample 
selection bias” and to eliminate unobservable as well as time-invariant 
differences between OFDI firms and their counter parts. 
 
2.4.5.  Extensions of the study 
  In the study of Chapter 5, we also employ the PSM-DID approach to 
conduct our analyses on own-firm effect of Chinese firms via OFDI. Compared 
to the recent works by CT, CRS, and EHITT. Four crucial extensions are 
embedded in Chapter 5. 
  Firstly, although we use the same data source as CT, we notice that, as the 
                                                        
8  These data sets includes the Emerging Multinationals’ Events and networks DATAbase (EMENDATA), 
fDiMarkets from the Financial Times Group, and Zephyr as well as Orbis databases from Bureau van Dijk (BvD). 
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OFDI projects data set provided by Ministry of Commerce of China is not a 
specific database for study, there exist a large quantity differences on firm 
name and organization code for the same firm between Chinese Industrial 
Enterprise Database and OFDI projects dataset, in fact, which causes masses of 
OFDI firms can’t be identified through simple link approach9. In order to 
improve the identified rate on Chinese firms with OFDI behaviors, we devote a 
great deal of time and energy to check each firm in OFDI projects dataset 
manually one by one through the information acquired by their own official 
websites and other credible sources from internet. This work increase the 
identified observations and firms by 50.83% and 42.40% compared to the 
identification only by firm name in our dataset. Another improvement is that 
we identify the OFDI operating strategies on information gathering, trade & 
sales, production, as well as technology acquiring through the main business 
scope of each OFDI project. The strategy classification on OFDI projects 
provides new data resource for more complex analysis. Therefore, the strict 
link approach and the more information acquiring is the first contribution of the 
study in Chapter 5 to literature.10 
  Secondly, compared to CT, we focus on first OFDI behavior in one year 
(2005), which allow our analyses not to be disturbed by other own-firm effect. 
The sufficient linked firms in our data also provide a good chance for selecting 
matching partners based on only one year rather than obtaining counter parts in 
different periods as CRS. It is undoubtedly essential to increase the accuracy of 
the econometric results, and can be taken as the second contribution of our 
study in Chapter 5. 
  Thirdly, although firm productivity as an indicator on performance is also 
considered in CT and CRS, all of three papers chiefly focus on firm 
performance but not productivity. In Chapter 5, we concentrate on the 
productivity-enhancing effect by using various types of firm-level productivity 
measured by different approaches, and the productivity defined by the level, 
the growth, as well as the relative growth, respectively. This is the third 
contribution of Chapter 5 to literature. 
  Fourthly, unlike CT, CRS, and EHITT, to clarify which factors are critical 
                                                        
9 More details on dataset, data processing, as well as link strategy are introduced in Chapter 3. 
10 Another advantage on the linked data based on Chinese Industrial Enterprise Database and OFDI projects 
dataset is the large scale on firms and abundant information, which can be used to select a more appropriate 
counter part for each OFDI firm and to estimate firm-level productivity by using more accurate approach, which 
would not be achieved through the data employed by CRS and EHITT.  
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for and to what extent these factors can affect own-firm effect, we also examine 
a series of factors which may related to special characteristics on Chinese 
OFDI behaviors, including the absorptive capacity for technology and 
knowledge, the OFDI strategies, the firm ownership, and the government 
support. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical study has involved this 
issue till now. Therefore, we try to fill this gap by our original dataset, which 
construct our fourth contribution. 
   
2.5.  Spillover effect  
 2.5.1.  Empirical issue one: Little studies on firm productivity and OFDI 
  In addition to direct effects from foreign direct invest (FDI) to firms11, the 
indirect effect of FDI on productivity is receiving increasing attention as well. 
It is well recognized by now that the presence of IFDI can benefit local firms 
by spillover effects. However, compared to a large quantity of empirical studies 
on IFDI spillover effect (i.e. host country effect) based on firm-level data, 
OFDI spillover effect (i.e. home country effects) still have been researched to 
lesser extent. A few studies focus on this issue by industry-level data. The 
results, however, have been mixed. Some studies find positive effects between 
OFDI and the growth of industries in home country such as Pradhan and Singh 
(2009) for India, Driffield et al. (2009) for the United Kingdom, and Driffield 
and Chiang (2009) for Taiwan. In a study of OECD countries, Bitzer and 
Kerekes (2008) find no significant or negative effects. Other studies including 
Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001) and Herzer (2012) stress differences between 
countries on this issue.  
  Vahter and Masso (2006) employ firm-level panel data to study home 
country effects of Estonia. In their study, own-firm effect and spillover effect 
are distinguished explicitly. To the best knowledge, this paper is the only 
existing study using firm-level data on this issue. Their results show that there 
exist statistically significant and positive own-firm effect, but no evidence on 
spillover effect for Estonian firms. 
                                                        
11 The direct effect can be further divided into two types, that is, IFDI and OFDI own-firm effect. In our study, we 
only investigate the direct effect from OFDI to parent firm in Chapter 5, and two types of own-firm effects in 
Chapter 6. 
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  Since reform and opening up to the outside world in 1978, IFDI inflows into 
China have grown steadily and persistently. Chinese enterprises try to introduce 
overseas advanced technology and managerial expertise through “Bring-in” 
when obtaining foreign capital. During the past decade, under the background 
of China’s accession to WTO in 2001, the qualified Chinese enterprises have 
begun to invest in overseas. These firms actively utilize the foreign resources 
and market by “Going-out”. OFDI spillover effect has already become a 
valuable subject that should be pay attention to. However, empirical study on 
this issue by using firm-level data is still missing. 
 
 2.5.2.  Empirical issue two: Mixed study results on spillover effect 
  Another thorny problem is that the empirical results on spillovers are mixed 
regardless of studies both on IFDI and OFDI. For IFDI spillovers, several 
studies (e.g. Kokko, 1994; Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999) find that IFDI had a 
positive effect on domestic firms’ productivity, while several others (e.g. 
Haddad and Harrison, 1993) don’t find any statistically significant effect. Other 
studies (e.g. Aitken and Harrison, 1999) even find that IFDI actually exists the 
negative effect on domestic firms in terms of productivity. 
  Regarding this issue, a series of studies argue possible reasons for these 
mixed results. First, Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Haskel et al. (2002) show 
that a negative effect through an increase in market competition may lead to 
mixed results on spillovers; Second, Javorcik (2004), Kugler (2006) as well as 
Blalock and Gerter (2008) argue that spillovers occur only among industries, 
which implies spillovers may be vertical, but not horizontal; Third, Todo and 
Miyamoto (2006) and Todo (2006) stress that spillovers transfer through their 
R&D activities but not production activities; Fourth, results on spillovers also 
seems to vary across countries, especially between developed and developing 
countries (Lin et al., 2009). 
 
 2.5.3.  Spillover mechanism 
  According to spillover mechanism, we argue that the occurring of spillovers 
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need to meet several conditions. The first condition is FDI12 firm as spillover 
source should possess resources that may be overflowed. The second condition 
is several spillovers channels take effect without blockade. The third condition 
is local firms have adequate technology gap to FDI firms. Therefore, some 
obstructive factors acting on anyone of these three conditions may affect actual 
effect on spillovers. 
  More specifically, for spillover source firms, in general, firm with 
higher-level technology is more likely to be spillover source. In other words, 
whether there exist spillovers may be correlated with the technology level of 
spillover source firms themselves.  
  Regarding spillover channels13, according to Aitken and Harrison (1999), 
Görg and Strobl (2005), Vahter and Masso (2006) as well as Lin et al. (2009), 
intra-industrial spillovers can occur through following channels. The first 
channel is labor turnover effect. Workers employed and trained by FDI firms 
may join other domestic firms or create their own firms. The second channel is 
demonstration effect. Domestic firms may learn by simply observing and 
imitating FDI firms. This may be able to reduce their innovation costs. The 
third channel is competition effect, FDI firms may force domestic firms to 
restructure and improve their production techniques and management. 
  However, some obstacles might block spillovers through these three 
channels on domestic firms. For the first channel, FDI firms often pay higher 
wages (Fosfuri et al. 2001; Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004; Malchow-Møller, et al., 
2013), which may prevent trained worker from moving to a domestic 
competitor14; For the second channel, some measures used by FDI firms might 
prevent domestic firms from observing and imitating FDI firms. For instance, 
in general wholly-owned enterprises are more difficult to occur spillovers than 
joint-venture enterprises (Wang et al., 2004); For the third channel, the 
increased intensity of competition may hurt other domestic firms at least in the 
short run by reducing their market share and output. The productivity of local 
firms would fall if they have to spread their fixed costs over smaller sales 
volume. This is usually interpreted as crowding-out effect in product market 
(Aitken and Harrison, 1999). 
                                                        
12 Hereinafter, both IFDI and OFDI firms are collectively named as FDI firms. 
13 According to our definitions on FDI spillovers as mentioned in Section 2.1., the spillover channels on both IFDI 
and OFDI should be similar. 
14 Moreover, the entry of FDI firms might also raise labor costs of domestic firms due to higher wage paid by them, 
which usually interpreted as the crowding-out effect in labor market (Aitken et al., 1996). We don’t focus on this 
effect in Chapter 6. 
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  From the perspective of those firms that obtain FDI spillovers, Findlay 
(1978), Wang and Blomström (1992) and Keller and Yeaple (2009) stress that 
as the narrowing of technology gap between domestic and FDI firms, the 
technologies which can be imitated by domestic firms have been reduced, and 
become more complex, thereby leading to the increasing of imitation costs. 
Hence, technology gap can be taken as learning space to some extent. While 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990), Glass and Saggi (1998) as well as Hale and Long 
(2006) argue as the increasing of technology level of domestic firms, they can 
raise the capability to absorb more advanced technologies. Therefore, it is 
possible that spillover effect is affected by absorptive capacity and learning 
space, simultaneously.  
  Moreover, some specific factors in China might also affect FDI spillovers 
through spillover mechanism, which should be worth of investigating. 
 
2.5.4.  Extensions of the study 
  First, in Chapter 6, we examine the effects of both IFDI and OFDI on 
Chinese enterprises’ productivity, especially spillover effects based on 
firm-level data. Therefore, a primary purpose of the study in Chapter 6 is to fill 
this gap in the literature on Chinese OFDI spillovers. 
Second, different from previous studies, we explicitly discuss the reason on 
inconsistent results from the perspective of spillover mechanism, while 
previous literature treats it only as “a black box” through which spillover effect 
works. We argue that some obstacles in spillover mechanism that prevent 
domestic firms from benefiting spillovers, thereby leading to the positive 
spillovers can’t be captured. Therefore, in Chapter 6, we focus on some 
obstacles in spillover mechanism, and test these factors empirically. This is 
another purpose of our study in Chapter 6. 
 
2.6.  Specific characteristics and Chinese OFDI 
  It is worth reminding that, in recent years, the specific characteristics from 
Chinese OFDI and MNEs have been analyzed by a large quantity of papers. 
  Firstly, masses of studies assert the disadvantage of Chinese MNEs and the 
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government support from Chinese OFDI. 
  Child and Rodrigues (2005) begin to focus on the Chinese central and local 
government role in promoting OFDI in their study, which argue that the 
purpose is to promote export and ensure resource security. 
  Fornes and Butt-Philip (2009) further point out the government role in 
Chinese OFDI is to provide financial support and protection so as to help 
reduce the “late-coming disadvantage” of Chinese enterprises. 
  Buckley et al. (2008) argue that OFDI from Chinese State-owned firms 
process certain specific advantages oriented from government support. In 
particular, firms enable to acquire the financial support influenced and 
controlled by government to embark on OFDI, such as government subsidies 
and “soft loans”.  
  Similar views on firm disadvantage and government financial support are 
also asserted by many other studies such as Dunning and Lundan (2006), Tang 
et al (2008), as well as Wang and Huang (2010). 
  Luo et al. (2010) further elaborate the system of government structures and 
procedures associated with Chinese OFDI in details, and discuss the facilitating 
effect of existing government management system on promoting OFDI. 
  Secondly, numerous studies stress the strategic assets seeking motivation and 
the catch up strategy of Chinese OFDI. 
  According to the case study on Chinese OFDI in developed countries, Deng 
(2004, 2009) argues that Chinese MNEs can acquire the critical resources 
through undertaking OFDI in developed countries. 
  This view is in line with other studies based on cases from different 
countries. 
  Burghart and Rossi (2009) point out an important motivation of cross border 
M&A in the United Kingdom conducted by Chinese MNEs is the developing 
knowledge and innovation  
  For Italy, Rabellotti and Sanfilippo (2008), Pietrobelli et al. (2011) argue 
Chinese OFDI are increasingly targeting the advanced technology and other 
capabilities such as design skills and brands. 
  The case study of Zhang (2010) also indicates driven by motivation of 
“technology exploration”, a large number of Chinese enterprises establish R&D 
centers in the United States and Europe via OFDI as well. 
  Nevertheless, these specific features from Chinese MNEs have been rarely 
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considered in empirical literature on the nexus between firm productivity and 
OFDI. To clarify the effect of these characteristics more clearly, we therefore 
intend to investigate the impact of government financial support for Chinese 
OFDI firms on self-selection effect. Subsequently, in the studies of own-firm 
effect and spillover effect, we further examine a series of heterogeneous factors 
from Chinese MNEs and the types of OFDI to analyze whether these 
productivity effects are varied with the specific factors. 
 
2.7.  Estimations of firm productivity  
2.7.1.  Introduction 
  As Krugman (1997) argued, “Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long 
run it is almost everything”, it is widely used as a key indicator on firm 
performance in a large quantity of studies on firm-level empirical analysis. It is 
commonly defined as the measures how efficiently production inputs are being 
used in a firm to produce a given level of output.  
  In this study, we also employ firm productivity as the indictor of firm 
performance. So what is the best measure of firm productivity? As Gal (2013) 
mentioned, there is no single best measure for firm productivity, some 
approach may be more suitable than others for certain study objective15. 
  In order to avoid those possible misjudgments due to the use of only the 
single productivity measure and obtain more robust study results, I would like 
to employ a system with various evaluation indicators on firm productivity 
  Taking into account the productivity measures adopted in previous studies 
and the economic transition in China, I intend to apply three types of 
productivity measurements including labor productivity (LP), total factor 
productivity (TFP), and technical efficiency (TE). Moreover, a Cobb-Douglas 
production function is employed in all measures. 
 
 2.7.2.  Labor productivity  
  Labor productivity (LP) is widely used as the simplest measurement to firm 
                                                        
15 More details on firm-level productivity measurement are available on Del Gatto et al. (2011) and Gal (2013). 
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productivity, which also is employed as a main measure in many studies 
concerning the nexus between firm productivity and OFDI (e.g. HMY, 2004; 
Damijan et al., 2007; Tomiura, 2007). In the study, we also use this simple 
productivity indicator. The details on LP are listed in Appendix C. 
 
 2.7.3.  Total factor productivity 
  As total factor productivity (TFP) controls for both capital and labor (and 
other intermediate inputs), it is potential to more accurately measure firm 
productivity than LP. Therefore, we also prepare to adopt TFP. For 
measurement, TFP based on estimations are widely used in various studies, and 
the “Solow Residual” from OLS regression is the simplest approach. 
Nevertheless, as early as 1944, Marschak and Andrews has explicitly indicated 
the coefficients obtain through OLS estimation are likely to be inconsistent and 
biased due to the non-experimental economic data leading to endogenous 
problem, which is the famous so called “simultaneity bias”16. More specifically, 
part of productivity changes, which is commonly called “productivity shocks” 
(see Olley and Pakes, 1996) in the error term can be observed by firm itself 
first, and, thus, the profit-maximizing firms will adjust their inputs as a result 
of “productivity shocks”, which introduce a positive correlation between the 
error term and the labor inputs (or other variable inputs except capital stock). 
The OLS estimation of production functions yields inconsistent and biased 
parameters due to this endogenous problem.  
  A well-known treatment for “simultaneity bias” is the semi-parametric 
approach developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) (hereinafter OP-approach). 
They take the investment as a proxy variable for unobservable “productivity 
shocks”. Nevertheless the investment is proved to be a “lumpy” variable by 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for the reasons as follows: 
  First, the investment proxy may not smoothly respond to the “productivity 
shocks” because there are substantial adjustment costs.  
  Second, OP-approach requires a strictly monotonous relationship between 
the investment and output. This means than any observation with zero 
                                                        
16 Several approaches are proposed to solve the “simultaneity bias” in estimating production functions such as 
simultaneous equations (Marschak and Andrews, 1944), instrumental-variables approach or GMM (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998, 2000), semi-parametric approach (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and 
Petrin, 2003) and so on (see Griliches and Mairesse, 1995, Del Gatto et al., 2011, Gal, 2013). 
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investment has to be dropped in order for an inevitability condition, but, in fact, 
there are large-scale “zero investment” in many datasets, which limits the 
application of OP-approach, and the insufficient valid data of firm investment 
in the dataset is just the problem we faced with.  
  Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) develop a modified approach (hereinafter, 
LP-approach) based on OP-approach. In LP-approach, the intermediate inputs 
is used as a proxy rather than investment, which has solved the above two 
problems efficiently. Since many datasets contain significantly less non-zero 
data in intermediate inputs than in investment generally. Furthermore, due to 
less costly to adjust the intermediate inputs, it may respond to firm productivity 
more fully than investment. 
  Therefore, we intend to apply LP-approach to estimate TFP (named 
TFP-levpet)17 as one kind of firm productivity measure18. The specific process 
of estimation is listed in Appendix C and D. 
 
 2.7.4.  Technical efficiency 
  When firm is not complete efficient, technical efficiency (TE) from 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) may be a better productivity measure than 
TFP, especially for Chinese firms. 
  The estimation of TFP is based on the assumption that all the individuals in 
long-term equilibrium can realize the optimal productivity efficiency. 
Nevertheless, Farrell (1957) indicates that not every individual are located in 
the frontier of production function, there are gaps between the optimal 
productivity efficiency and the actual efficiency for most individuals, that is, 
there is the so-called “technical inefficiency”. Therefore, TE illustrates the 
comparison of actual output and the maximum out output.  
  This measure may be a better productivity indicator when firms located in 
transitional countries such as China, since it illustrates the firm productivity 
with the consideration of the firm efficiency loss (see Si and Wang, 2011; Su 
and Dai, 2012). 
  Due to the incompletion in market, symmetry of information, institutions 
                                                        
17 In practice, we use the Stata program of “levpet” developed by Petrin and Levinsohn (2004) to estimate 
TFP-levpet. 
18 Another important advantage why we employ this type of sophisticated measure is that this feasible measure 
needs no assumption of constant returns to scale for production function.   
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and so on, the product unit will generate efficiency loss, so it can’t reach the 
optimal productivity efficiency at frontier. Hence, given this situation, we also 
employ TE as the third productivity measurement in the study. TE can be 
estimated by using SFA proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and 
Broeck (1977). 
  In practice, TE is estimated via a point estimator proposed by Battese and 
Coelli (1988) and a cross-section SFA Normal-Exponential distribution model. 
The details on this process are listed in Appendix C.   
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Chapter 3.  Data 
 
3.1.  Description of the dataset 
  In order to make the empirical analyses possible, we employ an original and 
unique merged dataset, which including two sub-datasets. One is a large-size 
dataset named Chinese Industrial Enterprise Database (CIED) containing 
yearly information on Chinese industrial firms collected in annual enterprise 
census conducted by Chinese National Bureau of Statistics from 2002 ~ 2007. 
The other is a dataset on Chinese firms’ OFDI information (COFDID) acquired 
from the Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM) till 200919 that we have 
processed manually. Both of them are unbalanced panel datasets.  
  CIED covers manufacturing firms, mining firms as well as firms that 
produce and supply electricity, gas, and water. It includes all state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and non-SOEs including privately-owned enterprises 
(POEs) and foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) with sales above 5 million RMB. 
The number of firms in our dataset ranges from 181557 in 2002 to 336790 in 
2007. It includes the necessary firm information (involving many operating and 
financial items) that can be used to estimate firm-level productivity and 
selected as basic characteristics on firms. However, this dataset doesn’t have 
OFDI information, thus we need additional OFDI information from MOFCOM 
to link with CIED. 
  As MOFCOM adopts archive-filing management to each OFDI project, in 
principle, Chinese OFDI’s dataset covers all of OFDI cases undertaken by 
Chinese firms till now, including a wealth of information on micro-level OFDI. 
Till 2009, this dataset includes 8399 cases (involving 6294 OFDI firms)20 The 
information of OFDI cases involves the investing firms’ names and their 
organization codes21, OFDI time, overseas affiliates, host country, the main 
business scope of each OFDI project, and so on. This dataset can fill the OFDI 
information gap in CIED.  
                                                        
19  We employ the OFDI data till 2009 but not 2007, since some of econometric analyses need the lag of some 
period. 
20  Chinese OFDI micro-level data can be obtained from MOFCOM’s official website 
(http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/). 
21 The organization code can be accessible at the register system of OFDI firm via inputting OFDI firm name in 
COFDID one-by-one. 
 29 
 
3.2.  Data processing 
  For each year of CIED, we employ the same strategy of data processing, 
according to some literature (see Cai and Liu, 2009; Du et al., 2012; Lin and 
Kwan, 2014) on data processing of CIED, we eliminate the observation if data 
meet one of the following conditions.  
  First, it is the missing value on key variables22; Second, there is zero or 
negative value on key variables; Third, the financial data is against generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) including the total assets are less than 
the net value of fixed assets, the accumulative depreciation is less than the 
current depreciation, and the intermediate input is greater than the gross output; 
Fourth, the number of employees of one firm is less than 8 persons23; Fifth, the 
firm is not a manufacturing firm24. 
  The details on removed observations are listed in Appendix A. 
  With regard to Chinese OFDI dataset, we adjust this dataset from OFDI 
case-level to firm-level by aggregating data based on investors firms’ name. 
Some new variables are also created such as the variable of the first time of 
OFDI, and the dummy variable on whether it is a firm with OFDI in some year. 
  It is worth reminding that we construct a series of variables on OFDI 
strategies based on the main business scope of each OFDI project in COFDID. 
This is a manual identification process by reading a brief summary of 
approximately 100 words for each OFDI project. 
  The strategies are constructed by the manual identification for the main 
business scope of each OFDI project one by one. In this process, we adopt a 
relative conservative approach to identify OFDI firm strategies, that is, the 
according strategy would be identified, only when the content of main business 
scope shows a clear strategy goal on this OFDI case. Moreover, for one OFDI 
project, there may be several strategies, simultaneously. Eventually, we identify 
four types of OFDI strategies, including (1). information gathering, (2). trade & 
sales, (3). production, and (4). technology acquiring. 
                                                        
22 In this study, the key variables refer to industry code, gross output, sales, total assets, fixed assets, net value of 
fixed assets, the number of employees, and intermediate inputs. 
23 The enterprise less than 8 employees doesn’t establish a stable accounting system, therefore, the data from these 
firms are not reliable. 
24 The observations are dropped if their industry code is less than 1300 (mining sector) or larger than 4400 (the 
sectors of producing and supplying electricity, gas, and water). 
 30 
  In order to control for inflation, we take 2002 as the base year, relevant 
variables are deflated using the appropriate deflators25 from China Economic 
Information Network (CEInet) statistics database.  
   
3.3.  Link strategy 
  These two datasets are merged with a more accurate but time costly 
approach.   
  With regard to these two datasets, there exist three link strategies. The 
simplest approach is that we merge two datasets by firm name, which enables 
to identify 7248 observations (1790 firms) involving OFDI in CIED. This 
process don’t need any other information imported in COFDID, however, as 
several reasons such as the change of firm name, the different writing styles for 
the same firm, this simple approach may induce a serious linkage bias. To the 
best of knowledge, the existing studies based on this merged dataset between 
CIED and COFDID all adopt this link strategy (e.g. CT, 2014). 
  If we use organization code obtained from the register system of OFDI firm 
in MOFCOM as the alternative, 9604 observations (2285 firms) are merged. 
The growth of identified OFDI firms is mainly because the organization code is 
more stable than firm name26.  
  Given there are still some OFDI firms in CIED that are not identified due to 
the change of firm name and organization code or other problems, we develop 
a comprehensive link approach. This approach is based on the above two 
linked criteria and also identifies OFDI firms listed in Chinese OFDI dataset 
one by one through exploiting information27 from firms’ official websites and 
other credible sources.  
  Finally, we identify 10932 observations (2549 firms) by this comprehensive 
link approach. Compared to the link strategy based on only the firm name, this 
comprehensive link approach raised the number of identified observations and 
                                                        
25 Industrial value-added, sales, advertisement expenses, government subsidies are deflated by the ex-factory price 
index of industrial products at 2-digit level industry; Intermediate inputs is deflated by the price index of raw 
material, fuel and power; The net value of fixed assets is deflated by the price index of investment in fixed assets; 
The wage per capita is deflated by consumer price index at province-level. 
26 In principle, the organization code is unique. However, there still exist some cases such as the ownership 
change of SOEs, which leads to the change of organization code. Therefore, organization code still can’t solve the 
data merging issue completely. 
27 This searching process helps to master the overall situations of an OFDI firm such as the name changes, other 
names, address, and overseas affiliates. 
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firms by 50.83% and 42.40%, respectively. Therefore, the last link approach 
enables us to decrease bias as much as possible28. We employ the merged 
dataset by this new approach for following analyses.  
 
3.4.  Descriptive analysis based on merged dataset 
3.4.1.  Descriptive analysis of the number of OFDI firms 
  In this section, we employ the merged dataset to conduct some basic analysis 
on the number of OFDI firms. 
 
 
Fig. 3-1: The number of manufacturing firms with OFDI by year 
 
Notes: Fig. 3-1 is constructed based on the merged dataset. 
 
  Fig. 3-1 reports the distribution of the number of manufacturing firms with 
                                                        
28 The following OFDI firms are not included in our merged dataset: (1). The OFDI parent firms are in tertiary 
industry; (2). The OFDI parent firms belong to the sectors of mining or producing and supplying electricity, gas, 
and water; (3). The OFDI parent firms are non-SOEs with sales less than 5 million RMB; (4). The OFDI parent 
firms that we still couldn’t identify in CIED. For types (1) ~ (3), these OFDI firms are not in the range of our study. 
For the last type, we have already employed the comprehensive link approach to decrease the link bias as little as 
possible. 
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OFDI by year in our dataset. Overall, the number of manufacturing firms 
increase substantially over 2002 ~ 2007. In 2002, only few of manufacturing 
firms have undertaken OFDI, However, with the China’s accession to the WTO 
and the implementation of “Going-out” strategy, the number of OFDI 
manufacturing firms has increased sharply. 
 
 
Fig. 3-2：The number of manufacturing firms with OFDI by year and ownership 
 
Notes: Fig. 3-2 is constructed based on the merged dataset. 
 
  From Fig. 3-2, it is obvious that the number of OFDI firms on both SOEs 
and non-SOEs increased significantly as time goes on. In particular, there are 
fewer of OFDI firms with non-SOEs ownership than that of SOEs in 2002, 
whereas, the number of OFDI firms with non-SOEs ownership has far 
exceeded that of SOEs by 2007. This seems to indicate that non-SOEs are more 
active in undertaking OFDI. 
 33 
 
Fig. 3-3：The number of manufacturing firms with OFDI by year and firm size 
 
Notes: Fig. 3-3 is constructed based on the merged dataset. The firm size is divided by 
the median of total assets of each firm in each year. 
 
  Then, we further separate OFDI firms into two sub-groups based on the 
median of total assets of firms in each year in Fig. 3-3. In spite of the growth of 
the number of OFDI firms of both large enterprises (LEs) as well as small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), LEs always remain the overwhelming 
quantity of OFDI firms than SMEs. This indicates that there may exist a higher 
threshold for OFDI.  
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Fig. 3-4：The number of manufacturing firms with OFDI by year and region 
 
Notes: Fig. 3-4 is constructed based on the merged dataset. East region (12 provinces): 
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan; Mid & west region (19 provinces): Shanxi, 
Neimenggu, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Chongqing, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang. 
 
  Fig. 3-4 shows the distribution of the number of OFDI firms in east and mid 
& west regions by year in the dataset. It is clear that the east region possesses 
the absolute advantage in the quantity of OFDI firms. 
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Fig. 3-5: The number and proportion (total assets) of OFDI firms by 2-digit level 
industry in 2007. 
 
Notes: Fig. 3-5 is constructed based on the merged dataset. The code stands for 2-digit 
level industry according to the national standards (GB/T4754-2002) including 30 
industries: 13 (farm and sideline products processing), 14 (food processing), 15 
(beverages), 16 (tobacco products), 17 (textiles), 18 (apparel, shoes and hat), 19 
(leather, furs and related products), 20 (wood processing and wood products), 21 
(furniture), 22 (paper making and paper products), 23 (printing and record media 
reproducing), 24 (educational and sports products), 25 (petroleum processing), 26 
(chemical materials and products), 27 (pharmaceutical products), 28 (chemical fiber), 
29 (rubber products), 30 (plastic products), 31 (nonmetal products), 32 (ferrous metal 
smelting and rolling), 33 (nonferrous metal smelting and rolling), 34 (metal products), 
35 (general purpose machinery), 36 (special purpose machinery), 37 (transport 
equipment), 39 (electrical machinery and equipment), 40 (communication equipment, 
computer and other electronic products), 41 (instruments and meters, and office 
machinery), 42 (arts and crafts products), 43 (waste resources recycling). 
 
  Subsequently, Fig. 3-5 shows the number and the total assets proportion of 
manufacturing OFDI firms by 2-digit level industry in 2007, respectively. We 
 36 
could observe that, from the view of the quantity of OFDI firms, 17 (textiles) 
(153 firms), 35 (general purpose machinery) (104 firms), 39 (electrical 
machinery and equipment) (101 firms), 18 (apparel, shoes and hat) (93 firms), 
37 (transport equipment) (85 firms), 40 (communication equipment, computer 
and other electronic products) (84 firms) remain in top 6, respectively. 
  From the perspective of total assets, the first 6 of industries are 32 (ferrous 
metal smelting and rolling) (26%), 33 (nonferrous metal smelting and rolling) 
(14%), 40 (communication equipment, computer and other electronic products) 
(12%), 39 (electrical machinery and equipment) (10%), 18 (apparel, shoes and 
hat) (9%), 37 (transport equipment) (9%). 
Taken together, it appears that the more advanced manufacturing industries 
has stronger tendency on engaging in OFDI.  
 
 
Fig. 3-6: The proportion of OFDI firms at Chinese county-level in 2007 
 
Notes: Fig. 3-6 shows the proportion of OFDI manufacturing firms based on 
employees in 2007 at county-level. (1). The map is created based on the geographic 
information on Chinese county-level regions from GADM database 29 , which 
including 2411 county-level regions in map. (2). 2392 regions can be identified in 
CIED. (3). The darker color represents higher proportion of OFDI in region. 
                                                        
29 GADM is a spatial database of the location of the world’s administrative areas for use in geographic 
information system (GIS), which can be obtained from (http://www.gadm.org). 
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Eventually, we employ the proportion of OFDI in 2007 measured by 
employee to depict the spatial distribution of OFDI existence at county-level. 
The results in Fig. 3-6 indicate OFDI are also concentrated in east regions as 
Fig. 3-4, especially in Yangtze River Delta, Shandong Peninsula, and Pearl 
River Delta.  
 
3.4.2.  Descriptive analysis of the productivity of OFDI firms 
  Then, we further take use of the merged dataset to conduct some basic 
analysis on OFDI firms’ productivity.  
 
 
Fig. 3-7: Weighted average TFP between OFDI and non-OFDI firms by 2-digit level 
industry in 2007. 
 
Notes: Fig. 3-7 is constructed based on the merged dataset. (1). The code stands for 
2-digit level industry according to the national standards (GB/T4754-2002) including 
30 industries as in Fig. 3-5. (2). The industry TFP (TFP-levpet) (in logs) at 2-digit 
level industry, which is constructed as the weighted average of firm-level TFP with 
and without OFDI, with the weights of firms’ total assets. (3). The firm-level TFP 
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(TFP-levpet) (in logs) is estimated by LP-approach (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) 
from 2002 ~ 2007 of all of firms in CIED. 
 
  In Fig. 3-7, the productivity in terms of the weighted average TFP by 2-digit 
level industry between OFDI and non-OFDI firms is presented. It is obvious 
that, in any one of 2-digit level industry, the average productivity of OFDI 
firms is higher than that of non-OFDI firms30. 
  This can be regarded as the initial evidence on the relation of high-level 
productivity and OFDI in the perspective of industry, to some extent. 
  Furthermore, we construct the spatial distribution of TFP and OFDI firms 
based on Chinese county-level map. In Fig. 3-8, the productivity in terms of 
weight average TFP from 2002 ~ 2007 at county-level is presented. We could 
observe that the high level firms’ TFP are distributed mainly in east and coastal 
areas. 
  It is worth noting that, together with both Fig. 3-6 and 3-8, we could observe 
an interesting phenomenon that regions with high-level of TFP substantially 
overlap with regions with high level of OFDI existence, in respect of region 
levels. The results reveal the nexus between firm productivity and OFDI 
initially, which may include self-selection effect, own-firm effect, and spillover 
effect. 
 
                                                        
30 From Fig. 3-7, we could observe that the OFDI firms from the sector of tobacco products (16) has extreme 
productivity premium than non-OFDI firms. It is likely that this value on productivity is an outlier as a result of a 
small quantity of firms in the sector of tobacco products. 
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Fig. 3-8: Weighted average TFP of firms at Chinese county-level over 2002 ~ 2007 
 
Notes: Fig.3-8 show the average TFP (TFP-levpet) of firms from 2002~2007 at 
county-level. (1). TFP at county-level is constructed as the weighted average of 
firm-level TFP, with the weights of firms’ total assets. (2). Firm-level TFP 
(TFP-levpet) (in logs) is estimated by LP-approach (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) 
from 2002 ~ 2007 of all of firms in CIED. (3). The map is created based on the 
geographic information on Chinese county-level regions from GADM database, 
which including 2411 county-level regions in map. (4). 2392 regions can be identified 
in CIED. (5). The darker color represents higher firm productivity in region. 
 
  Subsequently, we analyze the firm productivity premium on OFDI and its 
heterogeneity from the view of the distribution of TFP (TFP-levpet). 
  Fig. 3-9 shows the probability density (above) and the cumulative density 
distribution (below) of TFP (TFP-levpet) between OFDI and non-OFDI groups 
in 2007. It is clear that TFP of OFDI group possesses substantial productivity 
advantage than non-OFDI group in either case. 
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Fig. 3-9: The distributions of TFP (TFP-levpet) between OFDI and Non-OFDI groups 
in 2007 
 
Notes: Fig. 3-9 is constructed based on the merged dataset. The firm-level TFP 
(TFP-levpet) (in logs) is estimated by LP-approach (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) 
from 2002 ~ 2007 of all of firms in CIED. 
 
  In order to obtain the first impression of firm heterogeneity on Chinese 
OFDI, we further focus on some specific characteristics we have discussed in 
Chapter 2., such as whether it is a firm with the state-owned nature and the 
government subsidy. 
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Fig. 3-10: The distributions of TFP (TFP-levpet) on OS, ONS, NOS, and NONS 
groups in 2007 
 
Notes: Fig. 3-10 is constructed based on the merged dataset. The firm-level TFP 
(TFP-levpet) (in logs) is estimated by LP-approach (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) 
from 2002 ~ 2007 of all of firms in CIED. 
 
  According to the information on ownership, the sample therefore is divided 
into four groups: OS group (SOEs with OFDI), ONS group (Non-SOEs with 
OFDI), NOS group (SOEs without OFDI), and NONS group (Non-SOEs 
without OFDI).  
  From Fig.3-10, we could observe productivity advantage on those OFDI 
groups from both the probability density (above) and cumulative density 
distributions (below) as we have found in Fig. 3-9. It’s also worth noting that it 
seems to be more productive for firms with the state-owned nature for OFDI 
firms. It would appear that there exists substantial heterogeneity even within 
OFDI group. 
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Fig. 3-11: The distributions of TFP (TFP-levpet) on OSU, ONSU, NOSU, and 
NONSU groups in 2007 
 
Notes: Fig. 3-11 is constructed based on the merged dataset. The firm-level TFP 
(TFP-levpet) (in logs) is estimated by LP-approach (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) 
from 2002 ~ 2007 of all of firms in CIED. 
 
  This issue is also represented in Fig.3-11, which is separated into four groups: 
OSU group (OFDI firms with government subsidies), ONSU group (OFDI 
firms without government subsidies), NOSU group (Non-OFDI firms with 
government subsidies), and NONSU group (Non-OFDI firms without 
government subsidies). For OFDI groups, firms with subsidies seem to have 
productivity premium than firms without subsidies in terms of TFP.  
  Eventually, considering the possible substituted nexus between government 
support and firm productivity, we employ government subsidy intensity and 
TFP-levpet of OFDI firms in 2007 to conduct the following analysis. 
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Fig. 3-12: The scatterplot and linear fitting between subsidy intensity and TFP based 
on OFDI firms in 2007 
 
Notes: Fig. 3-12 is constructed based on the merged dataset. (1). The firm-level TFP 
(TFP-levpet) (in logs) is estimated by LP-approach (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) 
from 2002 ~ 2007 of all of firms in CIED. (2). The subsidy intensity is calculated by 
Subsidy (SUB) / Sales (SA). (3). The coefficient by OLS is -13.989***, 0.552, 
-20.032***, and -4.871 from Fig. 3-12-1 ~ Fig. 3-12-4, respectively. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Fig.3-12 shows the scatterplot and linear fitting between government subsidy 
intensity and TFP-levpet based on SOEs and POEs groups, respectively. 
  We observe it is clear that, to some extent, there exists substituted 
relationship between subsidy intensity and TFP for SOEs group and the 
coefficient by OLS is -13.989, statistically significant at the 1% level (Fig. 
3-12-1), while for non-SOEs group, it seems that this type of substituted nexus 
is not exist, and the coefficient by OLS is 0.552, not statistically significant 
(Fig. 3-12-2). 
  Fig. 3-12-3 and Fig. 3-12-4 further show this nexus based on no zero value 
subsidies, which is still similar as Fig. 3-12-1 and Fig. 3-12-2. For SOEs group, 
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the coefficient by OLS is -20.032, statistically significant at the 1% level (Fig. 
3-12-3). Instead, the coefficient by OLS is -4.871, not statistically significant 
(Fig. 3-12-4). 
  From this basic analysis, it is appear that subsidy is the reason why firms 
without productivity advantage still could undertake OFDI, especially for 
OFDI firms.  
  On the whole, we can initially observe the productivity advantage from 
OFDI group and the firm heterogeneity even within OFDI group. Nevertheless, 
these impressions are obtained without any control measures. Therefore, from 
the next Chapter, we will start our formal econometric analysis to investigate 
the productivity premium and firm heterogeneity on OFDI. 
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Chapter 4.  First OFDI decisions and firm productivity in Chinese 
manufacturing 
 
4.1.  Estimation procedures 
4.1.1.  Regression based on qualitative response model 
  To avoid the reverse causality from OFDI to firm productivity, we tentatively 
focus on firms’ first OFDI decisions31. These OFDI beginners have no OFDI 
records in their history. Therefore, their existing productivity could not be 
raised by the OFDI activities before. Moreover, to deal with the potential 
simultaneity of productivity and first OFDI in the same year, we estimate the 
regression using data from previous year for productivity and other 
independent variables. By applying these two techniques, we ex ante eliminate 
the reverse causality (i.e. own-firm effect) from OFDI to firm productivity, 
thus avoiding the mutual causality bias in our results.  
  We estimate the regression by using a binary Logit model, This model is 
defined in Eq. (4-1), in which first OFDI behavior depends on a variety of 
firm-specific characteristics, which are often recognized as the firm-level 
determinants on OFDI (see Forssbæck and Oxelheim, 2011; CT, 2014; CRS, 
2014; EHITT, 2014). 
 
  𝑃𝑟(𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 1 | 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡−1)
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡−1)
 (4-1), 
 
where the dependent variable OFDI is the first OFDI behavior dummy, which 
is equal to 1 if firm i at year t undertakes first OFDI, and otherwise is equal to 0; 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is the multidimensional vector of independent variables of firm i 
at year (𝑡 − 1) which may affect firm i ’s first OFDI decision-makings at year 
t, and 𝛽 is the vector of coefficients. We have specified 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 to include 
several sets of firm-specific characteristics as follows: 
                                                        
31 In each cross section, the firms that have already undertaken OFDI are removed from the dataset, and we 
estimate based on each processed cross section dataset. The baseline results are estimated by using the cross 
section on firms with first OFDI behaviors in 2005. 
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  𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 is our estimated firm-level productivity (in logs)
32, which is the key 
variable on OFDI decision-makings we focus on; Firm’s basic characteristics 
includes firm size (in logs) (𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡−1)
33, capital intensity (in logs) (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡−1), 
export intensity (𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−1), firm age (𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡−1), and government subsidy (in logs) 
(𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖𝑡−1); Firm financial characteristic is employed to capture the impact of 
firm financial status on first OFDI decisions including ROA (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1) and 
cost of debt that is proxied by interests/debts (𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 ); Firm technical 
characteristic is used to capture technology effect, including R&D intensity (in 
logs) (𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡−1), training intensity that is proxied by employee training expense 
per capita (in logs) (𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡−1), and human capital that is proxied by firm-level 
average wage (in logs) (𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡−1); To control for the impact of ownership status, 
we also employ 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑃𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 dummies to capture effect of SOEs 
and POEs, respectively; 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡−1 denotes Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
34that captures the competition effect on the odds of first OFDI for industry j ; 
Finally, we also include dummies for industry (𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗) and region (𝑅𝐸𝑟)
35 to 
capture industry- and region-specific effects that are not specific to an 
individual firm, respectively. All of variables are defined in Appendix B in 
details. 
    
4.1.2.  Further tests based on PSM  
  As mentioned earlier, one potential problem of estimating the above Logit 
model on first OFDI behavior is the “sample selection bias”. More specifically, 
several of firm characteristics could affect firm-level productivity and first 
OFDI behavior, simultaneously, such as firm size (Forssbæck and Oxelheim, 
2011; Chen and Guariglia, 2013; EHITT, 2014), capital intensity (Abraham et 
al., 2010; CT, 2014), export status (Aw et al., 2008; Chen and Guariglia, 2013; 
CT, 2014), ROA (CRS, 2014), and firm age (Palangkaraya et al., 2009; Chen 
and Guariglia, 2013; CRS, 2014). Therefore, it is unlikely to be randomly 
                                                        
32 In view of the robustness of results, we employ several types of firm-level productivity measures, which are 
introduced in Section 2.7.. 
33 In Chapter 4, firm size (𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡−1) is measure by the number of employees in a firm in logs. 
34 HHI is calculated based on 3-digit level industry (including 169 industries). 
35 Industry dummies (𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗) are constructed based on 2-digit level industry, corresponding to 30 industries. Region 
dummies (𝑅𝐸𝑟) are constructed based on province level, corresponding to 31 provinces. 
 47 
selected which firms undertake first OFDI. Firms with first OFDI behavior 
might exhibit characteristics that systematically differ from non-OFDI firms. 
This means that the comparisons between first OFDI firms and non-OFDI 
firms would yield biased results if non-randomness of firm productivity were 
not taken into account.  
  In order to solve this problem, we use PSM technique introduced by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The aim of this method is to find a control 
group of non-OFDI firms for the first OFDI firms (the treatment group), and 
calculate the different outcome of these two groups. The results should come 
from the differences between the two.  
  Our matching procedures can be described as follows. Take the sample on 
the first OFDI in 2005 as an example. For each OFDI firm in our sample, we 
find a corresponding non-OFDI firm as its counterpart, which is most similar to 
the firm with first OFDI behavior. As we intend to analyze whether there exists 
productivity differences between OFDI group and non-OFDI group, the criteria 
of similarity are based on the year of 2004, that is, (1). The firm characteristics 
that affect both productivity and first OFDI behavior should be similar; (2). 
The propensity of OFDI estimated by these firm characteristics should be 
similar as well. Through this approach, the non-randomness of firm 
productivity can be corrected. In other words, we convert the observed data to a 
kind of quasi-random controlled experiment data in fact. In practice, we 
estimate the propensity score (PS), that is, the probability of first OFDI 
behavior, to find a matched-firm. To obtain the PS, we perform a Logit model 
with regard to first OFDI behavior as mentioned earlier, but not including firm 
productivity. After obtaining the PS of each firm including all OFDI firms and 
all non-OFDI firms, we employ the nearest neighbor matching to find the 
non-OFDI firms for each OFDI firms as its counterpart in the control group. 
This approach will search the closest control sample both backwards and 
forwards according to PS of the treatment group, which can be defined as: 
 
𝐶(𝑖) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑗
‖𝑃𝑆(𝑋𝑖) − 𝑃𝑆(𝑋𝑗)‖ (4-2), 
 
where C(i) represent a series of non-OFDI firms matching to the j th treatment 
firm according to 𝑃𝑆(𝑋𝑖) − 𝑃𝑆(𝑋𝑗). Given that the control firm has similar 
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probability of first OFDI behavior as the treated firm, with in each pair of the 
treated firm and the control firm, we can regard the firm productivity between 
two groups as a random pick and take the control firms without first OFDI 
behaviors as the counterfactual of the treated firms. 
  We further compare the differences of firm productivity between these two 
groups, that is, the so-called Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT). If 
the firm productivity of treated group is still higher than that of control group, 
we could confirm the self-selection effect on OFDI with the consideration of 
“sample selection bias”. 
 
4.1.3.  Firm-level productivity measures 
  As mentioned in Chapter 2, we employ TFP (TFP-levpet) estimated by 
LP-approach (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) as a basic measure in this Chapter. 
  To obtain robustness results, other two types of productivity measures are 
employed as well, including LP (LP) and TE (TE) estimated by SFA. All of 
details on productivity measures are listed in Appendix C and D.   
 
4.2.  Summary statistics 
   Table 4-1 reports summary statistics employed in the regression of our 
study. A comparison of firm-level productivity between first OFDI firms and 
non-OFDI firms in Table 4-1 gives a first impression on the productivity 
advantage of OFDI starters in all productivity measures (TFP-levpet, LP, and 
TE). In addition to firm productivity, first OFDI firms also display notable 
advantages in terms of mean and median on almost all of firm characteristics, 
such as firm size (FS), capital intensity (CA), export intensity (EX), subsidy 
(SUB), R&D intensity (RD), training intensity (TR), and human capital (WA). 
Table 4-1 also reports a t-test with unequal variances and a non-parametrical 
rank-sum test (Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney rank-sum test). As shown by these 
two tests, the advantages of firm productivity and other firm characteristics 
from first OFDI firms exhibit statistically significant differences, as compared 
to non-OFDI firms.  
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Table 4-1: Basic summary statistics 
  Non-OFDI firm in 2005     First OFDI firm in 2005      Test   
Variable Obs. Mean Std.dev. Median Obs. Mean Std.dev. Median  T-test Rank sum test 
TFP-levpet 171058 6.188 1.053 6.115 327 7.110 1.244 6.937 -13.398*** -13.378*** 
LP 171058 3.805 1.030 3.759 327 4.073 0.946 3.988 -5.122*** -4.216*** 
TE 171058 0.670 0.122 0.693 327 0.722 0.083 0.732 -11.326*** -8.335*** 
FS 171058 4.761 1.075 4.663 327 5.911 1.339 5.838 -15.528*** -15.624*** 
CA 171058 3.474 1.289 3.527 327 3.849 1.179 3.941 -5.739*** -5.194*** 
EX 171058 0.217 0.375 0.000 327 0.429 0.412 0.325 -9.302*** -13.846*** 
AG 171058 8.240 9.323 5.000 327 9.752 11.294 7.000 -2.420*** -3.609*** 
SUB 171058 0.828 2.032 0.000 327 2.383 3.149 0.000 -8.925*** -12.592*** 
ROA 171058 0.072 0.173 0.031 327 0.070 0.103 0.040 0.252 -2.949*** 
COD 171058 0.024 0.081 0.008 327 0.022 0.027 0.020 1.320 -6.264*** 
RD 171058 0.108 0.377 0.000 327 0.296 0.664 0.000 -5.121*** -12.251*** 
TR 171058 0.079 0.172 0.000 327 0.128 0.185 0.059 -4.711*** -7.995*** 
WA 171058 2.364 0.517 2.333 327 2.558 0.507 2.456 -6.921*** -7.379*** 
SOE 171058 0.311 0.463 0.000 327 0.385 0.487 0.000 -2.772*** -2.920*** 
POE 171058 0.445 0.497 0.000 327 0.333 0.472 0.000 4.267*** 4.055*** 
HHI 171058 0.008 0.011 0.005 327 0.008 0.009 0.004 -1.313* -0.358 
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for the included firm-specific 
variables in 2004. (1). All variables are defined in Appendix B in detail. (2). T-test 
refers to two-sample t-test with unequal variances for the null hypothesis that 
non-OFDI firms and first OFDI firms have equal mean. (3). Rank-sum test reports 
two-sample Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney rank-sum test statistic for the null hypothesis 
that non-OFDI firms and first OFDI firms have equal distribution around the median. 
(4). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
4.3.  Empirical results 
4.3.1.  Basic results  
  The results obtained via estimation Eq. (4-1) are presented in Table 4-2. The 
eight models in this table are the results of performing different specifications 
on the determinants of first OFDI behavior. In order to treat the 
heteroscedasticity in a large sample, a robust standard error is employed for 
statistical inference. Column 1 corresponds to a single-attribute model of TFP 
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(TFP-levpet), which presents a strong effect from TFP to first OFDI behavior, 
while the Pseudo-𝑅2 is only 0.049. From Column 2, we capture the part of the 
likelihood of first OFDI that can be ascribed to a different region and industry 
pattern by province (RE) and industry dummies (IND). The impact of TFP 
(TFP-levpet) becomes larger and the Pseudo-𝑅2 increases. 
  Then, we further control additional factors involving the market structure, 
the firm’s basic characteristics, the financial status, the technology level, as 
well as the ownership from Column 3 ~ 7, respectively, to capture other 
determinants of first OFDI behavior. Each variable we used is introduced in 
Section 4.1.1.. We find most of firm characteristics including firm size (FS), 
capital intensity (CA), export intensity (EX), government subsidy (SUB), R&D 
intensity (RD), and ownership (SOE and POE) have both positive and 
statistically significant effects on the probability to undertake first OFDI. 
Meanwhile, the impact of TFP (TFP-levpet) on first OFDI behavior is still 
positive and statistically significant even when we control other main 
determinants on OFDI decisions. These results can be taken as the initial 
evidence on the self-selection effect regarding OFDI. Column 8 is a refined 
specification removing part of non-significant variables. At the bottom of Table 
4-2, the likelihood-ratio (LR) tests for each pair of two adjacent specifications 
are reported, which indicate the specification of Column 8 is reasonable. 
Therefore, we will employ this refined specification below. 
  Since Logit produces results in terms of coefficients scales in log odds, 
Column 8 implies that for a one unit increase in TFP (in logs) (TFP-levpet), the 
log odds of first OFDI decision-makings increases by 0.397. In other words, a 
one unit increase in TFP (in logs) (TFP-levpet), the odds of undertaking first 
OFDI are 1.487 times (𝑒0.397=1.487) larger than the odds of not undertaking 
first OFDI. 
 
Table 4-2: The impact of firm productivity on first OFDI decisions 
Variable Dependent Variable:  Dummy for first OFDI in 2005         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
TFP-levpet 0.725*** 0.926*** 0.923*** 0.417*** 0.432*** 0.376*** 0.371*** 0.397*** 
 
(0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.065) (0.065) (0.072) (0.073) (0.069) 
FS       0.517*** 0.509*** 0.518*** 0.522*** 0.510*** 
 
      (0.060) (0.061) (0.063) (0.064) (0.062) 
CA       0.267*** 0.261*** 0.244*** 0.261*** 0.273*** 
 
      (0.050) (0.049) (0.052) (0.054) (0.052) 
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EX       0.860*** 0.860*** 0.924*** 1.093*** 1.096*** 
 
      (0.163) (0.163) (0.167) (0.177) (0.177) 
AG       -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 
 
      (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
SUB       0.071*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 
 
      (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
ROA         -0.264 -0.271 -0.201 -0.200 
 
        (0.349) (0.355) (0.350) (0.345) 
COD         0.167 0.149 0.040   
 
        (0.420) (0.412) (0.456)   
RD           0.244*** 0.249*** 0.267*** 
 
          (0.090) (0.092) (0.091) 
TR           0.303 0.213   
 
          (0.218) (0.235)   
WA           0.018 0.107   
 
          (0.129) (0.132)   
SOE             0.560*** 0.550*** 
 
            (0.183) (0.180) 
POE             0.353* 0.336*   
 
            (0.182) (0.179) 
HHI     3.057 2.298 2.245 1.917 1.834 1.821 
 
    (2.749) (3.370) (3.394) (3.636) (3.622) (3.578) 
Intercept -11.063*** -13.095*** -13.102*** -13.258*** -13.284*** -13.060*** -13.673*** -13.520*** 
 
(0.319) (0.636) (0.636) (0.618) (0.618) (0.646) (0.690) (0.646) 
IND No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 171385 171385 171385 171385 171385 171385 171385 171385 
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.049 0.119 0.119 0.155 0.155 0.157 0.160 0.159 
Log likelihood -2258.8 -2091.9 -2091.7 -2005.6 -2005.4 -2001.3 -1995.6 -1996.2 
LR test ~ 338.81*** 0.41 172.13*** 0.34 8.29** 11.47*** 1.34 
Notes: This table reports the basic results on the impact of firm productivity on first 
OFDI decisions by using Logit estimations and the sample of firms with first OFDI in 
2005. (1). Dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if firm i firstly undertake 
OFDI in 2005, otherwise it is equal to 0. (2). Firm-level productivity is TFP-levpet. 
(3). All independent variables are lagged one year (2004). (4). All those firms that 
have already embarked on OFDI before 2005 are deleted from this sample. (5). 
Industry dummies (IND) are constructed based on 2-digit industry level, 
corresponding to 30 industries. (6). Region dummies (RE) are constructed based on 
province level, corresponding to 31 provinces. (7). Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. (8). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
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4.3.2.  Robustness tests based on qualitative response and count models 
  Consequently, we intend to examine whether the significant and positive 
impact of firm productivity on first OFDI is robust through some changes 
based on specifications. 
  We perform several types of robustness checks on the basic results obtained 
in the preceding subsection, and the results still survive in various robustness 
tests. 
  Firstly, we begin the test for robustness from some econometric concerns. In 
the preceding subsection, considering the impact of heteroscedasticity on the 
statistical inference, we employ the robust standard error as a result of the large 
sample. In this section, we directly deal with this issue through the estimate 
procedures. As the firm size (FS) is considered as the main source of 
heteroscedasticicity in our sample, we therefore fit a heteroscedastic Probit 
model (Het-Probit) and use firm size to model the variance in Column 2 of 
Table 4-3. Following Haravy (1976), we set the linear combination of the 
independent variables 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽, the variance 𝜎𝑖
2 = {𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑧𝑖
′ 𝜓)}2, where 𝑧 ≡ (𝐹𝑆). 
Since the independent variables are lagged one year in Column 2 of Table 4-3, 
thus 𝑃(𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 1) =  𝛷(𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
′ 𝛽/𝜎𝑖𝑡−1). 
  Another problem we don’t consider in the previous regressions is the 
endogenous issue, that is, the unobservable factors not included in model 
specification could affect first OFDI decisions and firm productivity 
simultaneously, thereby yields biased results. To deal with this issue, we 
employ the Probit model with continuous endogenous regressors treated by 
using Instrumental Variable (IV) approach (IV-Probit). We use cost of debt, 
training intensity and human capital as instruments36 of firm productivity, and 
run the IV-Probit by using Newey's efficient two-step estimator (Newey, 1987). 
Column 3 of Table 4-3 presents the results on this endogenous concern.  
  For comparisons, a Probit model without the consideration of the 
heteroscedastic and the endogenous setting is also performed in Column 1. The 
results of the Het-Probit (Column 2) and the IV-Probit (Column 3) are 
qualitative similar with the results in Column 1 of Table 4-3. This indicates the 
                                                        
36 The reason we select these variables as instruments is that we find these firm features are not statistically 
significant as the firm-level OFDI determinants from the basic results (Table 4-2), but all of them are correlated 
with firm productivity. 
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HMY’s predicts are still robust though we take account of some econometrics 
issues. Moreover, the LR test of heteroskedasticity is not statistically 
significant with 𝜒2(1) =0.909 (p-value = 0.340) for the heteroscedastic Probit, 
and the Wald test of the exogeneity of the instrumented variables is not 
statistically significant with 𝜒2(1)＝0.987 (p-value = 0.321) for the IV Probit 
as well. There is not sufficient information in the sample to reject the null of 
both two tests, therefore, a regular binary response regression may be 
appropriate. 
   Secondly, we further re-estimate the Logit model of Column 8 in Table 4-2 
by using various types of firm productivity measures, which includes LP and 
TE as mentioned above. Column 4 ~ 5 of Table 4-3 show similar pattern for all 
specifications as basic results. 
 
Table 4-3: Robustness tests for first OFDI decisions based on binary response model 
Variable Robust 1: Econometric issues Robust 2: Productivity measures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Probit Het-Probit IV-Probit LP TE 
PRO 0.140*** 0.123*** 0.224**  0.387*** 3.830*** 
 
(0.023) (0.026) (0.087) (0.069) (0.761) 
FS 0.181*** 0.207*** 0.143*** 0.756*** 0.683*** 
 
(0.022) (0.029) (0.044) (0.050) (0.050) 
CA 0.098*** 0.087*** 0.090*** 0.208*** 0.315*** 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.056) (0.052) 
EX 0.369*** 0.331*** 0.380*** 1.097*** 1.091*** 
 
(0.059) (0.064) (0.059) (0.177) (0.177) 
AG -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
SUB 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.022) (0.022) 
ROA -0.094 -0.077 -0.228 -0.175 -0.131 
 
(0.117) (0.104) (0.209) (0.342) (0.360) 
RD 0.111*** 0.098*** 0.088**  0.271*** 0.297*** 
 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.043) (0.091) (0.090) 
SOE 0.186*** 0.166*** 0.193*** 0.548*** 0.544*** 
 
(0.061) (0.058) (0.058) (0.180) (0.180) 
POE 0.123** 0.110**  0.133**  0.334* 0.326*   
 
(0.060) (0.055) (0.056) (0.179) (0.179) 
HHI 0.687 0.554 0.620 1.857 2.523 
 
(1.373) (1.250) (1.885) (3.574) (3.339) 
Intercept -5.444*** -5.095*** -5.762*** -13.488*** -14.356*** 
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(0.222) (0.399) (0.393) (0.644) (0.740) 
IND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 171385 171385 171385 171385 171385 
Pseudo-R2 0.160      ~      ~ 0.159 0.159 
Log likelihood -1993.6 -1993.2      ~ -1997.0 -1996.1 
Wald ( 𝜒2) statistic 
 
861.152 600.667 
  Notes: This table reports robustness tests for first OFDI decisions based on binary 
response model. (1). From Column 1 ~ 3, firm-level productivity is TFP-levpet. From 
Column 4~5, firm-level productivity measures are LP and TE, respectively. (2). For 
all of five specifications, dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if firm i 
first undertake OFDI in 2005, otherwise it is equal to 0. (3). All of independent 
variables are lagged one year (2004). (4). All those firms that have already embarked 
on OFDI before 2005 are deleted from this sample. (5). Industry dummies (IND) are 
constructed based on 2-digit industry level, corresponding to 30 industries. (6). 
Region dummies (RE) are constructed based on province level, corresponding to 31 
provinces. (7). At the bottom of the table, Wald ( 𝜒2) statistic is computed for testing 
the significance of the full model. The LR test of heteroskedasticity is 𝜒2(1)=0.909 
(p-value = 0.340) for the heteroscedastic Probit (Column 2), and the Wald test of the 
exogeneity of the instrumented variables is 𝜒2(1)=0.987 (p-value = 0.321) for the IV 
Probit (Column 3). (8). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (9). ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Thirdly, to confirm whether the basic results is sensitive to the sample period, 
we also run the Logit model of refined specification based on the samples of 
first OFDI in 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. All of three samples are 
processed by the same way as the sample on first OFDI behavior in 2005. 
Column 1 ~ 3 of Table 4-4 indicate the basic results are robust with different 
sample periods as well. 
  The last robustness tests are the count regressions on the number of oversea 
affiliates of first OFDI based on the samples period from 2005 to 2008, 
respectively. Since the variances within each year of the number of first 
oversea affiliates are higher than the means within each year 37 . These 
differences suggest that over-dispersion is present and a Negative Binomial 
                                                        
37 In this dataset, the variances of count outcome variables are 31.8％, 34.8%, 25.0%, and 44.4% higher than the 
means from 2005 to 2008, respectively. 
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model would be appropriate than the Poisson model. Column 4 ~ 7 of Table 
4-4 report the results by using the Negative Binomial model. At the bottom of 
Table 4-4, we can find the alpha value (the alpha value is constrained to zero in 
a Poisson model) and a LR test that alpha equals zero, which strongly suggests 
that alpha is statistically significant non-zero at the 1% level and the negative 
binomial model is more appropriate than the Poisson model. From robustness 
tests based on the Negative Binomial model, we confirm that firm productivity 
still has significant and positive impact on first OFDI, regardless of years. 
  Therefore, we can conclude there exists the strong and robust evidence on 
self-selection effect regarding OFDI based on the qualitative response analysis. 
 
Table 4-4: Robustness tests for first OFDI decisions based on different years and 
count regression 
Dependent variable  Dummy for first OFDI The number of first OFDI affiliates 
  Robust 3: First OFDI year (Logit) Robust 4: First OFDI year (Negative Binomial) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variable 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 
TFP-levpet 0.306*** 0.278*** 0.371*** 0.395*** 0.412*** 0.310*** 0.410*** 
 
(0.066) (0.079) (0.060) (0.081) (0.073) (0.083) (0.064) 
FS 0.537*** 0.512*** 0.525*** 0.561*** 0.555*** 0.566*** 0.567*** 
 
(0.059) (0.067) (0.051) (0.071) (0.060) (0.071) (0.054) 
CA 0.255*** 0.382*** 0.162*** 0.283*** 0.254*** 0.392*** 0.162*** 
 
(0.053) (0.056) (0.048) (0.058) (0.051) (0.066) (0.054) 
EX 1.652*** 1.169*** 0.900*** 1.015*** 1.739*** 1.185*** 1.032*** 
 
(0.155) (0.185) (0.156) (0.176) (0.170) (0.198) (0.174) 
AG -0.021*** -0.016**  -0.022*** -0.011 -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
SUB 0.094*** 0.044*   0.084*** 0.072*** 0.106*** 0.042*   0.082*** 
 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) 
ROA -0.828** -0.001 -0.886*** -0.381 -0.929** -0.074 -1.081*** 
 
(0.409) (0.259) (0.267) (0.506) (0.411) (0.310) (0.290) 
RD 0.303*** 0.314*** 0.295*** 0.288** 0.367*** 0.337*** 0.326*** 
 
(0.070) (0.074) (0.057) (0.113) (0.081) (0.074) (0.058) 
SOE 0.718*** 0.423**  0.120 0.382** 0.674*** 0.411**  0.166 
 
(0.182) (0.196) (0.152) (0.170) (0.201) (0.204) (0.160) 
POE 0.866*** 0.532*** -0.060 0.188 0.836*** 0.502*** 0.056 
 
(0.171) (0.179) (0.146) (0.163) (0.189) (0.192) (0.150) 
HHI -4.539 0.096 -0.004 1.625 -5.335 -0.938 0.545 
 
(5.723) (5.020) (1.993) (5.981) (6.443) (5.630) (3.039) 
Intercept -12.366*** -14.997*** -12.737*** -13.658*** -12.946*** -14.477*** -13.477*** 
 
(0.601) (1.088) (0.578) (0.717) (0.662) (0.976) (0.611) 
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IND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 177531 207453 274344 174599 189139 210639 277262 
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.173 0.131 0.143 0.149 0.171 0.126 0.132 
Log likelihood -2153.3 -2021.4 -2790.9 -2155.9 -2326.8 -2129.4 -2999.5 
Alpha    ~    ~    ~ 21.690 20.551 23.693 27.670 
LR test    ~    ~    ~ 212.5*** 257.0*** 138.8*** 330.7*** 
Notes: This table reports robustness tests for first OFDI decisions by using Logit 
model and Negative Binomial model based on each cross section. (1). From Column 1 
~ 3, Dependent variables are dummies, which represent whether firm i firstly 
undertake OFDI in 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively; while from Column 4 ~ 7, 
dependent variables are count variables, which represent the number of oversea 
affiliates of first OFDI for firm i in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively. (2). 
Firm-level productivity is TFP-levpet. (3). All of independent variables are lagged one 
year. (4). All those firms that have already embarked on OFDI before 2005 are deleted 
from this sample. (5). Industry dummies (IND) are constructed based on 2-digit 
industrial level, corresponding to 30 industries. (6). Region dummies (RE) are 
constructed based on province level, corresponding to 31 provinces. (7). At the 
bottom of the table, a LR test with the null hypothesis that alpha equals zero is 
reported (the alpha value is constrained to zero in a Poisson model). (8). Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. (9). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
4.3.3.  PSM for controlling “sample selection bias” 
  In order to treat the possible “sample selection bias” on the non-random firm 
productivity, we further employ the PSM technique38 to find a control group 
(non-first OFDI group) for the first OFDI firm (the treatment group), and then 
check the treatment effect of firm productivity on first OFDI decisions. Our 
matching technique is one-to-one nearest neighbor matching. A Logit model 
that includes all of variables used in Column 8 of Table 4-2 is conducted to 
estimate the first OFDI likelihoods (i.e. PS). Each first OFDI firm is thus 
matched with one non-OFDI firm in a manner that minimizes the within-pair 
difference by PS. A total number of 172253 non-OFDI firms have been 
                                                        
38 In practice, we employ the Stata program of “psmatch2” developed by Leuven and Sianesi to conduct PSM 
analysis. 
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assigned as matches to 328 firms with first OFDI behaviors in 2005, where a 
control firm can be assigned more than once in the matching process. 
  Fig.4-1-1 and Fig.4-1-2 show the kernel density functions of the first OFDI 
group and the control group, based on the pre- and after-matching. It is clear 
that the kernel density functions of the two groups are significantly different 
before matching. After matching, as shown in Fig.4-1-2, the kernel density 
functions of the two groups almost overlap completely, indicating that the 
characteristics of the variables in the two groups are similar after matching. 
This suggests that our matching process has been able to find appropriate 
matches. Another piece of evidence on the appropriation of our matches is 
presented in Panel B of Table 4-5. Comparing to the significant explanation 
effect (Pseudo-𝑅2=0.154) to identify whether it is a firm with first OFDI 
behavior before matching, the Logit model has not statistically significant 
explanation power to identify first OFDI group and control group any more 
after matching, which implies we can analyze the effect of firm productivity on 
first OFDI decisions without the distraction from “sample selection bias”, that 
is, the firm productivity is adapted to be random between OFDI group and 
non-OFDI group (see Fig.4-1-3 and Fig.4-1-4). 
  Panel A of Table 4-5 shows the averages of firm productivity for first OFDI 
group (the treated) and non-first OFDI group (the control) in Column 3 and 4. 
Before matching, the TFP-levpet difference between first OFDI firms and 
non-first OFDI firms is 0.923 and significant at the 1% level. After matching, 
we can observe the difference of two groups within the matched pairs through 
the ATT. We find that after taking into account the non-random selection of the 
sample (“sample selection bias”), the TFP advantage of first OFDI group is still 
positive (0.267) and significant at the 1% level.  
  Fig.4-2-1 and Fig.4-2-2 show the accumulative density functions between 
the first OFDI group and the control group, based on the pre- and 
after-matching, which illustrate a clearer impression on this productivity 
advantage of OFDI group in relative to non-OFDI group in terms of 
TFP-levpet. We can find that after the “sample selection bias” is taken into 
account, although the relative productivity advantage of OFDI group has 
changed narrowed, it is still clearly that there exists the TFP advantage for first 
OFDI group. Meanwhile, we also test non-parametrically for significant 
differences in distribution on firm productivity by using a rank sum test 
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(Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney rank-sum test). The test results suggest that there is 
still a statistically significant difference (z = -2.704, p = 0.007) on the 
distributions of firm productivity between non-OFDI group and first OFDI 
group after matching, at the 1% level. The sum of first OFDI group ranks 
(114310) is higher, while the sum of non-OFDI group ranks (101186) is 
lower. Therefore, the first OFDI group has higher rank. These results indicate 
that the firm productivity is still a determinant on first OFDI decisions and the 
self-selection effect on OFDI still exists, even the “sample selection bias” 
considered.  
 
 
Fig. 4-1: The distributions of PS and TFP-levpet between pre- and after-matching of 
two groups 
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Fig. 4-2: The cumulative density of TFP-levpet between pre- and after-matching of 
two groups 
 
Notes: According to two-sample Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney rank-sum test statistic, the 
distributions of firm productivity (TFP-levpet) between non-OFDI group (control 
group) and OFDI group exhibit significantly different in pre-match (z=-13.423, 
p=0.000) and after-matching (z=-2.704, p=0.007) at the 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4-5: Basic results based on PSM 
Panel A           
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference T-test 
LP Unmatched 4.073 3.807 0.266 4.66*** 
 
ATT 4.073 3.874 0.199 2.68*** 
TFP-levpet Unmatched 7.111 6.188 0.923 15.83*** 
 
ATT 7.111 6.844 0.267 2.74*** 
TE Unmatched 0.722 0.670 0.052 7.73*** 
  ATT 0.722 0.692 0.030 3.97*** 
Panel B           
Sample Pseudo-R2 LR (χ2) P > χ2 
Unmatched 0.154 735.60*** 0.000 
Matched 0.034 30.57 0.998 
Notes: The matching approach is the nearest neighbor matching. (1). Based on first 
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OFDI behavior in 2005, the number of treated firms (first OFDI group) and the 
untreated firms (non-OFDI group) used in PSM are 328 and 172253, respectively. (2). 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
4.3.4.  Robustness tests from PSM 
  We further perform a number of robustness checks on the basic results 
obtained in the preceding subsection. The results survive in all robustness tests. 
Firstly, we also use other definitions of firm productivity including LP and TE. 
The results are similar with that based on TFP in Table 4-5. The advantages of 
first OFDI group in terms of other two productivity measures are both positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% levels, after matching.  
  Then, we test whether the results are sensitive to different matching 
approach and first OFDI period. We thus employ the above three productivity 
measures to run the estimates by using radius matching approach. As the 
sample on first OFDI in 2005, we also perform PSM technique by using the 
sample on first OFDI in 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. Each sample is 
treated based on the same processing strategy as the sample on first OFDI in 
2005.  
  Results from Table 4-6 indicate that in nearly all of the specifications, the 
productivity differences between first OFDI group and control group are 
qualitatively the same as and quantitatively similar to the basic results, 
regardless of productivity measure, matching approach, and sample period on 
first OFDI. 
  These results provide strong evidence that there exist causal links from 
productivity to OFDI as HMY’s predicts. High productivity firms are more 
likely to embark on OFDI. 
 
Table 4-6: Robustness tests on different matching approach and sample periods 
The year of first OFDI 2005   2006   2007   2008   
Variable Sample Difference T-test Difference T-test Difference T-test Difference T-test 
LP Unmatched 0.266 4.66*** 0.199 3.71*** 0.311 5.41*** 0.316 6.06*** 
 
ATT 0.202 3.86*** 0.163 3.53*** 0.235 4.13*** 0.260 5.11*** 
TFP-levpet Unmatched 0.923 15.83*** 0.805 14.59*** 0.800 13.47*** 1.008 18.7*** 
 
ATT 0.250 3.71*** 0.218 3.59*** 0.247 3.42*** 0.305 4.60*** 
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TE Unmatched 0.052 7.73*** 0.038 6.38*** 0.033 4.38*** 0.051 7.51*** 
  ATT 0.025 5.31*** 0.019 4.07*** 0.008 1.08 0.020 3.18*** 
Notes: The matching approach is based on radius matching. (1). The radius is 0.001. 
(2). Based on first OFDI behavior in each year, the number of treated firms (first 
OFDI group) and the untreated firms (non-OFDI group) used in PSM are 325 and 
172253 in 2005, 357 and 177169 in 2006, 308 and 207142 in 2007, as well as 373 and 
206180 in 2008, respectively. (3). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
4.3.5.  Heterogeneity of self-selection effect 
  In this subsection, we intend to analyze some heterogeneity, which might 
affect, to some extent, the self-selection effect on OFDI in the context of 
Chinese firms. The following discussion is based on the neighbor matching 
approach, and the sample is based on firms with first OFDI behaviors in 2005. 
 
4.3.5.1.  Heterogeneity from competitive advantage  
  To examine whether the competitiveness could affect the self-selection effect 
on OFDI, we employ two indexes to analyze this issue. One is HHI, which is 
used to identify industrial competitiveness. Therefore, the sample firms are 
classified into two subgroups via the median of HHI39. Firms with HHI larger 
than sample median are classified into the high-HHI group (the weak 
competitive group), while the remaining firms are classified into the low-HHI 
group (the strong competitive group). As the SOEs are commonly regarded as 
more inefficient than other firms with non-SOEs ownership in China (Jefferson 
et al., 2008), the other index we employ is firm ownership, which is used to 
capture the firm-level competitiveness. According to the ownership, the sample 
firms are split into three subgroups: the SOEs (government controlled) group, 
the POEs, and the FOEs, which the final two types are non-SOEs. 
  The results, as shown in Table 4-7 and 4-8, indicate that the heterogeneity 
from the competitiveness yields different results for self-selection effect. We 
find significant differences after matching in different subgroups both in Table 
                                                        
39 HHI is calculated based on 3-digit industry level (including 169 industries). 
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4-7 and 4-8, respectively. In Table 4-7, it is clear that all of productivity 
measures are not significantly different within the high-HHI group, whereas all 
three productivity measures are still different within low-HHI group, positive 
and statistically significant at the 5% or 10% levels. Similarly, in Table 4-8, 
ATTs of all specifications are not significantly different within SOEs group as 
well. However, for POEs and FOEs group, most of productivity measures of 
both two non-SOEs ownerships are still positive and statistically significantly 
different within this subgroup. 
  Thus, we argue that, in the context of Chinese establishments, the differences 
of productivity on the self-selection effect between the first OFDI group and 
the control group are derived mainly from competitive firms.  
 
Table 4-7: The impact of HHI on the self-selection effect in terms of firm productivity 
Variable Sample Difference T-test Difference T-test 
    High-HHI group Low-HHI group 
LP Unmatched 0.399 4.75*** 0.127 1.66* 
 
ATT 0.118 1.01 0.203 2.03** 
TFP-levpet Unmatched 1.100 12.36*** 0.750 10.03*** 
 
ATT 0.165 1.07 0.244 1.95* 
TE Unmatched 0.050 4.97*** 0.052 5.81*** 
  ATT 0.014 1.33 0.028 2.50** 
Notes: The matching approach is the nearest neighbor matching. (1). HHI is 
calculated based on 3-digit level industry (including 169 industries). (2). Based on 
first OFDI behavior in 2005, the number of treated firms (first OFDI group) and the 
untreated firms (non-OFDI group) used in PSM are 160 and 83453 in high-HHI group, 
168 and 81936 in low-HHI group, respectively. (3). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4-8: The impact of ownership on the self-selection effect in terms of firm 
productivity 
Variable Sample Difference T-test Difference T-test Difference T-test 
    SOEs group 
 
POEs group 
 
FOEs group   
LP Unmatched 0.355 3.79*** 0.103 1.17 0.384 3.17*** 
 
ATT 0.111 0.85 0.268 2.32** 0.442 2.83*** 
TFP-levpet Unmatched 1.170 11.60*** 0.633 7.43*** 0.853 7.12*** 
 
ATT 0.037 0.21 0.173 1.23 0.349 1.84* 
TE Unmatched 0.061 5.17*** 0.031 3.02*** 0.066 4.99*** 
  ATT 0.013 0.94 0.029 2.29** 0.051 3.59*** 
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Notes: The matching approach is the nearest neighbor matching. (1). Based on first 
OFDI behavior in 2005, the number of treated firms (first OFDI group) and the 
untreated firms (non-OFDI group) used in PSM are 126 and 49514 in SOEs group, 
110 and 63103 in POEs group, as well as 92 and 34462 in FOEs group, respectively. 
(2). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
  However, for those firms from the high-HHI group or the SOEs group, it 
seems a contradictory on HMY’s theory that firms undertake first OFDI 
regardless of their productivities. One possibility may be employed to explain 
this issue. Fosfuri and Motta (1999) have proposed a model shows that firms 
without advantage might engage in OFDI to capture local advantage, rather 
than to exploit existing ones, that is, firms without specific-advantage are still 
likely to undertake OFDI. In the Chinese context, the government conducts 
masses of OFDI promotion policies to facilitate OFDI and aid firms to 
overcome investment obstacles in the hope of bringing benefits, such as 
technological and managerial resources to the home economy (see Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005; Buckley et al. 2007; Luo et al., 2010). 
  A series of stimulus measures from Chinese authorities strengthen firms’ 
competitive position or compensate for their competitive disadvantages (Child 
and Rodrigues, 2005; Fornes and Butt-Philip, 2009; Luo et al., 2010), which 
include some financial supports such as the subsidy, the preferential taxation, 
and the credit support, some institutional supports such as the effective 
approval process, the risk-safeguard mechanism, and the overseas information 
service network, as well as other favorable treatments (see Luo et al., 2010). 
Therefore, sunk costs with regard to OFDI can be partly compensated by the 
government, which make firms without advantage operating across national 
and cultural boundaries possible. 
  To clarify this specificity in the context of Chinese firms, we focus on one 
kind of financial support, that is, the subsidies obtained from government, and 
conduct some analyses on this issue.  
  Table 4-9 presents the results of a series of basic statistics and t-test with 
unequal variances on subsidies, we find the fact that Chinese government is 
tend to support firms from the high-HHI group and the SOEs group in terms of 
subsidy, whether within non-OFDI group or the first OFDI group. Meanwhile, 
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the government also sponsors first OFDI firms more than non-OFDI firms at 
the mean level, regardless of the classification. All of t-tests on these 
differences of subsidies are statistically significant at the 1% levels.  
 
Table 4-9: The impact of government subsidy on the self-selection effect in terms of 
firm productivity (1) 
  First OFDI group   Non-OFDI group     
  No. of firms Mean Std. dev. No. of firms Mean Std. dev. Difference 
Panel A: Statistics on subsidy by ownership         
SOEs 130 2.858 3.481 59302 1.214 2.525 1.645***(7.413) 
Non-SOEs 213 1.988 2.832 132858 0.600 1.677 1.388***(12.055) 
Difference   0.870*** (2.528)   0.614*** (62.827)   
Total 343 2.318 3.118 192160 0.789 1.998 1.529***(14.141) 
Panel B: Statistics on subsidy by HHI           
High HHI 168 2.711 3.257 96945 0.825 2.055 1.887***(11.876) 
Low HHI 175 1.941 2.938 95215 0.753 1.938 1.187***(8.088) 
Difference   0.771**(2.303)   0.071***(7.826)   
Total 343 2.318 3.118 192160 0.789 1.998 1.529***(14.141) 
Notes: (1). t-test refers to two-sample t-test with unequal variances for the null 
hypothesis that first OFDI firms and non-OFDI firms have equal mean. The figures in 
parentheses refer to t-value. (2). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  Then, we further spilt the sample into two subgroups via the mean of 
subsidies according to the year before first OFDI (i.e. the year of 2004). Firms 
with subsidies more than sample mean are classified into the high-level group, 
while the remaining firms are classified into the low-level group. Based on 
these two subgroups, we run PSM to conduct comparisons of the two 
subgroups with respect to the self-selection effect on first OFDI. Panel A of 
Table 4-10 shows that for low-level group, all of productivity measures of 
productivity premium and significance are higher than that of high-level group. 
Furthermore, ATTs in terms of TE even shows positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level for low-level subsidy group. These results are 
consistent with the view initially that Chinese government sponsors OFDI 
firms to strengthen their productivity advantages  
  Nevertheless, these results are not robust. As firms can obtain government 
subsidies from a series of reasons, such as the export activity and the nature of 
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SOE, while these types of subsidies are not related with the promotion of 
undertaking OFDI. Therefore, it may yield some biased results when we use 
the total amount of government subsidies as the analytical foundation. 
  To treat this issue, we employ the following estimation model to remove the 
information that is not related with the promotion of OFDI from the total 
amount of subsidies. 
 
𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑅𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 + 𝑅𝐸𝑟 + 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4-3), 
 
where subscripts i, j, r, and t are firm, sector, province and year, respectively. 
𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖𝑡 is the total amount of government subsidies of firm i in year t (in logs), 
𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 represent the export intensity and dummy for SOEs of 
firm i in year t-1, respectively. Moreover, 𝑌𝑅𝑡, 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗, and 𝑅𝐸𝑟 are used to 
capture the effect of years, sectors, and regions. 
  Subsequently, we estimate Eq. (4-3), and take the residual 𝜀?̂?𝑡 as the new 
index of subsidies, since the subsidies related with export, SOE propriety, as 
well as a series of factor such as year, sector, and region are not included in the 
residual. This econometric technique is also widely used in many empirical 
fields to correct the proxies with possible measured bias (see Forssbæck and 
Oxelheim, 2011). 
  Then, we spilt the sample into two subgroups via the mean of the subsidies 
residual 𝜀?̂?𝑡, and conduct the PSM analysis, again. Panel B of Table 4-10 
shows that, for low-level subsidy group, all of specifications have statistically 
significant productivity advantage, while for high-level subsidy group, most of 
the productivity measures are not significant. It is obvious that our processing 
method improves the estimated quality effectively, and the promotion role of 
government financial supports on OFDI is further confirmed through these 
results. 
  Furthermore, considering the accumulation effects of subsidies, we 
aggregate the residual 𝜀?̂?𝑡 used in Panel B before the first OFDI (i.e. from 
2002 ~ 2004), and regroup based on this aggregate data. According to these 
two groups, we examine self-selection effect by PSM as a robust test. Panel C 
of Table 4-10 presents that all of ATTs from low-level group are positive and 
significant at the 1% or 5% levels. Instead, for high-level group, anyone of 
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ATTs is not statistically significant.   
  Eventually, in view of the difference of estimation procedures, we also 
employ the fixed-effect model (FEM)40 to obtain the residual, and conduct the 
same analysis as Panel C. The results from Panel D of Table 4-10 show a 
similar pattern as that of Panel C, which indicates our results are also robust 
with different estimation approaches for obtaining residual. 
  All of these results in Table 4-10 provide strong and robust evidence that 
government subsidies have an effect on self-selection with regard to first OFDI. 
Firms with the characteristic of low-level competitiveness or stated-owned 
propriety (government controlled) conduct their first OFDI without the 
consideration of their productivities, as a result of high-level financial supports 
from government such as subsidies.  
 
Table 4-10: The impact of government subsidy on the self-selection effect in terms of 
firm productivity (2) 
Panel A:  PSM based on subsidy        
Variable Sample Difference T-test Difference T-test 
    Low-level group High-level group 
LP Unmatched 0.248 3.40*** 0.287 3.17*** 
 
ATT 0.163 1.52 0.065 0.55 
TFP-levpet Unmatched 0.724 9.73*** 1.227 13.27*** 
 
ATT 0.174 1.29 0.143 0.97 
TE Unmatched 0.044 5.10*** 0.062 5.87*** 
  ATT 0.021 2.04** 0.012 1.19 
Panel B:  PSM based on subsidy residual (OLS)     
Variable Sample Difference T-test Difference T-test 
    Low-level group High-level group 
LP Unmatched 0.311 3.51*** 0.230 3.08*** 
 
ATT 0.194 1.69* 0.144 1.56 
TFP-levpet Unmatched 0.938 10.36*** 0.914 12.05*** 
 
ATT 0.255 1.66* 0.127 1.05 
TE Unmatched 0.049 4.74*** 0.054 6.13*** 
  ATT 0.027 2.44** 0.018 2.03** 
Panel C:  PSM based on subsidy residual from 2002 ~ 2004 (OLS)  
Variable Sample Difference T-test Difference T-test 
    Low-level group High-level group 
LP Unmatched 0.325 4.64*** 0.155 1.61 
 
ATT 0.260 2.71*** 0.102 0.87 
                                                        
40 In practice, we use the FEM as follow: 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑅𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, where 𝑢𝑖 is 
unobservable individual effect. We estimate this specification and take 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡̂  as the residual. 
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TFP-levpet Unmatched 0.785 10.98*** 1.187 12.03*** 
 
ATT 0.241 1.99** 0.072 0.48 
TE Unmatched 0.046 5.62*** 0.058 5.16*** 
  ATT 0.030 3.04*** 0.013 1.24 
Panel D:  PSM based on subsidy residual from 2002 ~ 2004 (FEM)  
Variable Sample Difference T-test Difference T-test 
    Low-level group High-level group 
LP Unmatched 0.327 4.65*** 0.155 1.61 
 
ATT 0.277 3.04*** -0.077 -0.59 
TFP-levpet Unmatched 0.796 11.09*** 1.158 11.84*** 
 
ATT 0.305 2.53** -0.019 -0.12 
TE Unmatched 0.048 5.78*** 0.055 4.93*** 
  ATT 0.024 2.52** 0.003 0.29 
Notes: The matching approach is the nearest neighbor matching. (1). Based on first 
OFDI behavior in 2005, the number of treated firms (first OFDI group) and the 
untreated firms (non-OFDI group) used in PSM are 200 and 171044 in low-level 
group, and 128 and 135981 in high-level group for Panel A, 135 and 162527 in 
low-level group, and 193 and 147316 in high-level group for Panel B, 217 and 
171044 in low-level group, and 111 and 143068 in high-level group for Panel C, and 
215 and 171044 in low-level group, and 113 and 143068 in high-level group for Panel 
D, respectively. (2). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.  
 
4.3.5.2.  Heterogeneity from firm OFDI strategy  
  The self-selection effect on OFDI may vary across the firm strategies of first 
OFDI as well. In order to reveal the possible impact of heterogeneity from firm 
OFDI strategy, three types of first OFDI strategies could be identified in our 
dataset, including the information gathering, the trade & sales, and the 
production 41 . We classify them into three subgroups and preform PSM 
combining with non-OFDI firms, respectively. 
  The main results put forward by Table 4-11 is that most of ATTs in 
information group and trade & sales group are still both positive and 
statistically significant after matching, while for production group, the 
differences, though, are still positive, but no significant any more after 
matching. These results indicate that for firms with the first OFDI strategies on 
                                                        
41 The strategies are constructed by the manual identification for the main business scope of each OFDI project. 
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the information gathering and the trade & sales, firm productivity is a 
determinant on their first OFDI decisions, while for firm embarking on first 
OFDI with the strategy on the production, no strong evidence shows that 
self-selection effect exists in their first OFDI behaviors.  
 
Table 4-11: The impact of first OFDI strategy on the self-selection effect in terms of 
firm productivity 
Variable Sample Difference T-test Difference T-test Difference T-test 
    Information group Trade & sales group Production group 
LP Unmatched 0.097 1.04 0.233 3.63*** 0.338 2.72*** 
 
ATT 0.298 2.63*** 0.186 2.28** 0.275 1.51 
TFP-levpet Unmatched 0.602 6.33*** 0.905 13.87*** 0.982 7.76*** 
 
ATT 0.278 1.93* 0.137 1.30 0.229 1.00 
TE Unmatched 0.044 4.04*** 0.050 6.66*** 0.049 3.37*** 
  ATT 0.033 2.46** 0.014 1.81* 0.034 1.58 
Notes: The matching approach is the nearest neighbor matching. (1). Based on first 
OFDI behavior in 2005, the number of treated firms (first OFDI group) and the 
untreated firms (non-OFDI group) used in PSM are 117 and 121909 in information 
group, 260 and 166811 in trade & sales group, as well as 67 and 149643 in production 
group, respectively. (2). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
4.3.5.3.  Heterogeneity from region 
  In the context of China, subsequent heterogeneity from region involving 
many economic environment features, such as tax policy, legal protection, 
infrastructure, financial market development and so on (Chen and Guariglia, 
2013), which could also produce some effects on the self-selection on OFDI. 
To clarify the impact of heterogeneity from region, we divide the whole sample 
into three subgroups, named the east region group, the mid region group, and 
the west region group42, respectively. Then, we run PSM technique based on 
each subgroup for the comparisons. 
  Table 4-12 presents the results of comparisons after matching. We find 
                                                        
42 East region (12 provinces) includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan; mid region (9 provinces) contains Shanxi, Neimenggu, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan; while west region (9 provinces) includes Chongqing, Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang (10 provinces). 
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significant differences between the east and non-east regions. For firms from 
non-east regions, the positive differences of most of the productivity measures 
are no longer statistically significant. In comparison, ATTs in all of three 
productivity measures of firms from east region are still both positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels. These results reveal that the 
substantial heterogeneity from regions could affect self-selection behavior on 
OFDI.  
 
Table 4-12: The impact of region on the self-selection effect in terms of firm 
productivity 
Variable Sample Difference T-test Difference T-test Difference T-test 
    East region group Mid region group West region group 
LP Unmatched 0.245 4.00*** 0.200 1.03 0.742 3.10*** 
 
ATT 0.216 2.58*** 0.117 0.41 0.534 1.50 
TFP-levpet Unmatched 0.876 14.01*** 0.959 4.96*** 1.649 6.37*** 
 
ATT 0.242 2.34** 0.328 0.88 0.553 1.16 
TE Unmatched 0.048 6.70*** 0.047 2.01** 0.113 3.53*** 
  ATT 0.021 2.84*** 0.023 0.69 0.107 2.70*** 
Notes: The matching approach is the nearest neighbor matching. (1). Based on first 
OFDI behavior in 2005, the number of treated firms (first OFDI group) and the 
untreated firms (non-OFDI group) used in PSM are 279 and 136660 in east region 
group, 30 and 21113 in mid region group, as well as 19 and 6795 in west region group, 
respectively. (2). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
 
4.3.5.4.  Heterogeneity from host country 
  The heterogeneity from host country might affect self-selection behavior. 
Head and Ries (2003) investigate the impact of this type heterogeneity. Their 
results shows that more productive firm prefers to invest in high income 
countries, while for less productive firms, they are more likely to invest in low 
income countries. 
  Using PSM, we re-examine the same hypothesis proposed by Head and Ries 
(2003) with the consideration of “sample selection bias”. We spilt first OFDI 
firms into two subgroups, named MEDCs (more economically developed 
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countries) 43  group and non-MEDCs group (developing countries group), 
respectively. Then, we further run PSM combining with non-OFDI firms. 
  In line with the previous results on this issue addressed by Head and Ries 
(2003), Table 4-13 shows all of ATTs from MEDCs group are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% levels. In contrast, for firms that firstly invest 
in developing countries, the positive differences of all productivity measures 
are no longer statistically significant. Therefore, this is the strong evidence on 
the heterogeneity from host country could affect the select-selection behavior 
on OFDI. 
 
Table 4-13: The impact of host countries’ characteristics on the self-selection effect in 
terms of firm productivity 
Variable Sample Difference T-test Difference T-test 
    MEDCs group Non-MEDCs group 
LP Unmatched 0.351 4.90*** 0.124 1.32 
 
ATT 0.316 3.15*** 0.120 0.95 
TFP-levpet Unmatched 1.071 14.71*** 0.675 7.08*** 
 
ATT 0.357 2.86*** 0.078 0.46 
TE Unmatched 0.060 7.18*** 0.035 3.18*** 
  ATT 0.042 4.15*** 0.015 1.16 
Notes: The matching approach is the nearest neighbor matching. (1). Based on first 
OFDI behavior in 2005, the number of treated firms (first OFDI group) and the 
untreated firms (non-OFDI group) used in PSM are 207 and 164394 in MEDCs group, 
as well as 121 and 146514 in non-MEDCs group, respectively. (2). ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
4.4.  Conclusions 
  In Chapter 4, we have explored the effect of firm-level productivity on first 
OFDI behavior, or the self-selection process with regard to OFDI, using an 
original large linked firm-level dataset on Chinese manufacturing from 2004 ~ 
2008.  
  We contribute to the literature in three ways. Firstly, considering the possible 
“sample selection bias” from non-random sample, we first conduct PSM 
                                                        
43 In this study, if a country is included in the latest lists of developed countries published by United Nations (UN), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the same time, we will 
categorize it into MEDCs group. 
 71 
technique to deal with this issue in OFDI behavior studies; Secondly, to the 
best of our knowledge, it is the first to investigate self-selection effect on first 
OFDI by using Chinese firm-level data; Thirdly, we find that self-selection 
effect on first OFDI is affected by substantial heterogeneity from 
competiveness, firm strategy, region, and host country. In particular, we 
provide concrete evidence that the government financial support is one 
important reason for some OFDI beginners without productivity advantage. 
  The results show strong evidence that there exists the causality from firm 
productivity to first OFDI decisions, even with the consideration of the reverse 
causality from OFDI to productivity. Meanwhile, we employ PSM technique to 
deal with the possible “sample selection bias” due to non-random samples from 
first OFDI group and non-OFDI group, and the results are still in line with 
HMY’s predicts. Furthermore, the evidence on self-selection effect is robust 
with different firm productivity measures and sample periods as well. Our 
results indicate that HMY’s theory is still applied to Chinese manufacturing 
firms. 
  Moreover, we further analyze whether the self-selection behavior in terms of 
productivity is affected by some specific factors from competitiveness, firm 
strategy, region, and host country. We find the self-selection behavior in 
low-HHI and non-SOEs groups, while no evidence on productivity advantage 
exists in high-HHI and SOEs groups. The reason for OFDI from weak 
competitive firms is explained as the support from government, which is partly 
confirmed by our Chinese firm-level dataset. The self-selection behavior is also 
captured in firms located in east region, with the strategies on information and 
trade & sales, as well as investing in MEDCs countries. In contrast, no 
significant productivity advantage for firms from mid & west region, with the 
strategy on production, as well as investing in developing countries. These 
findings reveal the substantial heterogeneity in self-selection effect on OFDI in 
fact, which could be a complement on HMY’s predicts. 
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Chapter 5.  Does OFDI really enhance firm productivity ?. 
 
  5.1.  Estimation procedures 
 5.1.1.  The reason we employ the combined approach on PSM and DID 
techniques  
  Although we can eliminate the interference due to firms with OFDI 
behaviors but not for the first time in 2005, by dropping those firms with first 
OFDI behaviors before 2005, as well as control the self-selection effect (see 
HMY 2004) by some econometric processing, such as the usage of the dummy 
on self-selection behavior, the instrumental variables for first OFDI behavior 
and the lagged independent variables. The traditional econometric regression 
still could not tell us the causal effect of first OFDI behavior on the firm 
productivity, unless the firm productivity is exogenous to first OFDI firms. 
However, it is obvious that this exogenous is invalid. In fact, most of firm 
characteristics from first OFDI firms, which determine their first OFDI 
behaviors, could also affect their productivity in the future (i.e. after 2005). 
Therefore, it is not likely to be random which firms undertake OFDI. Firms 
with first OFDI behavior might exhibit characteristics that systematically differ 
from non-OFDI firms. This means that traditional econometric regression for 
own-firm effect would yield biased results if non-randomness of firm 
productivity were not taken into account. This problem is the so-called “sample 
selection bias”. 
  To correct this potential sample selection bias, we employ the PSM 
technique to eliminate the systematical differences between first OFDI firms 
and non-OFDI firms by selecting a control group (non-OFDI firms) for the 
treatment group (first OFDI firms), and then we can regard the firm 
productivity between two groups as a random pick. In the next step, we use the 
new sample with two groups to conduct DID analysis, which is an insightful 
approach to identify various productivity effects as a result of different reasons. 
This combined approach of PSM and DID is widely used to deal with the 
“sample selection bias” in many fields (e.g. Girma et al. 2004; Arnold and 
 73 
Hussinger 2005; Heyman et al., 2007; Böckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2009; Lian 
et al., 2011), and has been applied as a insightful approach to study the nexus 
between FDI and firm performance recently (e.g. Chari et al., 2012; Yang et al., 
2013; Huang et al., 2013). 
 
5.1.2.  Selection on the control group based on PSM techniques 
  To select the control group for the first OFDI firms (the treatment group), 
first of all, we employ PSM technique (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). As 
mentioned earlier, in Chapter 5 we also focus on the first OFDI in 2005 as in 
Chapter 4. 
  For each OFDI firm in our sample, we find a corresponding non-OFDI firm 
as the counter part, which is most similar to the firm with first OFDI behavior 
before the first OFDI (that is, in 2004). In practice, we estimate the propensity 
score (PS), that is, the probability of first OFDI behavior, to find a paired-firm. 
To obtain the PS, we perform a Logit model with regard to first OFDI behavior: 
The dependent variables is a dummy on whether the firm undertake first OFDI 
in 2005, and the independent variables include the corresponding firm 
characteristics in 2004 which are often recognized that could affect both OFDI 
(see CT, 2014; CRS, 2014; EHITT, 2014) and firm productivity (see Aw et al., 
2009; Palangkaraya et al., 2009; Chen and Guariglia, 2013) in other studies as 
well, including firm size (in logs) (𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡−1), capital intensity (in logs) (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡−1), 
export intensity (𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−1), ROA (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1), firm age (𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡−1), R&D intensity 
(in logs) (𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡−1), government subsidy (in logs) (𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖𝑡−1), SOEs dummy 
(𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡−1), POEs dummy (𝑃𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡−1), respectively. Moreover, we also include 
HHI (𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡−1)
44 and dummies for industry (𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗) as well as region (𝑅𝐸𝑟)
45 
variables to capture the competition- industry- and region-specific effects that 
are not specific to an individual firm, respectively. The definitions of all 
variables are listed in Appendix B. As mentioned earlier, in order to eliminate 
the interference the possible own-firm effect from those firms, which have 
already embarked on first OFDI before 2005, all such firms are removed from 
the sample. Meanwhile, to capture the own-firm effect occurred in 2005, we 
                                                        
44 HHI is calculated based on 3-digit level industry (including 169 industries). 
45 Industry dummies (𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗) are constructed based on 2-digit level industry, corresponding to 30 industries. Region 
dummies (𝑅𝐸𝑟) are constructed based on province level, corresponding to 31 provinces. 
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use one period lagged independent variables as we have defined in the Logit 
model, that is, the decision-makings on first OFDI is made by 2004, we thus 
take the firm productivity in 2004 as the initial productivity.  
  After obtaining the PS of each firm including all OFDI firms and all 
non-OFDI firms, we employ the one-to-one nearest neighbor matching strategy 
to find the non-OFDI firms for each OFDI firms as its counter part in the 
control group. The nearest neighbor matching method will search the closest 
control sample both backwards and forwards according to PS of the treatment 
group, which can be defined as: 
 
𝐶(𝑖) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑗
‖𝑃𝑆(𝑋𝑖) − 𝑃𝑆(𝑋𝑗)‖ (5-1), 
 
where C(i) represent a series of non-OFDI firms matching to the j th treatment 
firm according to 𝑃𝑆(𝑋𝑖) − 𝑃𝑆(𝑋𝑗). 
  Given that the control firm has similar probability of first OFDI behavior as 
the treated firm, with in each pair of the treated firm and the control firm, we 
can regard the firm productivity between two groups as a random pick and take 
the non-OFDI behavior of the control firm as the counterfactual of the treated 
firms. Through this approach, the non-randomness of firm productivity can be 
corrected. In other words, we convert the observed data to a kind of 
quasi-random controlled experiment data in fact. 
  Finally, in our samples 329 firms with first OFDI behaviors in 2005 find 
their own counter parts46, therefore, the observations that belong to these 658 
firms will be used in the following analyses.  
 
5.1.3.  Baseline DID specification  
  In order to investigate the impact of first OFDI behavior on firm productivity, 
we perform the following DID specification based on the new constructed 
sample from 2002 ~ 2007: 
 
                                                        
46 Duplicated firms are allowed in this process. 
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𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 + 𝑅𝐸𝑟 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5-2), 
 
where subscripts i, j, p, and t are firms, sectors, province and years, respectively. 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡  is the firm-level productivity measured by several specifications that are 
introduced in Chapter 2.  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖  is a fixed pre-treatment effect (i.e. 
self-selection effect) that is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the first OFDI 
group, and 0 otherwise. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a core dummy on the treatment effect via 
OFDI (i.e. own-firm effect) we are focusing on, which is equal to 1 for the 
periods in and after the firms undertake first OFDI, and 0 otherwise. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 is 
a aggregate period effect that is equal to 1 if the period is in and after first 
OFDI year (i.e. since 2005), and 0 otherwise. 
  Thus, 𝛼 captures firm-level productivity differences between first OFDI 
firms and non-OFDI firms before the first OFDI behavior (self-selection effect). 
The DID estimator of an OFDI behavior for firm productivity is given by 𝛽, 
that is, the difference between the treated firms (first OFDI firms) and control 
firms (non-OFDI firms) in their differences on firm productivity between 
post-treatment year (in and after the treatment year) and pre-treatment year 
(before the treatment year). Similarly, 𝛾 captures the common period effect on 
both two groups firms in and after the period of first OFDI behaviors. 
  Furthermore, 𝛼 + 𝛽 can be regarded as the average productivity advantage 
on the treated firms in relative to the control firms in all periods, and 𝛽 + 𝛾 is 
the whole firm productivity-enhancing on the treated firms in and after first 
OFDI behavior year. 
  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗, 𝑅𝐸𝑟, and 𝑢𝑖 are employed to capture the unobserved time-invariant 
characteristics on industries, regions (provinces) and firms, respectively. At last, 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
  With regard to estimated approach, as the baseline DID specification 
contains some time-invariant variable (such as 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖) that we need to 
obtain its coefficient (𝛼), this fixed effect model is estimated by Least Squared 
Dummy Variables (LSDV) approach. 
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5.1.4.  DID specification with the cross product 
  According to our story, we should investigate the impacts of some factors, 
such as the first OFDI strategy, the absorptive capacity, on own-firm effect via 
OFDI, therefore, we further estimate Eq. (5-2) with several specific interaction 
terms. Hence Eq. (5-2) is re-constructed as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇(𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 +
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 + 𝑅𝐸𝑟 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5-3), 
 
  In Eq.(5-3),  the own-firm effect is given by 𝛽 + 𝜇𝐹𝑖𝑡 , and depended on 
some factor, 𝐹𝑖𝑡. 
 
 5.1.5.  Firm-level productivity measures 
  In this Chapter, TFP (TFP-levpet) estimated by LP-approach (Levinsohn and 
Petrin, 2003) and labor productivity (LP) introduced in Chapter 2 are employed 
as productivity measures. The details on productivity measures are listed in 
Appendix C and D. 
  More precisely, to clarify the impact of first OFDI behavior on the level as 
well as the growth of firm productivity, we apply three types of specifications 
to represent the level, the (absolute) growth and the relative growth of firm 
productivity based on TFP-levpet, respectively. 
  The (absolute) growth of firm productivity (𝐺𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡) is defined as follows: 
 
𝐺𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛 (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1)  (5-4), 
 
  Furthermore, the relative growth of firm productivity ( 𝑅𝐺𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 ) is 
calculated as the following equation: 
 
𝑅𝐺𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 =
𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡)−𝑙𝑛 (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥)
𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1)−𝑙𝑛 (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡−1
𝑚𝑎𝑥)
   (5-5), 
 
where 𝑙𝑛 (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥) is the maximum level of TFP-levpet (in logs) within the 
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4-digit level industry 47  at time t, thereby, 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛 (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥)  is 
repressed as the technology distance of firms relative to industry leaders at time 
t48. Consequently, 𝑅𝐺𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 can be taken as an indictor on the relative growth 
of productivity (or technology), which may reveal more complex changes on 
firm productivity. 
   
5.2.  Estimation results 
5.2.1.  Baseline results and robust tests on own-firm effect 
  To get a first feeling of causal relationship between OFDI and productivity, 
we start with DID analysis based on the sample constructed by PSM technique. 
Table 5-1 reports the estimation results with different time period (Panel A of 
Table 5-1), the change of own-firm effect over time (Panel B of Table 5-1), and 
various alternative firm productivity specifications (Panel C of Table 5-1) 
  Column A-1 of Table 5-1 shows the baseline results with TFP (in logs) 
(TFP-levpet) as the dependent variable estimated by LSDV estimation from 
2002 ~ 2007. The coefficient on pre-treatment effect is both positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, which implies that more productive 
firms tend to undertake OFDI. Therefore, the self-selection effect on OFDI (see 
HMY, 2004) is supported by this result. The coefficient on treatment effect (the 
productivity-enhancing effect or the own-firm effect) we focus on has positive 
sign and statistically significant at the 5% level. Therefore, the baseline result 
indicates that parent firms can raise their productivity through OFDI. This 
result is also consistent with the results from CT (2014) and CRS (2014). 
Moreover, positive and significant coefficient on time effect is observed, which 
implies a common trend on productivity enhancing of both groups as time goes 
on (in and after first OFDI).  
  Column A-2 ~ A-3 of Table 5-1 show the similar pattern as baseline results, 
which indicate that the baseline results are robust with different time periods. 
  To test whether there exist the change of own-firm effect since first OFDI, 
we further estimate Eq.(5-2) based on the period from 2004 ~ 2005, 2004 ~ 
                                                        
47 There are 482 industries at 4-digit level in the dataset.  
48 Girma (2005) employ the similar specification to denote the technology distance of a firm to the industry 
frontier, which is supposed to indicate technological congruity with industry leaders. 
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2006, respectively.  
  The results in Panel B and Column A-3 of Table 5-1 indicate that the 
magnitude and the statistical significance of own-firm effect has gradually 
become stronger since first OFDI in 2005, which seems to imply there exist the 
accumulation effects on the OFDI productivity-enhancing effect over time. 
  Subsequently, various types of firm productivity as the dependent variables 
including LP (LP) (Column C-1) are taken into consideration as well, 
Nevertheless, we can’t observe the statistically significant own-firm effect in 
terms of LP. Given TFP is more reliable indictor on productivity than LP, we 
still conduct our following analyses based on TFP. 
  Then, we further replace with the (absolute) productivity growth (GTFP) and 
the relative productivity growth (RGTFP), as mentioned in Section 5.1.5.. The 
coefficients on the productivity-enhancing effect of both two specifications 
(Column C-2 and C-3) still have positive signs and RGTFP are statistically 
significant at the 10% level, indicating that the productivity-enhancing effect 
via OFDI is not only in productivity level, but also in terms of relative growth 
(RGTFP) on productivity, to some extent.  
  Fig.5-1 provides a clearer impression on the nexus between OFDI and firm 
productivity. In Fig. 5-1-1, TFP (in logs) (TFP-levpet) is the average value by 
groups and years. Fig. 5-1-1 illustrates the change trends on the firm 
productivity (TFP-levpet) for both OFDI and control group (non-OFDI group), 
while Fig. 5-1-2 reflects the change trends on the differences of firm 
productivity (TFP-levpet) between OFDI and control group. 
  We can confirm from both two sub-figures, on average, firms with first 
OFDI behaviors possess more advantage (roughly 0.23) in terms of 
productivity than that of non-OFDI firms in the first OFDI decision-making 
period (2004). The productivity premium exactly indicates the self-selection 
effect (see HMY, 2004). Consequently, it is clear that there exist the common 
trends on the productivity enhancing of both groups as time goes on (in and 
after first OFDI (in 2005)) from Fig. 5-1-1. 
  Regarding the own-firm effect we concentrate on, after eliminating the 
self-selection effect and time effect, we can exactly find firms can increase 
their firm productivity through OFDI from Fig. 5-1-2. More specifically, Parent 
firms with first OFDI behaviors in 2005, on average, have a sharp growth of 
about 0.12, relative to the control group. A possible explanation for this is that 
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firms acquire the strategic assets (Deng, 2009) via OFDI and then quickly 
improve their productivity. Subsequently, Fig. 5-1-2 further illustrates the 
difference of firm productivity of OFDI group decreases by 0.05 after one year 
of first OFDI (2006). After two year of first OFDI (2007), the productivity 
premium further decreases slightly relative to non-OFDI firm, but the 
magnitude of own-firm effect via OFDI are still large. This is not surprising 
because whether for cross border M&A or greenfield investment in overseas, 
firms might need some time for integration or adaption during the initial stage 
of OFDI (see CRS, 2014). 
 
Table 5-1: Baseline and robust results on DID analysis 
Variable                 
  Panel A: Period Panel B: Since first OFDI Panel C: Productivity measures 
  TFP-levpet TFP-levpet TFP-levpet TFP-levpet TFP-levpet LP GTFP RGTFP 
  02~07 03~07 04~07 04~05 04~06 02~07 03~07 03~07 
  A-1 A-2 A-3 B-1 B-2 C-1 C-2 C-3 
Pretreat 1.227*** 0.259 0.539*** 0.223 1.633*** 1.025*** 0.217 0.021 
(i.e. self-selection effect) (0.293) (0.205) (0.172) (0.180) (0.189) (0.288) (0.333) (0.052) 
Treat 0.075** 0.075* 0.097**  0.092* 0.097** 0.024 0.030 0.012* 
(i.e. own-firm effect) (0.037) (0.039) (0.046) (0.050) (0.046) (0.036) (0.052) (0.007) 
Time 0.255*** 0.214*** 0.175*** 0.087** 0.126*** 0.239*** (0.041) (0.003) 
（i.e. since 2005） (0.026) (0.027) (0.032) (0.036) (0.032) (0.025) (0.035) (0.005) 
Intercept 5.265*** 5.661*** 6.692*** 0.785 5.569*** 4.893*** -0.453 0.011 
 
(0.466) (1.078) (0.656) (1.007) (0.484) (0.674) (0.575) (0.151) 
IND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3387 2981 2512 1304 1918 3387 2704 2704 
R-squared 0.879 0.892 0.907 0.942 0.920 0.786 0.194 0.174 
Log likelihood -2070.4 -1667.5 -1243.0 -312.8 -779.2 -1994.8 -1977.6 3567.5 
Notes: (1). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. (2). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (3). All of 
specifications are estimated by LSDV approach. 
 
 80 
 
Fig. 5-1 The change trends of average TFP-levpet between OFDI and non-OFDI firms 
 
 5.2.2.  Absorptive capacity and own-firm effect 
  As a number of studies (see Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Glass and Saggi, 
1998; Girma, 2005; Hale and Long, 2006; Todo, 2006; Huang et al., 2012) 
stress that the absorptive capability of firms is crucial in the process of 
technology or knowledge transfer. Thus, the own-firm effect is likely to be 
affected by firms’ absorptive capability when the own-firm effect in terms of 
productivity is correlated with technology. 
  To clarify the impact of the absorptive capability on the own-firm effect, we 
estimate Eq.(5-3) with the cross product between the absorptive capability and 
the own-firm effect.  
  Several types of absorptive capability are defined in Chapter 5. First of all, 
we employ the so called “technology gap” (Table 5-2). The similar 
specifications are also widely used in many studies (e.g. Girma, 2005; Todo, 
2006). This indictor is defined as, 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼  (TE gap), where 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 
denotes technical efficiency at firm-level, and 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼  denote the average 
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technical efficiency of OFDI firms at 2, 3 and 4-digit level (Panel A, Panel B, 
and Panel C of Table 5-2), respectively, weighted by firm’s total assets. TE49 
is estimated via a point estimator proposed by Battese and Coelli (1988) and a 
cross-section SFA Normal-Exponential distribution model.  
  As the robustness checks, in Table 5-3, we also employ R&D expenses 
dummy (RDdum), training expenses for employees dummy (TRdum) as input 
proxy measures (see Aw et al., 2007; Girma et al., 2008), and new product 
dummy (NPdum) and ratio (NP) as output proxy measures (see Lachenmaier 
and Woessmann, 2004; Bocquet and Musso, 2010) for absorptive capability. It 
is generally considered that these indictors are correlated with the innovation 
and the accumulation of human capital (see Arnold and Hussinger, 2005, 
Girma, 2005; Malchow-Møller et al. 2013). 
  Furthermore, TFP-levpet and GTFP are employed as dependent variables 
from Panel A to C of Table 5-2, and in Table 5-3, all of specifications are 
estimated by TFP-levpet. 
  The results in Table 5-2 from Panel A to C show that the coefficients on 
interaction terms are positive and statistically significant in terms of TFP level 
(TFP-levpet) for all of three specifications, while for TFP growth (GTFP) we 
can only observe positive but not significant effect of absorptive capability 
  The results on robustness checks presented in Table 5-3 show similar 
patterns as Table 5-2. An overwhelming majority of cross products on firm 
absorptive capacity are positive and significant at the 10% level at least, 
regardless of the measurements for absorptive capability. 
  Therefore, these results provide strong and robust evidence that the 
magnitude of the productivity-enhancing effect via OFDI becomes stronger as 
the absorptive capability rises. 
 
Table 5-2: Absorptive capacity and own-firm effect 
Variable             
  Panel A: 2-digit industry Panel B: 3-digit industry Panel C: 4-digit industry 
  TFP-levpet GTFP TFP-levpet GTFP TFP-levpet GTFP 
  A-1 A-2 B-1 B-2 C-1 C-2 
Pretreat 0.029 0.011 0.037 0.020 0.034 0.014 
(i.e. self-selection effect) (0.025) (0.048) (0.026) (0.048) (0.027) (0.049) 
Treat 0.574*** -0.323 0.640*** -0.287 0.803*** -0.095 
                                                        
49 TE is estimated by year and 2-digit level industry (including 30 industries), respectively. More details are 
available on Appendix C. 
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(i.e. own-firm effect) (0.162) (0.214) (0.161) (0.207) (0.182) (0.243) 
Time 0.206*** -0.079*** 0.223*** -0.062** 0.241*** (0.037) 
（i.e. since 2005） (0.017) (0.030) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018) (0.031) 
(Treat ∙ TE gap) (2-digit) 1.661*** 0.699         
 
(0.225) (0.473)         
TE gap (2-digit) 5.859*** 5.817***         
 
(0.155) (0.306)         
(Treat  ∙  TE gap) (3-digit)     1.717*** 0.711     
 
    (0.242) (0.486)     
TE gap (3-digit)     5.581*** 5.766***     
 
    (0.152) (0.312)     
(Treat ∙ TE gap) (4-digit)         1.654*** 0.538 
 
        (0.257) (0.461) 
TE gap (4-digit)         5.136*** 5.287*** 
 
        (0.158) (0.300) 
Intercept 5.243*** 0.253 5.058*** -0.132 5.232*** -0.567 
 
(0.307) (0.462) (0.293) (0.469) (0.310) (0.602) 
IND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3387 2704 3387 2704 3387 2704 
R-squared 0.944 0.421 0.940 0.417 0.936 0.398 
Log likelihood -768.4 -1528.6 -875.0 -1538.2 -997.2 -1581.9 
Notes: (1). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. (2). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (3). All of 
specifications are estimated by LSDV approach. 
  
Table 5-3: Absorptive capacity and own-firm effect (Robustness checks) 
Variable         
  RDdum  TRdum NPdum NP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pretreat 0.026 0.032 0.014 0.024 
(i.e. self-selection effect) (0.042) (0.054) (0.053) (0.052) 
Treat 1.243*** 1.235*** 0.702** 0.679**  
(i.e. own-firm effect) (0.295) (0.292) (0.299) (0.300) 
Time 0.250*** 0.264*** 0.308*** 0.313*** 
(i.e. since 2005) (0.028) (0.026) (0.034) (0.034) 
Treat ∙ RDdum 0.127**       
 
(0.053)       
RDdum -0.014       
 
(0.029)       
Treat ∙ TRdum   0.061     
 
  (0.056)     
TRdum   0.047      
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  (0.034)     
Treat ∙ NPdum     0.141**   
 
    (0.061)   
NPdum     0.052   
 
    (0.048)   
Treat ∙ NP       0.298*   
 
      (0.155) 
NP       0.006  
 
      (0.127) 
Intercept 5.327*** 5.265*** 3.314*** 3.275*** 
 
(0.471) (0.470) (0.911) (0.955) 
IND Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3387 3387 2741 2741 
R-squared 0.879 0.879 0.890 0.889 
Log likelihood -2066.2 -2066.0 -1566.0 -1569.1 
Notes: (1) ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2). All of 
specifications are estimated by LSDV approach. 
 
  Furthermore, in empirical field, a series of studies (see Damijan et al., 2008; 
Van Beveren and Vandenbussche, 2009; Caldera, 2010; Bocquet and Musso, 
2010; Becker and Egger, 2013) focus on the heterogeneous effects of product 
and process innovation on export activities. Hence, it is also interesting to 
know that whether different types of technical absorptive capability have 
different impacts on the own-firm effect. To examine this issue, we distinguish 
the absorptive capability on product and process innovations based on the 
following estimation model. 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐴𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑅𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 + 𝑅𝐸𝑟 + 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5-6), 
 
where subscripts i, j, r, and t are firm, sector, province and year, respectively. 
𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡  is the average amount of innovation (R&D and training) expense of firm 
i from 2002 ~ 2007 (in logs), 𝐴𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 represent the average new product ratio 
of firm i from 2002 ~ 2007 calculated by 𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 with total sales as weight. 
Moreover, 𝑌𝑅𝑡, 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗, and 𝑅𝐸𝑟 are used to capture the effect of years, sectors, 
and regions. 
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  We estimate Eq. (5-6), and decompose the average innovation expense of 
one firm into two parts. Appendix E. shows the estimation results of Eq. (5-6). 
It is observed that the coefficient of 𝐴𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡  (𝛽1 ) is positive (4.543) and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the predicted value of 𝐴𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 
(?̂?1𝐴𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡) (PDINO) is taken as the innovation expense related with product 
innovation, while the residual of Eq. (5-6) (𝜀?̂?𝑡) (PCINO) is deemed as the 
innovation expense related with process innovation. The similar econometric 
technique is also employed in Chapter 4. 
  The results in Table 5-4 show the specifications with interaction terms on 
average innovation expense (INO), innovation expense related with product 
innovation (PDINO), and innovation expense related with process innovation 
(PCINO) in order. The coefficients of interaction terms for all of three 
specifications are positive and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels in 
terms of TFP level (TFP-levpet). It's worth mentioning that the coefficients of 
product innovation (0.084**) are much larger than that of process innovation 
(0.031***). This evidence appears to indicate that more techniques acquired 
via OFDI may belong to the type of product innovation, but not that of process 
innovation. Therefore, relative to the absorptive capability on process 
innovation, the absorptive capability on product innovation may be more 
important for own-firm effect. 
 
Table 5-4: Absorptive capacity and own-firm effect (productivity and process 
innovation)  
Variable       
  Total Product Process 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Pretreat -0.114* 0.034 -0.001 
(i.e. self-selection effect) (0.061) (0.040) (0.045) 
Treat 0.499** 0.958*** 0.925*** 
(i.e. own-firm effect) (0.247) (0.284) (0.269) 
Time 0.256*** 0.255*** 0.102*** 
（i.e. since 2005） (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) 
Treat ∙ INO 0.038***     
 
(0.010)     
INO 0.404***     
 
(0.047)     
Treat ∙ PDINO   0.084**   
 
  (0.034)   
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PDINO   1.202***   
 
  (0.304)   
Treat ∙ PCINO     0.031*** 
 
    (0.010) 
PCINO     0.561*** 
 
    (0.068) 
Intercept 6.059*** 3.301*** 6.960*** 
 
(1.114) (1.199) (0.459) 
IND Yes Yes Yes 
RE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3369 3369 3369 
R-squared 0.872 0.872 0.875 
Log likelihood -2052.3 -2059.8 -2013.9 
Notes: (1) ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2). All of 
specifications are estimated by LSDV approach. 
 
 5.2.3.  OFDI operating strategy, host country, and own-firm effect 
  As mentioned earlier, own-firm effect could derive from different channels, 
therefore, the specific motivations (strategies) of OFDI are likely to be 
correlated with some channels. 
  To clarify which strategies are more important for improving productivity, 
we employ TFP-levpet as the dependent variables in each specification, and the 
interaction items we focus on are based on a series of strategies. We identify 
four types of OFDI operating strategies (Panel A in Table 5-5): (1). information 
gathering (dummy), (2). trade & sales (dummy), (3). production (dummy), (4). 
technology acquiring (dummy). The own-firm effect may be promoted through 
the former two strategies by expanding overseas market share (Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005; Burghart and Rossi, 2009) and acquiring more accurate 
market knowledge; while for the later two strategies, parent firms mainly 
increase their productivity by means of channels involving technology or 
knowledge (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Burghart and Rossi, 2009; Deng, 2009; 
Pietrobelli et al. 2011). Meanwhile, according to characteristics of host 
countries, we also focus on two types of countries (Panel B in Table 5-5): (1). 
MEDCs (dummy), (2). offshore areas50 (dummy). As MEDCs are rich in 
                                                        
50 Offshore areas refer to Bermuda (BMU), Bahamas (BHS), Belize (BLZ), Cayman Islands (CYM), Mauritius 
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advanced technology and management know-how, thus, this type of OFDI 
could increase parent firms’ productivity mainly via technology channel (see 
Falzoni and Grasseni, 2005). Moreover, masses of OFDI projects flowing to 
offshore areas aim to list abroad eventually. Therefore, this type of OFDI may 
raise productivity by low-cost funds (see Forssbæck and Oxelheim, 2011). 
  The results in Table 5-5 shows that positive coefficients on interaction terms 
of technology acquiring and MEDCs-oriented OFDI. It is worth mentioning 
that the magnitude of promotion from technology strategy is considerably large 
(0.451) and statistically significant at the 5% level. In other words, the 
magnitude of productivity-enhancing effect via OFDI becomes stronger if the 
oversea affiliates commit themselves to acquiring advanced technology.  
  To obtain a better and clear understanding of the results, we use the ratio of 
Chinese overseas affiliates with technology strategy relative to the total number 
of oversea firms in each host countries to create a world map (Fig. 5-2). From 
this map, it is obvious that the OFDI with technology motivations are mainly 
concentrate in developed countries such as North America, West Europe, and 
Japan. This map is consistent with our econometric results, to some extent. 
  Therefore, the findings provide concrete evidence on the promotion effects 
of technology channel productivity enhancing. 
 
Table 5-5: Firm strategy (operating intention and host country) and own-firm effect 
Variable             
  Panel A: OFDI operating strategy Panel B: Host country 
  Information Trade & sales Production Technology MEDCs Offshore areas 
  A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 B-1 B-2 
Pretreat 0.063 0.135** 0.092** 0.052 0.029 0.079**  
(i.e. self-selection effect) (0.043) (0.064) (0.038) (0.037) (0.050) (0.037) 
Treat 1.210*** 1.196*** 1.232*** 1.153*** 1.374* 1.229*** 
(i.e. own-firm effect) (0.294) (0.296) (0.295) (0.296) (0.737) (0.293) 
Time 0.256*** 0.252*** 0.248*** 0.256*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 
(i.e. since 2005) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Treat ∙ Information 0.319           
 
(0.252)           
Information -0.290           
 
(0.246)           
Treat ∙ Trade & sales   -0.209*         
 
  (0.120)         
                                                                                                                                                              
(MUS), Seychelles (SYC), and British Virgin Islands (VGB) in the study. 
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Trade & sales   0.138          
 
  (0.101)         
Treat ∙ Production     -0.683***       
 
    (0.261)       
Production     0.629**       
 
    (0.251)       
Treat ∙ Technology       0.451**      
 
      (0.226)     
Technology       -0.122     
 
      (0.190)     
Treat ∙ MEDCs         0.073   
 
        (0.055)   
MEDCs         (0.196)   
 
        (1.132)   
Treat ∙ Offshore areas           -0.150 
 
          (0.132) 
Offshore areas           4.572*** 
 
          (0.477) 
Intercept 5.303*** 5.227*** 5.241*** 5.351*** 5.146*** 5.249*** 
 
(0.470) (0.470) (0.469) (0.467) (0.802) (0.466) 
IND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3387 3387 3387 3387 3387 3387 
R-squared 0.879 0.879 0.879 0.880 0.879 0.879 
Log likelihood -2069.9 -2069.1 -2065.8 -2063.4 -2069.2 -2069.9 
Notes: (1). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. (2). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (3). All of 
specifications are estimated by LSDV approach. (4). The number of OFDI firms with 
information, trade & sales, production, and technology strategy is 121, 266, 69, and 
22, respectively. The number of OFDI firms located in MEDCs and offshore areas is 
207 and 7, respectively. 
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Fig. 5-2: Proportion of Chinese manufacturing overseas affiliates with technology 
strategy by host country in 2007  
 
Notes: (1). The map are created based on the 2216 OFDI cases in CIED till 2007 
including 136 OFDI cases with technology strategy. (2). This map is created based on 
the geographic information on word county-level regions at 1:110 million scales from 
Natural Earth database51. 
 
 5.2.4.  Ownership, government support, and own-firm effect 
  As the Chinese SOEs are the most inefficient firms in terms of productivity 
(see Jefferson et al., 2008) and could still face some issues on operating 
autonomy and entrepreneurial imitative (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). 
Meanwhile, Chinese government, as a sponsor, plays an important role for 
OFDI, especially for those OFDI projects undertaken by SOEs (Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005; Buckley et al., 2007; Luo et al., 2010). In a recent paper of 
Bannò et al. (2014), they argue government support can enhance the 
capabilities and resources of firms as well as provide a positive signal to 
private financiers, and find evidence on the promotion of government support 
on own-firm effect in Italian firms. 
  Therefore, in the issue of own-firm effect, it would be interesting to know 
whether the ownership and the government financial support matters. 
  To clarify the impact of the ownership, we estimate Eq.(5-3) with the 
consideration of four types of firm ownerships (Table 5-6) including SOEs 
                                                        
51 Natural Earth is a public domain map dataset supported by NACIS (North American Cartographic Information 
Society), which can be obtained from (http://www.naturalearthdata.com). 
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(SOE), SOEs administrated by Chinese central government (CSOEs) (CSOE), 
Local SOEs (LSOEs) (LSOE), and POEs (POE). TFP-levpet is employed as the 
dependent variable for all of four specifications in Table 5-6. 
  Subsequently, in order to test the government financial support on own-firm 
effect, we focus on the government subsidy (in logs) (SUB) (Table 5-7). As the 
examine on the relationship between government support and self-selection 
effect in Chapter 4, the total amount of subsidies may also include some parts 
related with export activity and the ownership of SOEs. To treat this issue, we 
employ the same strategy as Chapter 4, which estimates Eq. (4-3), and take the 
residual (𝜀?̂?𝑡) as the analytical foundation. Specification 1 ~ 4 in Table 5-7 show 
tests based on the government subsidy (in logs) (SUB), the residual of 
government subsidy (SUBRE1), the sum of the residual of government subsidy 
before first OFDI (i.e. from 2002 ~ 2004) (SUBRE2), and the accumulative of 
residual of government subsidy in each year (SUBRE3), respectively. 
TFP-levpet is used as the dependent variable for all of four specifications in 
Table 5-7. 
  The results in Table 5-6 show all of specifications on public ownership have 
no statistically significant promoting effect on the productivity enhancing via 
OFDI, while for POEs, the coefficient on cross product is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level. A possible explanation for these 
results is that the more operating freedom and effective of POEs in relative to 
SOEs. Another finding we should notice is that no statistically significant 
effect on government subsidy is captured by any one of four specifications, 
which isn’t consistent with Bannò et al. (2014). These results implies although 
government financial support can promote OFDI (i.e. self-selection effect), it 
does not help the firm productivity-enhancing via OFDI. 
 
Table 5-6: Ownership and own-firm effect 
Variable         
  SOEs Central SOEs Local SOEs POEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pretreat 0.064 0.080** 0.061 0.044 
(i.e. self-selection effect) (0.042) (0.036) (0.042) (0.040) 
Treat 1.233*** 1.250*** 1.235*** 1.245*** 
(i.e. own-firm effect) (0.292) (0.296) (0.292) (0.293) 
Time 0.253*** 0.254*** 0.254*** 0.255*** 
(i.e. since 2005) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
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Treat ∙ SOE 0.033       
 
(0.052)       
SOE -0.069       
 
(0.054)       
Treat ∙ CSOE   -0.021     
 
  (0.258)     
CSOE   -1.088**     
 
  (0.428)     
Treat ∙ LSOE     0.038   
 
    (0.051)   
LSOE     -0.041   
 
    (0.055)   
Treat ∙ POE       0.098*   
 
      (0.058) 
POE       0.014  
 
      (0.055) 
Intercept 5.279*** 5.211*** 5.280*** 5.142*** 
 
(0.469) (0.469) (0.468) (0.475) 
IND Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3387 3387 3387 3387 
R-squared 0.879 0.880 0.879 0.879 
Log likelihood -2069.1 -2061.5 -2069.8 -2067.9 
Notes: (1). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. (2). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (3). All of 
specifications are estimated by LSDV approach. (4). The number of OFDI firms with 
the ownership of SOEs, central SOEs, local SOEs and POEs is 132, 129, 3, and 122, 
respectively.  
 
Table 5-7: Government support and own-firm effect 
Variable         
  Subsidy Residual 1 Residual 2 Residual 3 
  (1) (2) (3) (3) 
Pretreat 0.068 0.052 0.076* 0.084**  
(i.e. self-selection effect) (0.043) (0.044) (0.040) (0.041) 
Treat 1.206*** 1.233*** -0.123 1.228*** 
(i.e. own-firm effect) (0.291) (0.267) (0.234) (0.287) 
Time 0.254*** 0.197*** 0.255*** 0.231*** 
(i.e. since 2005) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.028) 
Treat ∙ SUB 0.000       
 
(0.008)       
SUB 0.007       
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(0.005)       
Treat ∙ SUBRE1   0.001     
 
  (0.009)     
SUBRE1   (0.003)     
 
  (0.006)     
Treat ∙ SUBRE2     0.000   
 
    (0.004)   
SUBRE2     -0.033**   
 
    (0.016)   
Treat ∙ SUBRE3       -0.002 
 
      (0.003) 
SUBRE3       0.007*** 
 
      (0.002) 
Intercept 6.610*** 3.776*** 6.570*** 5.258*** 
 
(0.375) (0.791) (0.371) (0.471) 
IND Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3363 2709 3387 3387 
R-squared 0.878 0.906 0.879 0.88 
Log likelihood -2043.7 -1300.6 -2070.4 -2065.0 
Notes: (1). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. (2). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (3). All of 
specifications are estimated by LSDV approach. 
 
 5.3.  Conclusions 
  Chapter 5 explores whether OFDI can enhance firm productivity, that is, the 
own-firm effect, based on PSM-DID approach by using firm-level panel data 
from Chinese manufacturing firms over the period 2002 ~ 2007. 
  We contribute to the literature in four ways. Firstly, we investigate the 
productivity-enhancing effect of OFDI by using an original and unique linked 
Chinese firm-level panel data; Secondly, This study tries to examine the 
own-firm effect of Chinese establishments based on their first OFDI behaviors; 
Thirdly, we conduct an all-around analyses of the productivity-enhancing effect 
via OFDI, especially with the new constructed dependent variable: the relative 
productivity growth; Fourthly, this paper also examines which factors are 
crucial for own-firm effect for the first time. 
  Our analyses yield four main conclusions. Firstly, overall, Chinese 
manufacturing firms enhance their own productivity through OFDI, and this 
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evidence is robust with different time period; Secondly, the absorptive capacity 
is critical when parent firms increase productivity through OFDI, and the 
absorptive capacity related with product innovation are more important than 
that of process innovation for own-firm effect; Thirdly, the strategies for 
technology acquiring has significant promoting effect on increasing firm 
productivity; Fourthly, the privately ownership is a push factor on own-firm 
effect, while for government support (subsidy), no evidence indicates it 
contribute to accelerate the process of the productivity-enhancing via OFDI. 
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Chapter 6.  Spillover effects from both IFDI and OFDI 
 
  6.1.  Estimation procedures 
  6.1.1.  Estimation strategy 
  In this Chapter, we start to analyze FDI spillover effects. Different from 
Chapter 4 and 5, both IFDI and OFDI spillovers would be explored in Chapter 
6 since we intend to observe whether there exist the different spillover effects 
from between IFDI and OFDI in the context of China52. 
  To investigate the effects of the presence of FDI firms on the productivity of 
domestic firms, we employ the following estimation equation based on TFP 
estimated by a Cobb-Douglas production function. This is a two-step 
estimation framework with separate TFP estimation in the first phase. 
 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾
𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛾𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝜇𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒 + 𝜇𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒 +
𝜃𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 + 𝜃𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 + 𝑅𝐸𝑟 + 𝑌𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (6-1), 
  
  In Eq.(6-1),  𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛 is an IFDI status dummy that is equal to 1 if firm i has 
foreign investment at time t; otherwise it is equal to 0. 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛 is an OFDI 
status dummy that is equal to 1 if firm i has subsidiaries abroad at time t; 
otherwise it is equal to 0. These two variables are used to capture IFDI and 
OFDI own-firm effects, separately. 
  According to HMY (2004), there exist the so-called self-selection effect. 
When a firm accepts foreign investment or alternatively a firm undertakes 
OFDI, better enterprise is acquired by foreign investment or better firm 
undertakes OFDI. In order to control the self-selection bias, we examine this 
problem following the approach employed by Arnold and Javorcik (2005) and 
Vahter and Masso (2006). We add two independent dummy variables 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒
 
                                                        
52 Another reason why we don’t investigate the self-selection effect and the own-firm effect on IFDI, but explore 
spillover effects from both IFDI and OFDI, is that, different from all of OFDI firms, only those IFDI firm via cross 
border M&A exist the so called “self-selection effect” and “own-firm effect”, while for “green field” IFDI firms, it 
dose not exist these two notions. Nevertheless, the spillover effects have practical meaning to all of IFDI and 
OFDI firms, regardless of their types. 
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and 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒  to capture the self-selection effects of IFDI and OFDI, 
respectively. 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒
 indicates a dummy variable marking IFDI firms during 
the two years before accepting foreign investment, and 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒
 also 
indicates a dummy variable that labels OFDI firm during the two years before 
undertaking OFDI as well.53 
  𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 and 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 are defined to measure the presence of IFDI and OFDI 
firms in the firms’ own sector at time t for firm i, respectively. In order to 
measure intra-spillovers more accurately, we focus on the following four 
important concerns. First, as we concentrate on intra-spillovers but not 
inter-spillovers in Chapter 6, we calculate 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 and 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 based on 
3-digit level industries54, which is widely used to measure intra-spillovers. 
Since compared to the 2-digit level measurement for spillovers, the 
measurement for 3-digit level spillovers is more horizontal. (Vahter and Masso, 
2006). Second, In order to examine the robustness of results, according to 
previous studies (see Sinani and Meyer, 2004; Lin et al., 2009), we employ 
three types of specifications to measure inter-spillovers, based on sales, total 
assets, and the number of employees, separately, which are defined in 
Appendix B in details. Third, there is a caveat in estimating the model if we use 
the intra-spillovers variable simply defined as the share of sales, total assets, 
and the number of employees, like most previous studies. In fact, it is difficult 
to separate the own-firm and spillover effects wholly from each other. In order 
to isolate own-firm effect, we construct two heterogeneous intra-spillovers 
variables for each firm to measure IFDI and OFDI intra-spillovers, respectively. 
This approach developed by Vahter and Masso (2006) subtracts the IFDI (or 
OFDI) firms’ own share in the new measurement55. Fourth, an overwhelming 
majority of literature employs the industry share of IFDI (or OFDI) firms to 
investigate spillovers from FDI, but in fact the share variables may not 
                                                        
53 For instance, if the firm accepts foreign investment or undertakes OFDI for the first time in 2007, the 
corresponding dummy variable would take the value of 1 for 2005 and 2006. 
54 The industry code is based on Chinese national standards (GB/T 4754-2002). 
55 For instance, we can assume that there are only three firms in one sector. A and B are IFDI firms, but C is a 
domestic firm. The sum of total sales in the sector is 1000, A, B and C possess 500,300 and 200, respectively. The 
IFDI spillover variable value for firm A should be 0.3, as it can receive spillovers only from firm B; for firm B, the 
value is 0.5 as it can obtains spillovers only from firm A; For firm C, it is 0.8, as it can acquires spillovers from 
both firm A and B. 
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adequately capture the extent of the source of spillovers. As the correct of these 
settings is based on an implicit assumption that these share variables are highly 
correlated with the source of spillovers directly. From the perspective of 
spillover channels, it is obvious that the extent of the source of spillovers is 
affected by industrial level technology. Hence, the implicit assumption may not 
be appropriate. However, this issue is not considered in previous studies. In 
order to measure the technical effect on spillover source, we construct the share 
variables adjusted by technology at 3-digit level. Eventually, 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 and 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 are defined as follows: 
 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 =
(∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼
𝑖∈𝑗 )−𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑖∈𝑗
(
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑖∈𝑗
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼
𝑖∈𝑗
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑖∈𝑗
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑖∈𝑗
⁄ ), 
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼 = {
       1   𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚        
0   𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒                                  
(6-2), 
 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 =
(∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼
𝑖∈𝑗 )−𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑖∈𝑗
(
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑖∈𝑗
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼
𝑖∈𝑗
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑖∈𝑗
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑖∈𝑗
⁄ ), 
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼 = {
       1  𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚        
0   𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒                                  
(6-3), 
 
where 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 can be denoted by sales, total assets, and the number of employees, 
respectively. 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 (TFP-levpet) represents firm-level technology. 
 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡  denotes Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)
 56  that capture the 
combined effects of competition effects and crowding-out effects.   𝑋𝑖𝑡 
represents a vector of possible other control variables correlated with TFP 
including total assets (𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡) (in logs), ROA (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡), export intensity (𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡), 
firm age (𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡), dummy for SOEs (𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡) and POEs (𝑃𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡). Additionally, 
industry dummies (𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗), region dummies (𝑅𝐸𝑡)
57, and year dummies (𝑌𝑅𝑡) , 
and are also included so as to take account of industry, year, and region specific 
productivity differences. Hence, these three types of dummies as regressors to 
remove industry-, year-, and region-specific unobservable effects that may 
                                                        
56 HHI is calculated based on 4-digit level industry (including 482 industries). 
57 Industry dummies 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗  is defined at 3-digit level (169 industries). Region dummies 𝑅𝐸𝑟  is defined at 
China’s province level (31 provinces). 
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otherwise bias the results. At last, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
  To investigate the impact of some factors on FDI spillovers, we further 
estimate Eq. (6-1) with several specific interaction terms. Hence Eq. (6-1) is 
re-constructed as follows: 
 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾
𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛾𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝜇𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒 + 𝜇𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒 +
(𝜃𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 + 𝜆𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐼 ) + 𝜏𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐼 + (𝜃𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 + 𝜆𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑂) + 𝜏𝑂𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑂 +
𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 + 𝑅𝐸𝑟 + 𝑌𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (6-4), 
 
where (𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
⋅ 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐼 ) and (𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
⋅ 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑂) are the corresponding interaction terms 
for 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 and 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
, respectively. 
  In Eq.(6-4), IFDI spillover effect is given by (𝜃𝐼 + 𝜆𝐼 ⋅ 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐼 ), and depended 
on 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐼 , while OFDI spillover effect also has the similar logic as IFDI spillovers, 
which is determined by (𝜃𝑂 + 𝜆𝑂 ⋅ 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑂) and depended on 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑂. 
 
  6.1.2.  Estimation method 
  There are two econometric concerns with the estimation of Eq. (6-1).  
  First, in Step one, as mentioned in Chapter 2. We estimate TFP (in logs) 
(TFP-levpet) by LP-approach (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) to treat the 
“simultaneity bias”.  
  Second, in Step two, when we estimate Eq. (6-1) by the OLS estimation, it 
still suffers from endogeneity of regressors. In addition, more and positive 
spillovers might be observed in the longer time horizon, so it may take time for 
spillovers from FDI firms to take effect. Therefore, according to Todo (2006), 
we employ the following two specifications to account for possible 
endogeneity of regressors. First, we use one year-lagged variables as regressors 
and run the OLS estimation. We expect that the error term at time t is not 
correlated with variables at time t-1. Second, we perform the IV estimation, by 
using the current variables as regressors and the one year-lagged regressors as 
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instruments.    
 
  6.2.  Summary statistics 
  As some of variables of CIED used in Chapter 4 is only exist over 2004 ~ 
2007, therefore, the estimation period is from 2004 ~ 2007. Table 6-1 reports 
summary statistics employed in the regression of Chapter 6. 
 
Table 6-1：Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡  1014646 6.557 1.117 -3.421 13.122 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡 1030321 0.015 0.028 0.001 0.921 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒
 1030321 0.002 0.041 0.000 1.000 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒
 1030321 0.002 0.040 0.000 1.000 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛 1030321 0.217 0.412 0.000 1.000 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛  1030321 0.003 0.053 0.000 1.000 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 (sales) 1030321 0.367 0.175 0.000 0.958 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 (total assets) 1030321 0.397 0.165 0.000 0.905 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 (employee) 1030321 0.322 0.182 0.000 0.907 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 (sales) 1030321 0.028 0.046 0.000 0.323 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 (total assets) 1030321 0.038 0.061 0.000 0.475 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 (employee) 1030321 0.021 0.036 0.000 0.279 
𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 1030321 9.728 1.395 3.638 18.856 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 1028024 0.102 0.234 -0.708 3.437 
𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 1030320 0.180 0.348 0.000 1.000 
𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡 1029396 8.077 8.840 0.000 74.000 
𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 1030321 0.278 0.448 0.000 1.000 
𝑃𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 1030321 0.499 0.500 0.000 1.000 
 
  6.3.  Estimation results 
  6.3.1.  Baseline specifications 
  To get a first impression of the productivity effect of FDI, we start with 
baseline regression results in Eq. (6-1). Table 6-2 reports the estimation results 
by the OLS estimation using one year-lagged regressors with TFP as the 
dependent variable. We examine only self-selection effect and own-firm effect 
in specification (1) of Table 6-2, and FDI spillover effect from specification (2) 
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to (5), whereas specification (6) uses the full set of regressors to test all these 
three productivity effects. Total assets (𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡) (in logs), ROA (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡), export 
intensity (𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡), firm age (𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡), dummy for SOEs (𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡) and POEs (𝑃𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡) 
are used as other control variables throughout in Chapter 6. All spillovers 
variables are measured by sales at 3-digit level.   
  In any of specifications in Table 6-2, the coefficients on self-selection effect 
for both IFDI and OFDI are positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
levels. This finding supports the view that better firms are selected by foreign 
investors and better firms invest in overseas in terms of TFP (HMY, 2004). For 
own-firm effect, an interesting finding is that OFDI has generated positive and 
significant productivity effect, whereas IFDI brought negative productivity 
effect, which seems to imply that firms decrease their TFP, slightly but 
significantly, after introducing IFDI, whereas the reverse is true for OFDI. This 
finding is not similar to that of Vahter and Masso (2006) who find both 
positive and significant IFDI and OFDI own-firm effects by using data from 
Estonian firms. 
  Regarding spillover effect, Both IFDI and OFDI spillover effects appear 
negative but statistically insignificant in specification (2) and (3). Once the 
interaction terms of (𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛) and (𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛) are taken 
into consideration in specification (4), (5) and (6), the coefficients on both two 
interaction terms are positive and significant at the 1% or 5% levels. These 
results imply that the extent of FDI spillovers varies between firms with and 
without FDI. This is not surprising because firms with FDI are more likely to 
link to international markets closely and possess higher-level technology 
(Vahter and Masso 2006), thereby leading to stronger spillovers.  
  The competition effect is captured by HHI. In all of specifications, we find 
negative and significant coefficients on HHI at the 1% levels, which implies 
that lower industry concentration tends to raise firms’ TFP. That is, the positive 
competition effects dominate the negative crowding-out effects as mentioned 
earlier. These results are consistent with those of Blomström and Sjöholm 
(1999) and Sinani and Meyer (2004), who argue the competition in the host 
country force inefficient domestic firms to exploit existing technology more 
efficiently or to look for new technology for survival.  
 
Table 6-2: Baseline results 
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Variable Dependent variable: TFP         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡  -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.179*** -0.187*** -0.180*** 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒
 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒
 0.303*** 0.303*** 0.303*** 0.304*** 0.303*** 0.304*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛
 -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.080*** -0.035*** -0.080*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛
 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.220*** 0.184*** 0.186*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
   -0.023   -0.052*   -0.051*   
    (0.026)   (0.027)   (0.027) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
     -0.051   -0.055 -0.054 
      (0.058)   (0.058) (0.058) 
(𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝  ⋅ 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛)       0.105***   0.105*** 
        (0.016)   (0.016) 
(𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝  ⋅ 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛)         0.824** 0.819**  
          (0.394) (0.393) 
𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡  0.463*** 0.463*** 0.463*** 0.463*** 0.463*** 0.463*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  1.428*** 1.428*** 1.428*** 1.428*** 1.428*** 1.428*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡  0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
𝑃𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡  0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Intercept 1.938*** 1.939*** 1.937*** 1.943*** 1.938*** 1.943*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑅𝐸𝑟  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑌𝑅𝑡 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 625834 625834 625834 625834 625834 625834 
R-squared 0.431 0.431 0.431 0.431 0.431 0.431 
Log likelihood -771330 -771330 -771330 -771307 -771327 -771303 
IFDI spillovers Wald Test (P-value) ~ ~ ~ 22.29*** ~ 22.25*** 
OFDI spillovers Wald Test (P-value) ~ ~ ~ ~ 2.56* 2.53* 
Notes: (1). All specifications are performed through OLS estimation with one 
year-lagged variables as regressors. (2). Spillover variables are measured by sales at 
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3-digit level in all specifications. (3). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (4). 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
   To check the robustness of the baseline results, we further estimate 
specification (6) by not only the OLS estimation using lagged regressors 
(Column 1, 3, and 5 in Table 6-3) but by the IV estimation using current 
regressors instrumented by lagged regressors (Column 2, 4, and 6 in Table 6-3). 
As mentioned earlier, three alternative proxies, namely the share of sales, total 
assets, and employees at 3-digit level, are used to measure both IFDI and OFDI 
spillovers.  
  The results on self-selection effect, own-firm effect, and competition effect 
presented in Table 6-3 are qualitatively the same as and quantitatively similar 
to the baseline results, regardless of estimation approach and the measurement 
for FDI spillovers.  
  Regarding FDI spillovers, OFDI interaction terms are positive and 
significant at the 1% or 5% levels in all robust specifications, similar to our 
previous findings in Table 6-2, whereas IFDI interaction terms are not 
statistically significant in most of roust specifications, which seems to imply 
that we can only find strong support that OFDI firms are more likely to obtain 
OFDI spillovers. These results indicates that firms’ TFP can’t benefit from FDI 
spillovers overall, however FDI spillovers varies across firms as a result of firm 
heterogeneity. 
 
Table 6-3: Robust tests for baseline specifications 
Variable Dependent variable: TFP         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   OLS(sales) IV(sales) OLS(assets) IV(assets) OLS(employee) IV(employee) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡  -0.180*** -0.158*** -0.186*** -0.162*** -0.188*** -0.163*** 
  (0.055) (0.048) (0.055) (0.048) (0.055) (0.048) 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒
 0.129*** 0.063* 0.128*** 0.062* 0.128*** 0.062*   
  (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒
 0.304*** 0.186*** 0.303*** 0.185*** 0.302*** 0.185*** 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛
 -0.080*** -0.058*** -0.045*** -0.033*** -0.028*** -0.025*** 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛
 0.186*** 0.122*** 0.174*** 0.110*** 0.170*** 0.112*** 
  (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
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𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 -0.051* -0.074*** -0.030 -0.053** -0.003 -0.025 
  (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.029) (0.026) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 -0.054 -0.063 -0.074* -0.056 -0.021 -0.026 
  (0.058) (0.050) (0.043) (0.037) (0.069) (0.058) 
(𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝  ⋅ 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛) 0.105*** 0.068*** 0.021 0.008 -0.020 -0.013 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) 
(𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝  ⋅ 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛) 0.819** 0.731** 0.849*** 0.793*** 1.681*** 1.381*** 
  (0.393) (0.340) (0.322) (0.282) (0.558) (0.494) 
𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡  0.463*** 0.508*** 0.463*** 0.508*** 0.463*** 0.508*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  1.428*** 2.156*** 1.428*** 2.156*** 1.428*** 2.156*** 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡  0.039*** 0.090*** 0.040*** 0.091*** 0.040*** 0.091*** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡  -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.006*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡  -0.002 0.026*** -0.002 0.026*** -0.002 0.026*** 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
𝑃𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡  0.041*** 0.036*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Intercept 1.943*** 1.236*** 1.941*** 1.234*** 1.938*** 1.231*** 
 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑅𝐸𝑟  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑌𝑅𝑡 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 625834 624658 625834 624658 625834 624658 
R-squared 0.431 0.486 0.431 0.486 0.431 0.486 
Log likelihood -771303 -737095 -771323 -737111 -771324 -737114 
IFDI spillovers Wald Test (P-value) 22.25*** 27.20*** 1.27 5.08* 1.01 2.09 
OFDI spillovers Wald Test (P-value) 2.53* 6.04** 4.81*** 9.98*** 4.56** 7.94** 
Notes: (1). All specifications are performed through OLS estimation with one 
year-lagged variables as regressors or IV estimation with current variables as 
regressors and one year-lagged regressors as instruments. (2). The share of sales, total 
assets, and employees at 3-digit level are employed as the measures for spillovers. (3). 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (4). ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 6.3.2.  Differences in FDI spillovers across wage gap  
  As mentioned earlier, FDI spillover channels are likely to be blocked by 
some factors, which leads to spillovers not captured by the above empirical 
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tests. To investigate whether there exist obstacles for FDI spillovers, we run 
Eq.(6-4) with some specific interaction terms.  
  Regarding labor turnover, wage differentials between local and FDI firms 
are regarded as an important factor for the effectiveness of this channel on FDI 
spillovers in that FDI firms usually pay higher wages relevant to local firms in 
fact (Fosfuri et al. 2001; Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004), which may decrease the 
flow of workers from FDI firms to local firms, and even lead to the loss of 
talents for local firms. 
  To clarify the impact of wage differentials on both IFDI and OFDI spillovers, 
we examine the effects of interaction terms 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼) and 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼) , where 𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡  denotes the average wage at 
firm-level, and 𝑊𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼 as well as 𝑊𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼 denote the average wage of IFDI 
and OFDI firms at 3-digit level by using the number of employees in a firm as 
a weight variable, respectively. Therefore, (𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼) and (𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡 −
𝑊𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼) represent the wage gap of firm-industry level for IFDI and OFDI 
firm, respectively. Panel A in Table 6-4 shows that (𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼) and 
(𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼) are -0.284 and -0.277, supporting that both IFDI and OFDI 
firms pay higher wage for their employees compared to domestic firms indeed. 
Results from OLS and IV estimations in Table 6-5 indicate the coefficients on 
IFDI interaction terms are positive and significant at the 1% levels in all three 
types of spillover variables, while for OFDI interaction terms, positive 
coefficients can be observed in all of specifications, but not statistically 
significant. 
  These results imply that, to some extent, the magnitude of IFDI spillovers 
becomes stronger as the narrowing of wage gap relevant to IFDI firm, but not 
that of OFDI spillovers for OFDI wage gap. In other words, it is supported that 
wage differentials between domestic firms and IFDI firms is a critical factor 
when IFDI spillovers work through labor turnover. Meanwhile, it appears that 
the labor turnover channel for IFDI spillovers is more effective than that of 
OFDI.  
  The reason for these results may be the vocation preference in SOEs for 
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Chinese employees. In our sample, 33.96% of OFDI firms belong to state 
ownership in 2007, which may limit the effect of OFDI spillovers via worker 
mobility from OFDI firms to domestic firms. 
 
Table 6-4: Statistics of obstructive factors on spillovers 
Variable Observation Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Obstacles for spillover channels       
Wage gap            
(𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼) 1028886 -0.284 0.546 -4.625 4.899 
(𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼) 917096 -0.277 0.638 -5.162 3.902 
Equity holding level            
𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼  1029777 0.756 0.132 0.030 1.000 
Competing level           
(𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡) 798877 1.020 0.545 0.000 31.938 
(𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡) 798877 0.963 0.094 0.182 2.070 
            
Panel B: Obstacles for firms obtaining spillovers     
Technology gap           
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼  798833 -0.050 0.178 -1.000 1.000 
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼 766933 -0.135 0.247 -1.000 1.000 
            
Panel C: Other special obstacles         
Linkage to domestic market         
(𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡) 1029545 2.103 2.094 0.000 36.003 
(𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡) 751332 1.675 3.087 0.000 97.462 
Government subsidy           
 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖𝑡 1029119 0.699 1.918 0.000 10.063 
Note: (1). The variables on wage gap, technology gap, and government subsidy are 
firm-level variables measured by 3-digit level, while those on equity holding level, 
competing level, linkage to domestic market are industry-level variables measured by 
4-digit level. (2). In the dataset, there are 169 sectors at 3-digit level, and 482 sectors 
at 4-digit level. 
 
Table 6-5: Differences in FDI spillovers across wage gap 
Variable Dependent variable: TFP         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   OLS(sales) IV(sales) OLS(assets) IV(assets) OLS(employee) IV(employee) 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 0.046 0.030 0.024 0.015 0.057* 0.053*   
  (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026) (0.033) (0.029) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 -0.062 -0.068 -0.073 -0.060 -0.012 -0.037 
  (0.069) (0.061) (0.051) (0.045) (0.086) (0.074) 
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𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼) 0.097*** 0.132*** 0.083*** 0.121*** 0.097*** 0.142*** 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼) 0.014 0.048 0.002 0.032 0.036 0.047 
  (0.048) (0.040) (0.037) (0.031) (0.063) (0.052) 
(𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼) 0.299*** 0.217*** 0.301*** 0.218*** 0.301*** 0.220*** 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
(𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼) 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Observations 534924 533948 534924 533948 534924 533948 
R-squared 0.457 0.508 0.457 0.508 0.457 0.508 
Log likelihood -644422 -616176 -644449 -616215 -644442 -616225 
Notes: (1). All specifications are performed through OLS estimation with one 
year-lagged variables as regressors or IV estimation with current variables as 
regressors and one year-lagged regressors as instruments. (2). Spillover variables are 
measured based on the share of sales, total assets, and employees at 3-digit level. (3). 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (4). ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (5). Other variables are the 
same as Table 6-3 and omitted in this table. 
 
 6.3.3.  Differences in FDI spillovers across equity holding level 
  For demonstration effect, it seems that FDI firms enable to employ some 
measures, such as maintaining relative high holding level of equity, to prevent 
new products and advantaged technologies getting into the hands of domestic 
firms. In China, IFDI has a tendency from joint venture to sole proprietor since 
Chinese government permitted whole foreign-owned enterprise as a new IFDI 
entry mode in the 1990s (Lin et al. 2009). 
  To clarify the impact of equity holding level for IFDI firm58, we construct an 
interaction term (𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼) , where 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼  denotes the 
average foreign equity holding level for IFDI firms at 4-digit level by using 
total firm equity as a weight variable. Panel A in Table 6-4 shows that the 
mean statistics of 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼 reaches up to 0.756, which is consistent with 
the previous view that higher foreign equity holding level or even wholly 
                                                        
58 Relevant to IFDI firms, it is difficulty to confirm which ownership indeed suffers losses due to externalities 
from spillovers for OFDI firms. Therefore, in this section, we only focus on the impact of equity holding level of 
IFDI firms on IFDI spillovers. 
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foreign-owned firms are favored by foreign investors in China. The regression 
results from Table 6-6 estimated by OLS and IV show similar pattern in all 
three specifications for spillovers, which are negative and significant at the 1% 
or 5% levels. These results indicates that IFDI spillovers within industries 
become weaker as the enhancing of foreign equity holding level for IFDI firms. 
Therefore, higher foreign equity holding level for IFDI firms indeed a barrier 
for spillovers in intra-industry via demonstration effect. 
 
Table 6-6: Differences in FDI spillovers across equity holding level 
Variable Dependent variable: TFP         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   OLS(sales) IV(sales) OLS(assets) IV(assets) OLS(employee) IV(employee) 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 0.081* 0.067* 0.040 0.039 0.105** 0.118*** 
  (0.043) (0.038) (0.040) (0.036) (0.050) (0.045) 
(𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼) -0.131*** -0.155*** -0.085** -0.118*** -0.135*** -0.177*** 
  (0.042) (0.038) (0.040) (0.036) (0.049) (0.044) 
𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼 -0.052*** -0.015 -0.062*** -0.023 -0.058*** -0.019 
  (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Observations 625329 624153 625329 624153 625329 624153 
R-squared 0.431 0.486 0.431 0.486 0.431 0.486 
Log likelihood -770582 -736381 -770584 -736387 -770584 -736387 
Notes: (1). All specifications are performed through OLS estimation with one 
year-lagged variables as regressors or IV estimation with current variables as 
regressors and one year-lagged regressors as instruments. (2). Spillover variables are 
measured based on the share of sales, total assets, and employees at 3-digit level. (3). 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (4). ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (5). Other variables are the 
same as Table 6-3 and omitted in this table. 
 
  6.3.4.  Differences in FDI spillovers across firm competing level  
  Despite we have already use HHI to capture the competition effect, we still 
intend to know how the magnitude of spillovers varies across industries with 
different competing level. 
  We employ advertisement expense per capita to measure firm’s 
competitiveness, then we construct interaction terms 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼/
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𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡)  and 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡) , where 𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼 , 
 𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼 and 𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡 denote the average of advertisement expense per capita 
for non-IFDI firms, non-OFDI firms and all firms at 4-digit level by using sales 
as a weight, respectively. (𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡)  and (𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡) , 
represent that the average of advertisement expense  per capita for both IFDI 
and OFDI firms are adjusted by industrial mean due to the difference of 
advertisement expense across industries. 
  The regression results 59  in Table 6-7 show similar pattern for all 
specifications. The coefficients on interaction terms have positive signs and are 
statistically significant, which implies that the enhancing competition at 4-digit 
level brings more positive competition effect but not crowding-out effect. In 
other words, firms obtain more spillovers in those more competitive industries.  
 
Table 6-7: Differences in FDI spillovers across firm competing level 
Variable Dependent variable: TFP         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   OLS(sales) IV(sales) OLS(assets) IV(assets) OLS(employee) IV(employee) 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 -0.137*** -0.139*** -0.089** -0.089*** -0.129*** -0.115*** 
  (0.036) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) (0.041) (0.036) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 -0.517*** -0.289* -0.588*** -0.404*** -0.631** -0.482**  
  (0.191) (0.157) (0.154) (0.127) (0.246) (0.204) 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡) 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡) 0.700*** 0.286* 0.706*** 0.409*** 0.854*** 0.528**  
  (0.199) (0.164) (0.165) (0.136) (0.277) (0.230) 
(𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡) 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
(𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑡) -0.017 -0.025 -0.024 -0.034** -0.008 -0.026 
  (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) 
Observations 439001 438190 439001 438190 439001 438190 
R-squared 0.442 0.496 0.442 0.496 0.442 0.496 
Log likelihood -535155 -511451 -535156 -511454 -535158 -511455 
Notes: (1). All specifications are performed through OLS estimation with one 
year-lagged variables as regressors or IV estimation with current variables as 
regressors and one year-lagged regressors as instruments. (2). Spillover variables are 
                                                        
59 These estimations don’t include self-selection effect, since the data of advertisement expense is accessible only 
from 2005 to 2007. 
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measured based on the share of sales, total assets, and employees at 3-digit level. (3). 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (4). ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (5). Other variables are the 
same as Table 6-3 and omitted in this table. 
 
  6.3.5.  Differences in FDI spillovers across technology gap 
  From the perspective of those firms that obtain FDI spillovers, the actual 
effects of spillovers from FDI firms are mainly affected by absorptive capacity 
and learning space as mentioned earlier. These two factors can be expressed as 
technology gap. Therefore, it is not clear a priori which factor dominates in 
technology gap.  
  We employ new product ratio60 as the proxy of technology to construct the 
interaction terms of technology gap, 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼) and 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅
(𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼), where 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 denotes technology at firm-level, and 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼 
as well as 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼 denote the average technology of IFDI and OFDI firms at 
3-digit level by using firm’s total assets as a weight, respectively. 
Therefore,  (𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼)  and (𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼)  represent the technology 
gap of firm-industry level for IFDI and OFDI firm. Panel B in Table 6-4 shows 
that new product ratio for (𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼) and (𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼) are negative, 
indicating the technology of domestic firms is smaller than that of FDI firms 
measured at 3-digit level. 
  Table 6-8 shows results based on the interaction terms calculated by new 
product ratio by using OLS and IV estimations in all three specifications for 
spillovers. Positive and significant coefficients on interaction terms are found 
for all of IFDI specifications and part of OFDI specifications.   
  Therefore, to some extent, we find some evidence that the magnitude of 
spillovers become larger when the technology level of domestic firms is closer 
                                                        
60 For foreign affiliates in China, R&D expense may not be appropriate to represent their technology, since 
multinationals engage in R&D activities in their home country or other countries with high level technology, but 
not in China. Therefore, it is likely to underestimate technology level of IFDI by using R&D expense in our data. 
In order to treat this problem, we employ a proxy, namely new product ratio (the sales of new product / total sales) 
to measure firm technology level. Relevant to R&D expense, new product ratio may be a better variable to 
measure firm technology.  
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to high technology level of FDI firms, especially for IFDI spillovers. In other 
words, overall the effects of absorptive capacity dominate that of learning 
space in our dataset. Most firms are still in the early stage with enough learning 
space, where high absorptive capacity as main factor helps them benefit from 
FDI spillovers.  
 
Table 6-8: Differences in FDI spillovers across technology gap measured by new 
product ratio 
Variable Dependent variable: TFP         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   OLS(sales) IV(sales) OLS(assets) IV(assets) OLS(employee) IV(employee) 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 -0.100*** -0.102*** -0.086** -0.083** -0.090** -0.068*   
  (0.038) (0.034) (0.038) (0.034) (0.043) (0.038) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 0.146 -0.012 0.054 -0.034 0.137 -0.023 
  (0.090) (0.075) (0.067) (0.056) (0.098) (0.080) 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼) 0.094*** 0.071*** 0.076*** 0.056*** 0.085*** 0.078*** 
  (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.024) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼) 0.231* 0.182 0.178 0.131 0.351* 0.132 
  (0.138) (0.114) (0.113) (0.091) (0.211) (0.170) 
(𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼) 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.155*** 0.154*** 
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
(𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼) 0.034 -0.038* 0.031 -0.040** 0.032 -0.040**  
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
Observations 414624 413862 414624 413862 414624 413862 
R-squared 0.446 0.499 0.446 0.499 0.446 0.499 
Log likelihood -503357 -481115 -503363 -481122 -503362 -481122 
Notes: (1). All specifications are performed through OLS estimation with one 
year-lagged variables as regressors or IV estimation with current variables as 
regressors and one year-lagged regressors as instruments. (2). Spillover variables are 
measured based on the share of sales, total assets, and employees at 3-digit level. (3). 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (4). ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (5). Other variables are the 
same as Table 6-3 and omitted in this table. 
 
  6.3.6.  Differences in FDI spillovers across linkage to domestic market 
  Moreover, several other factors that on behalf of firm heterogeneity may 
affect FDI spillovers. The extent of the linkage to domestic market is one of the 
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factors. It has been suggested that the market orientation of FDI firms is likely 
to affect spillovers (Javorcik, 2004; Girma et al., 2008). Specifically, the extent 
of the linkage to domestic market for FDI firms might change the magnitude of 
completion effect and crowding-out effect simultaneously, but the combined 
effect is still not clear. 
  To clarify the impact of the linkage on spillovers, we construct interaction 
terms 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡) and 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡), where 𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼 , 
𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼  and 𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡 denote the average of export intensity (exports / sales) for 
IFDI, OFDI and all firms at 4-digit level by using sales as a weight, 
respectively. (𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡) and (𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡) represent that the average 
of export rate for both IFDI and OFDI firms are adjusted by industrial mean in 
order to eliminate the difference of export rate across industries. 
  The results estimated by using OLS and IV in Table 6-9 shows that negative 
and significant coefficients on interaction terms are observed for almost all 
specifications. In other words, the magnitude of spillovers becomes weaker as 
the industry-level export rate rises. This finding implies that firms enable to 
obtain more spillovers in those industries with more domestic-market-oriented 
firms. 
 
Table 6-9: Differences in FDI spillovers across the linkage to domestic market 
Variable Dependent variable: TFP         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   OLS(sales) IV(sales) OLS(assets) IV(assets) OLS(employee) IV(employee) 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 0.052 -0.024 0.042 -0.015 0.094** 0.025 
  (0.040) (0.036) (0.039) (0.035) (0.045) (0.041) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 -0.094 -0.081 -0.075 -0.049 0.066 0.094 
  (0.080) (0.069) (0.058) (0.050) (0.101) (0.085) 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡) -0.055*** -0.022* -0.060*** -0.023** -0.043** -0.002 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ (𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡) -0.026 -0.046** -0.031* -0.047*** -0.078** -0.108*** 
  (0.025) (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) (0.038) (0.034) 
(𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡) -0.003** -0.005*** 0.000 -0.004** -0.005*** -0.007*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
(𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑡) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 416530 415798 416530 415798 416530 415798 
R-squared 0.445 0.500 0.445 0.500 0.445 0.500 
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Log likelihood -506017 -483058 -506011 -483056 -506022 -483061 
Notes: (1). All specifications are performed through OLS estimation with one 
year-lagged variables as regressors or IV estimation with current variables as 
regressors and one year-lagged regressors as instruments. (2). Spillover variables are 
measured based on the share of sales, total assets, and employees at 3-digit level. (3). 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (4). ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (5). Other variables are the 
same as Table 6-3 and omitted in this table. 
 
  6.3.7.  Differences in FDI spillovers across government subsidy   
  In China, it is common that firm obtains subsidies from local government, so 
it would be interesting to know whether subsidy affects FDI spillovers. 
Although we don’t know the reason why firms acquire subsidies in our dataset, 
subsidy indeed contributes to ease financial constraints and gets out of 
operation difficulties. Therefore, we believe government subsidy may have 
positive effect on spillovers. 
  To examine this hypothesis, we construct interaction terms as follows, 
(𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖𝑡) and (𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖𝑡), where 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖𝑡  denotes the average 
subsidy per capita at firm-level.  
  Results from OLS and IV estimations in Table 6-10 indicate the coefficients 
on both IFDI and OFDI interaction terms are positive and significant for almost 
all of spillover variables. These results imply that the magnitude of FDI 
spillovers becomes stronger as the increasing of subsidies obtained by local 
firms. In other words, it is strongly supported subsidy has positive effect on 
spillovers. This is probably because subsidies are used to eliminate obstacles 
such as talent introduction, and technology upgrade. 
 
Table 6-10： Differences in FDI spillovers across government subsidy 
Variable Dependent variable: TFP         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   OLS(sales) IV(sales) OLS(assets) IV(assets) OLS(employee) IV(employee) 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 -0.025 -0.055** -0.025 -0.050** -0.015 -0.032 
  (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.029) (0.026) 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 -0.07 -0.071 -0.085* -0.06 -0.049 -0.043 
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  (0.059) (0.051) (0.043) (0.037) (0.070) (0.059) 
(𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖𝑡) 0.007*** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.008*** 0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
(𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑝 ⋅ 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖𝑡) 0.031** 0.019* 0.025** 0.014 0.059*** 0.040*** 
  (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.015) 
 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖𝑡  0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 624567 623398 624567 623398 624567 623398 
R-squared 0.427 0.482 0.427 0.482 0.427 0.482 
Log likelihood -768857 -734922 -768861 -734927 -768852 -734923 
Notes: (1). All specifications are performed through OLS estimation with one 
year-lagged variables as regressors or IV estimation with current variables as 
regressors and one year-lagged regressors as instruments. (2). Spillover variables are 
measured based on the share of sales, total assets, and employees at 3-digit level. (3). 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (4). ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (5). Other variables are the 
same as Table 6-3 and omitted in this table. 
 
 6.4.  Conclusions 
  In Chapter 6, we contribute to the literature in three ways. First, it is the first 
to investigate productivity spillovers from OFDI by using firm-level panel data 
from Chinese manufacturing sectors. Second, considering the possible bias on 
measuring spillovers based on share variables, we modify new spillover 
variables adjusted by industry-level technology. Third, for the mixed results on 
spillovers as mentioned earlier, we explicitly examine some obstacles in 
spillover mechanism that prevent domestic firms from benefiting spillovers, 
but not take it as “a black box”. 
  Overall, the estimation results produce findings that support positive 
self-selection effects from both IFDI and OFDI, as well as positive own-firm 
effects from OFDI only. For foreign invested firms in China, there exist 
negative own-firm effects after inducing foreign investment. The results don’t 
indicate there exist much spillover effect for both IFDI and OFDI as a whole. 
However, after taking consideration of some obstacles in spillover mechanism 
such as differentials of wage, equity holding level, competiveness, technology 
level, linkage to domestic market and government subsidy, we find strong and 
robust evidence that the magnitude of both IFDI and OFDI spillovers become 
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stronger as the extent of those obstructive factors decrease. These findings 
suggest that the magnitude of spillovers depends on the extent of obstacles in 
spillover mechanism, which might be a crucial reason for mixed results on FDI 
spillovers in previous studies. In short, both IFDI and OFDI spillovers varies 
across firms as a result of substantial heterogeneity. 
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Chapter 7.  Concluding remarks 
 
7.1.  Main results 
  In the study, according to empirical results from Chapter 4 ~ 6, we can reach 
the following conclusions. 
  Firstly, high productivity firms have high tendencies to undertake first OFDI 
as a whole61, which indicates HMY’s theory can be applied to Chinese 
manufacturing firms. Furthermore, this self-selection effect varies with some 
specific factors, including the competitiveness in home country, the OFDI 
strategies, the parent firms’ location, as well as the characteristics of host 
countries. In particular, the government financial support is one important 
reason why some of Chinese firms without productivity advantage still could 
undertake OFDI. 
  Secondly, the first OFDI behavior raises firm productivity, as a whole62. 
There also exists substantial heterogeneity on own-firm effect. In particular, the 
absorptive capacity is essential for the productivity-enhancing effect via OFDI. 
Furthermore, the absorptive capacity related with product innovation is more 
important than that of process innovation for own-firm effect. Moreover, OFDI 
strategies for obtaining advanced technology as well as the privately ownership 
have significant effect on own-firm effect. However, the financial support from 
government is not a push factor on productivity enhancing via OFDI. 
  Thirdly, there isn’t much spillover effect for both IFDI and OFDI, as a whole. 
However, after considering some obstacles in spillover mechanism such as 
differentials of wage, equity holding level, competiveness, technology, linkage 
to domestic market and subsidy, we find strong and robust evidence that both 
IFDI and OFDI spillovers varies across firms as a result of substantial 
heterogeneity.  
 
7.2.  Policy implications 
  Based on our conclusions, several policy implications can be obtained as 
                                                        
61 In Chapter 6, we also find self-selection effect on IFDI. 
62 In Chapter 6, we don’t find own-firm effect on OFDI. 
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follows: 
  Firstly, from Chapter 4, some evidence shows that government financial 
support is one important reason why some of Chinese firms without 
productivity advantage still could undertake OFDI. It means that the 
government support is an important promoting factor on the rapid growth of 
domestic MNEs in late-development countries. Therefore, on the one hand, 
from the view of promoting OFDI, the government support could be deemed as 
an effective behavior. On the other hand, for OFDI firms with government 
support, it also means the necessity of enhancing productivity in the long-run, 
although firms could take advantage of government support as a substitution at 
present.  
  Secondly, from Chapter 5, it’s worth noting that the absorptive capacity is 
critical for own-firm effect. It illustrates the importance of self-improving on 
technology for productivity enhancing via OFDI, and it could not get any 
own-firm effect if firms only embarks on OFDI blindly. Meanwhile, the 
government support doesn’t have any effect on own-firm effect, which would 
probably mean the government support is, at least in this field, inefficient. It 
provides an important policy implication that the government should provide 
OFDI promoting subsidies with some conditions such as technology upgrading, 
and establish a more effective system on evaluating the use of OFDI promoting 
subsidies.  
  Thirdly, from Chapter 6, two policy implications derived from the findings 
on spillover effect. On the one hand, compared to “Bring-in” policy, Chinese 
government has mainly focused on “Going-out” strategy recently. It is 
perfectly sensible to adjust policy since Chinese firms might benefit more from 
OFDI relative to IFDI in terms of firm productivity. On the other hand, since 
the extent of obstacles in spillover mechanism is a key issue on spillovers, 
some strategies aimed at promoting talent introduction, technology upgrade, 
and cooperating with FDI firms, might increase the magnitude of spillovers. 
 
7.3.  Defects and prospects of study  
  Owing to the limitations of available data and our research capability, there 
exist masses of defects in this study. Consequently, certainly more extensions 
are needed to fully understand the nexus between firm productivity and OFDI, 
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in future study. 
  Firstly, in the study on self-selection effect, as a result of lack of detailed 
information on government support, we can only investigate government 
support simply based on the total amount of government subsidy. Hence, it is 
necessary to study this issue based on more specific tests. 
  Secondly, in the study on own-firm effect, we examines the impact of 
absorptive capability on own-firm effect in detail, but the study don’t involving 
other non-technical channels such as securing raw material supplies (e.g. Child 
and Rodrigues, 2005; Amighini et al. 2013), expanding overseas market share 
(e.g. Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Burghart and Rossi, 2009), surmounting trade 
barriers (e.g. Neven and Siotis, 1996). In future study, some datasets including 
the information of firm export, anti-dumping, as well as the detailed 
characteristics on host countries should be merged in our present dataset so as 
to conduct these analyses. 
  Thirdly, in the study on spillover effect, we only focus on intra-industry 
spillovers. In fact, inter-industry spillovers also exist as Javorcik (2004) argues. 
We ignore such vertical spillovers by using relative narrowing industry at least 
3-digit level in all specifications in Chapter 6, while a further study including 
inter-industry spillovers are probably needed by using input and output table. 
Moreover, it’s important to note that the effects of some obstacles in spillover 
mechanism such as the wage gap and the technology gap might be non-linear. 
Therefore, the application of non-linear econometric models such as Hansen’s 
threshold model (Hansen, 1999) may be a better choice for more accurate 
results in the future. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A.  The number of observations removed in CIED 
Year 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Original dataset 336790 301989 271847 276474 196220 181557 
(1). Key variable with missing value 92 177 58 319 0 0 
(2). Key variable with 0 and minus value  17185 15495 13959 25424 20391 24034 
(3). Obs. is not obey GAAP 506 686 492 886 643 178 
(4). Firms less than 8 persons 770 754 671 989 411 426 
(5). Non-manufacturing firms 21483 20646 18636 17315 13175 12475 
Processed dataset 296754 264231 238031 231541 161600 144444 
 
Appendix B.  Variable definition 
  Employees (𝐿): The average number of employees per year in a firm, in 
logarithmic-form. 
  Capital (𝐾): The average of net value of fixed assets, between the beginning 
and end of year for a firm, in thousands of RMB, in logarithmic-form. 
  Intermediate inputs (M): The sum of raw materials, fuel and power and so on, 
in thousands of RMB, at the firm level, in logarithmic-form. 
  Value-added (VA): Industrial value-added, in thousands of RMB, at the firm 
level, in logarithmic-form. 
  Sales (𝑆𝐴): Total sales in a year in thousands of RMB, at the firm level, in 
logarithmic-form. 
  Total assets (𝐴𝑆): Total assets in a year in thousands of RMB, at the firm 
level, in logarithmic-form. 
  Capital intensity (CA): Total assets, in thousands of RMB, relative to the 
average number of employees in a firm, truncated at 0.1th and 99.9th 
percentiles. 
  Export intensity (EX): Total revenue from export, relative to total sales of the 
firm, truncated at 0.1th and 99.9th percentiles. 
  Firm age (AG): Firm age truncated at 0.1th and 99.9th percentiles. 
  ROA (ROA): Return on assets, constructed as the ratio of operating profit to 
total assets, truncated at 0.1th and 99.9th percentiles. 
 130 
 
  Cost of debt (COD): Total interests, relative to total debts in a year, 
truncated at 0.1th and 99.9th percentiles. 
  R&D intensity (RD): R&D expense per capita in a year, in thousands of 
RMB, at the firm level, truncated at 0.1th and 99.9th percentiles, in 
logarithmic-form. 
Training intensity (TR): Training expense per capita in a year, in thousands of 
RMB, at the firm level, truncated at 0.1th and 99.9th percentiles, in 
logarithmic-form. 
New product ratio (NP): New product value relative to total industrial output 
in a year.  
  Wage per capita (WA): Total wage relative to total employees in a firm, in 
thousands of RMB, truncated at 0.1th and 99.9th percentiles, in 
logarithmic-form. 
  Advertisement expense per capita (AD): Total advertisement expense 
relative to total employees in a firm, in thousands of RMB, truncated at 0.1th 
and 99.9th percentiles, in logarithmic-form. 
  Government subsidy (SUB): Total subsidies from government, in thousands 
of RMB, relative to total employees, in logarithmic-form. 
  State-owned enterprise (SOE): This is a dummy variable according to CIED. 
If a firm is state-owned enterprise, the variable is equal to 1, otherwise is 0. 
  Privately-owned enterprise (POE): This is a dummy variable according to 
CIED. If a firm is privately-owned enterprise, the variable is equal to 1, 
otherwise is 0. 
  Foreign-owned enterprise (FOE): This is a dummy variable according to 
CIED. If a firm is foreign-owned enterprise, the variable is equal to 1, 
otherwise is 0. 
  Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI):  𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡=∑ (𝑆𝑖𝑡/𝑆𝑗𝑡)
2
𝑖𝑡 , where industry j 
is defined at 3- and 4- digit industry levels, the measures 𝑆𝑖𝑡 and 𝑆𝑗𝑡 are the 
total sales of firm i, industry j in year t in the study, respectively. 
  According to the statistical system of CIED, the new product refers to the 
entirely product with the new techniques, principles, and design concepts, or 
the product with the significant improvement on product performance and the 
expansion on functions as a result of the remarkable improvement in structure, 
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materials and technology. The fixed assets refer to houses, buildings, 
machinery, transportation and other equipment, instruments, appliances 
associated with the production with the use period over one year. 
  Note that all above variables are derived from CIED. 
  
Appendix C.  Firm-level productivity measures 
  Labor productivity (LP) is defined as the industrial value-added relative to 
the average number of employees in a firm, at the firm level, in 
logarithmic-form. The industrial value-added is deflated as mentioned in 
Section 3.2.. 
 
  Total factor productivity (TFP) is estimated by a panel data from 2002 ~ 
2007, and defined as  
 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑃 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝐾
𝐿𝑃𝐾𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝐿
𝐿𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡) (A-C-1), 
 
where subscripts i, t denote firm and year, respectively; ?̂?𝐾
𝐿𝑃, ?̂?𝐿
𝐿𝑃 denote the 
estimators of 𝐾𝑖𝑡  and 𝐿𝑖𝑡  by LP-approach (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). 
𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 and 𝐾𝑖𝑡 are deflated as mentioned in Section 3.2.. 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑃 is used in 
logs. 
 
  Technical efficiency (TE) is estimated by year and 2-digit industry level, 
respectively and the estimation process is presented in the following. Firstly, 
we employ a cross-section Normal-Exponential distribution SFA model defined 
as follows, 
 
𝑉𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (A-C-2), 
 
where, subscripts i denote firm, 𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 and the specific distributional 
assumptions are 𝑢𝑖~𝐸(𝜎𝑢)  , 𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) , 𝑣𝑖  captures the measurement 
error, and 𝑢𝑖  represents the efficiency term.  𝑉𝐴𝑖  and 𝐾𝑖  are deflated as 
mentioned in Section 3.2.. 
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  TE is estimated by the well-known solution proposed by Battese and Coelli 
(1988), which exploit the conditional distribution of u given  𝜀 , then a point 
estimate of the inefficiencies can be obtained by the mean 𝐸(𝑢|𝜀̂) of this 
conditional distribution. Once point estimates of u are obtained, TE can be 
derived as 
𝑇𝐸 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−?̂?) (A-C-3), 
where ?̂? is 𝐸(𝑢|𝜀̂).  
 
Appendix D.  Levinsohn and Petrin semi-parametric approach 
  In the process of estimating TFP by LP-approach, we apply the 
Cobb-Douglas production function, which takes industrial value-added (𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡) 
as output, capital (𝐾𝑖𝑡) and employees (𝐿𝑖𝑡) as input. The econometric model is 
defined as follows: 
 
𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡  (A-D-1), 
 
where subscripts i, t denote firm and year, respectively; 𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡  refers to 
industrial value-added, 𝐿𝑖𝑡 refers to freely variable input employees (labor), 
and 𝐾𝑖𝑡  refers to the state variable capital; The error items has two 
components: 𝜔𝑖𝑡 denotes the “productivity shocks” which can observed by 
firm (but not econometrician) and impacts the firm’s inputs choice, leading to 
the well-known “simultaneity bias”; 𝜉𝑖𝑡 is an unexpected “productivity shocks” 
that is unobserved by both firm and econometrician, which is uncorrelated with 
firm’s inputs choice. All variables are deflated as mentioned in Section 3.2.. 
  Demand for intermediate inputs 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is assumed to depend on 𝐾𝑖𝑡 and 𝜔𝑖𝑡,  
 
𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖𝑡(𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝜔𝑖𝑡)  (A-D-2), 
 
  This demand function is monotonically increasing in 𝜔𝑖𝑡 (see Levinsohn 
and Petrin, 2003) which allows the inversion of intermediate demand function, 
so the unobservable productivity term 𝜔𝑖𝑡 can be solely as a function of two 
observed inputs 𝐾𝑖𝑡 and 𝑀𝑖𝑡 in the following 
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𝜔𝑖𝑡 =  𝜔𝑖𝑡
−1(𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡)  (A-D-3), 
 
where 𝜔𝑖𝑡
−1(∙) is the reverse function of 𝑀𝑖𝑡(∙) 
 
  Following Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) also assume 
that the firm productivity follows a first-order Markov process.  
 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 =  𝐸[(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖,𝑡−1)] +  𝜏𝑖𝑡 (A-D-4), 
 
where 𝜏𝑖𝑡 is an innovation to productivity that is uncorrelated with 𝐾𝑖𝑡 , but 
not necessarily with  𝜏𝑖𝑡 , which is part of the source of the simultaneity 
problem. 
  Let’s redefine the econometric model as follows, 
 
𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 (A-D-5), 
 
𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛷𝑖𝑡(𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡) + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 (A-D-6), 
 
where 𝛷𝑖𝑡(𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔
−1(𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡)  and 𝛷𝑖𝑡(∙)  is 
approximated with a third-order polynomial series in 𝐾𝑖𝑡 and 𝑀𝑖𝑡,  
 
𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑠𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝑗
𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑠3−𝑗
𝑠=0
3
𝑗=0 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡    (A-D-7), 
 
where 𝛽0 is not separately identified from the intercept of 𝛷𝑖𝑡(∙), 
then the partial linear in Eq. (A-D-7) can be estimated by OLS. This is the first 
stage of the estimation routine of LP-approach, where the consistent estimators 
of 𝛽𝐿 and 𝛷𝑖𝑡 (up to the intercept) can be obtained. 
  The second stage is to identify the coefficient 𝛽𝐾. First, the estimated value 
of 𝛷𝑖𝑡 should be obtained as  
 
𝛷𝑖?̂? =  𝑉𝐴𝑖?̂? − 𝛽?̂?𝐿𝑖𝑡    (A-D-8), 
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  For any candidate value 𝛽𝐾
∗ , the predictors for 𝜔𝑖𝑡
−1 (up to a scalar constant) 
can be obtained by equations as follows, 
 
𝜔𝑖?̂? =  𝛷𝑖?̂? − 𝛽𝐾
∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑡  (A-D-9), 
 
  Using this values, a consistent (nonparametric) approximation to  
 𝐸[(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖,𝑡−1)] is given by the predicted values from the following regression 
 
𝜔𝑖?̂? = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝜔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝜔𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾3𝜔𝑖,𝑡−1
3 + 𝜛𝑖𝑡  (A-D-10), 
 
  LP take 𝜔𝑖𝑡 as 𝐸[(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖,𝑡−1)]
̂ . 
  According to (A-D-3) and (A-D-4), given 𝛽?̂? , 𝛽𝐾
∗  and 𝐸[(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖,𝑡−1)]
̂ ,  
Levinsohn and Petrin obtain the sample residual of the production function as  
 
𝜉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖𝑡̂ = 𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽?̂?𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝐾
∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸[(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖,𝑡−1)]
̂   (A-D-11), 
 
The estimate 𝛽?̂? of 𝛽𝐾 is defined as the solution to  
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝛽𝐾
∗
∑ (𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽?̂?𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝐾
∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸[(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖,𝑡−1)]
̂ )
2
𝑖𝑡   (A-D-12) , 
 
which can be minimized by a golden section search algorithm via Stata. The 
standard errors of 𝛽?̂? and 𝛽?̂? are obtained by bootstrap approach. In our study, 
the replication is 500 times. 
 
Appendix E.  The estimation results of predicted model (Eq. (5-6))  
Variable Dependent variable: INO 
  
 ANP 4.543*** 
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(0.025) 
Intercept 2.388*** 
 
(0.017) 
IND Yes 
RE Yes 
Observations 1250187 
R-squared 0.153 
Log likelihood -2659604.1 
Notes: (1) ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2). This specification 
is estimated by OLS approach. 
 
 
